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Cosmopolitanism has become highly influential in political theory, philosophy, 
sociology and other disciplines over the past several decades. In political theory, 
cosmopolitans have given strong emphasis to universal moral principles and relatively 
strong duties which cross national boundaries. Thus, many cosmopolitan prescriptions 
would require some significant changes in attitude and actions from the status quo. 
Because of this, one of the persistent challenges to the practical application of 
cosmopolitan principles has been in identifying ways to motivate support for them. This 
thesis develops a possible answer to the problem of cosmopolitan motivation, in the form 
of a rooted cosmopolitanism which gives emphasis to the roles that ‘cosmopolitan 
ambassadors’ could play. The Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach presented here 
emphasizes ways in which support for domestic policy consistent with cosmopolitanism 
could be generated through (a) highlighting and reinforcing the cosmopolitan strains 
within existing national traditions and (b) by demonstrating how the ideas of revered 
national figures connect in significant ways with cosmopolitan principles. The theory is 
applied in the context of policy action to combat harmful climate change. The exemplar 
state is India, and the exemplar ambassador is Mahatma Gandhi. The thesis establishes 
important connections between cosmopolitan theory and Gandhi’s highly influential 
thought on social change and ethical life practices. It shows how such connections could 
be used in the Indian context. The final chapter indicates some other contexts where 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism, which stipulates the equal moral worth of individuals all across 
societies and grants no ultimate moral significance to the nation-state, has become a 
leading approach in normative political theory. Yet, cosmopolitans have faced a 
persistent challenge in showing that their moral postulates, including often demanding 
global duties of justice, can be translated into meaningful and effective action. This thesis 
explores the question of moral motivation in the context of cosmopolitan normative 
theory. It seeks to identify how support might be generated for domestic policy outcomes 
that are consistent with cosmopolitanism. It argues that one way of realizing such 
objectives can be by highlighting connections between cosmopolitanism and influential 
domestic systems of thought, especially thought promoted by revered national figures, 
whom, I will call 'Cosmopolitan Ambassadors.'  
 In other words, the focus of this thesis is on some possible means of shortening 
‘moral distance’ and generating realistic action by invoking the cosmopolitan elements of 
national cultures, through references to the moral and political teachings and exemplary 
life practices of the revered and iconic figures identifiable across cultural and political 
landscapes.  ‘Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism’ seeks to highlight and reinforce the 
cosmopolitan strains within existing national traditions of moral and/or religious 
thought by invoking the teachings and life practices of some of the revered and iconic 
personalities. The exemplar offered in this thesis is Mahatma Gandhi. I explore the 
potential for drawing on his work and life practices to help motivate support for domestic 




policies consistent with cosmopolitanism, specifically, policies relating to harmful 
climate change in the Indian context.  
1.2. Central Research Question  
 
The proposed research is an attempt to highlight the intersections and consistencies that 
exists between moral Cosmopolitanism and strands of humanistic traditions, deeply 
rooted in the cultural and philosophic traditions of societies across the World. The main 
focus of my research thus, is on examining and exploring ways in which moral 
Cosmopolitan thinking could be made action oriented. I argue that one plausible way of 
doing so is by identifying the consistent strands from the ethical and moral preaching of 
revered icons, and synchronising cosmopolitan prescriptions with them. The central 
research question therefore can be framed as ‘how might we motivate individuals and 
communities to undertake action consistent with moral cosmopolitan prescriptions in 
the context of climate change? This becomes pertinent given the fact that resolving 
vexed issues like climate change demands willingness and readiness both on the part of 
individuals and communities to undertake significant sacrifices.  
In other words, the focus of this thesis is on actualising cosmopolitan 
prescriptions especially in the context of climate change. I argue that one plausible 
way of doing so could be by building on the consistent ideas of iconic leaders 
(Ambassadors) and the veneration that exists for them in their respective socio-
cultural contexts.  
 




The thesis takes as its starting point two understandings. The first is that statism 
and related nationalist sentiments are persistent phenomena and can contribute to 
collective action challenges to realizing meaningful action on issues afflicting humanity 
at large. The second is that the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change demand 
urgent action and a solution to such collective action problems. The thesis then seeks to 
show that a cosmopolitan approach to distributing the burdens and benefits of addressing 
harmful climate change is morally the most defensible. It offers Ambassadorial 
Cosmopolitanism as a path to generating support for cosmopolitan climate change 
policies which, in being rooted in influential domestic ideas, is able to generate and 
sustain the required motivational impetus to actualize cosmopolitan prescriptions. 
In this introduction, I will first offer a very brief account of the threats posed by 
climate change. I will then offer a detailed definition of cosmopolitanism, presenting 
some of its variants and specifying problems of cosmopolitan moral motivation. I will 
close by offering a general overview of the arguments I will make in each chapter.   
1.3.  The Context of Climate Change 
The next chapter will give detailed background information on harmful climate change 
and attempts by states to address it through multilateral negotiations. Here, I will offer 
details aimed at reinforcing the second understanding noted above, that climate change 
is a global threat demanding urgent action. 
 With a week to go in the year, the US National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) had already declared ‘2016 as the warmest year on record’. 
According to a state of climate report released by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 




Administration (NOAA), the US Federal Agency monitoring the climate and 
environment, ‘including 2015, 15 of the 16 warmest years on record have occurred 
during the 21st century [and] overall the global annual temperature has increased at an 
average rate of 0.07oC (0.13oF) per decade since 1880, and at an average rate of 0.17oC 
(0.31oF) per decade since 1970’1. The seriousness of the problem gets further reinforced 
by a comment from Lord Nicholas Stern, author of the famous 2006 Stern Report on 
climate change. Stern said ‘Looking back, I underestimated the risks. The planet and the 
atmosphere seem to be absorbing less carbon than we expected, and emissions are rising 
pretty strongly’.2  
There seems to be a remarkable scientific consensus on the consequences that 
follow from global climate change. Such apprehensions have been well confirmed by a 
series of reports published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a 
key agency of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). It is well established now that an average increase of one degree Fahrenheit 
could well be responsible for phenomenon such as large scale melting of glaciers and a 
consequent rise in sea levels, enduring heat waves, life-threatening weather conditions 
and a consequent harm to biodiversity, wildfires, crop failures leading to droughts, 
cyclones, tsunamis, and new forms of deadly diseases. The impacts of climate change are 
also expected to disproportionately affect the poor in developing states (IPCC 2014), 
                                                                 
1 NOAA National Centres for Environmental Information, State of the Climate: Global Analysis for 
Annual 2015, published online January 2016,  Available 
at:  http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201513. [Accessed on November 27, 2016] 
2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/27/nicholas-stern-climate-change-davos 
 




despite the fact that such states historically have had a very clean, (almost negligible) 
record of emitting greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
 This puts the issue in the locus of morality, ethics and ‘global justice’ (Dobson 
2006: 175; Gardiner 2011: 3; Caney 2005a: 748). According to Steve Vanderheiden ‘it 
entails a massive negative environmental externality created by world’s affluent to be 
disproportionately borne by those least responsible for it among the poor and future 
generations’ (Vanderheiden 2008, xiv).  
Along with this however, there is also a remarkable consensus amongst states, 
about the need of undertaking both precautionary, corrective as well as adaptive 
measures to slowdown, limit and possibly roll back the adverse impacts of climate 
change (Page 2012). Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC 1992) mandates adoption of measures that could prevent ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’  so as to prevent/limit its adverse 
impacts. While declaring the principles that should guide actions, Article 3 (UNFCCC 
1992) assigns supreme importance to equity as the guiding norm on which cooperative 
action between the actors be initiated for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind.  
Despite the existence of near consensus however, it is surprising to note that the 
corresponding action on part of the political communities to address the challenges has 
been relatively limited over the past two decades. These details have been discussed in in 
the next chapter. Many factors have been cited for such a failure ranging from the 
anarchic nature of sovereign state system and the inherent weak enforcement 
mechanisms of international laws, to the difficulty in identifying the real perpetrators,  as 




in states, governments, communities, groups or individuals and fixing corresponding 
responsibilities (Humphreys 2010). Other factors such as the extraterritorial nature of the 
problem and the lack of resources especially in the developing states in dealing with it 
have also been highlighted.  
1.4.  The Moral Aspects of Climate Change 
A problem such as harmful climate changes raises a wide range of moral issues. I will 
note some here, as a preface to introducing more fully the cosmopolitan approach, which 
is defended in this thesis as the most apt moral approach for application in the climate 
change context, among a range of others involving global problems.  
 According to Aron Maltais (2008: 597) ‘the problem of anthropogenic global 
warming environmental problem has bound us together worldwide in a morally distinct 
way as we now face a set of exceedingly difficult global collective action problems both 
between states and generations that give rise to duty of justice to create new political 
project to address the human impact on our climate’ . Stephan Gardiner uses the 
metaphor of ‘A Perfect Moral Storm’, arguing that climate change is ‘most centrally an 
ethical failure, and one that implicates our institutions, our moral and political theories,  
and ultimately ourselves, considered as moral agents (Gardiner 2011, 3).  
Three related and mutually reinforcing factors (storms) face the world, according 
to Gardiner, namely (a) serious asymmetries in power between states  that enable the 
affluent states as well as affluent citizens to induce harm to the world’s poor people, (b) 
the way the current generation is forcing negative externalities or harms onto future 
generations from their own self-interested activity, and (c) the failure to generate a 




satisfactory and robust principle to resolve the climate conundrum. Together, these act as 
‘obstacles to our ability to behave ethically’ (Gardiner 2011: 7). 
Along with the factors mentioned by Gardiner above, I include the following: (1) 
temporal and spatial distance (2) moral disengagement and (3) moral distance. Whilst 
the temporal distance refers to the catastrophic impacts expected in future, the spatial 
distance concerns the physical separateness of the places from where bulk of emissions 
have originated and those that are likely to be worst impacted. The planetary reach and 
intergenerational span of climate change, along with the uncertainties in the magnitude, 
intensity, time scale etc., renders difficult not only the fixing of responsibilities but also 
undertaking of compensatory or remedial actions (Gardiner 2013:224). Further, diffusing 
of the identities mean that climate change cannot be seen as a ‘morally intense’ resulting 
in a corresponding lack of motivation to resolve (see Jamieson 2006: 476-77).  
The temporal and spatial dimensions of the climate change challenge also open 
up the problem of moral disengagement by seeming to absolve agents from moral 
responsibility. Similarly, the belief that the impacts would be on distant places and time 
(later generations) not only dilutes the development of strong sensibilities for the 
potential victims, it also deflates the moral urgency involved in resolving the issue 
(Markowitz and Shariff 2012). The dilution of evidence thus augments moral 
disengagement by building support for a business-as-usual scenario resulting in 
continued emissions, amid the idealization of conspicuously consumptive lifestyles.    
The issue of moral distance is also closely linked to the problems of the tempo-
spatial dimension of climate change.  Since the impacts of climate change are in distant 
places and on distant people, addressing them requires bridging of divides between ‘us’ 




and ‘them. It is in this context that issues of particularism and universalism and the need 
to create balances between them become important.  
Moral framing of climate concerns thus not only impels us to examine who is the 
subject of moral concern, i.e. individuals, communities, groups or collectives, states 
(Barry et al 2013), it also underlines the urgency of acting, as the projected impacts are 
expected to be most severe and in many cases catastrophic on the world’s most 
vulnerable people (Humphrey 2010). In fact, in many regions of the world, the 
catastrophic impacts of climate change have already become visible. We can gain further 
moral clarity, a number of theorists have argued, by understanding the threats in terms of 
the violation of basic human rights of those impacted particularly, the poor and the 
vulnerable (see Brooks et al 2005; Caney 2006a; 2008; 2009; 2010b; Barry & Woods 
2009; Humphrey 2010; Bell 2011; Brandstedt and Bergman 2013). As Bell asserts, ‘If 
anthropogenic climate change threatens to violate these basic rights, [right to life, 
physical security, subsistence and health] each one of us has [at least] a duty to pay his or 
her fair share of the costs of preventing anthropogenic climate change’ (Bell 2011: 100).  
As noted, the thesis will offer a cosmopolitan approach as the most defensible for 
determining a fair distribution of burdens and benefits in mitigation and adaptation 
efforts related to harmful climate change. Chapters 3 and 4 will make that case in detail, 
presenting reasons to adopt a rights-based cosmopolitanism. The next section offers 
some background details on the cosmopolitan tradition which should be useful in 
clarifying its major precepts and situating the overall argument of this thesis on 
generating support for cosmopolitan aims. 




1.5.  Introducing Cosmopolitanism  
As noted, cosmopolitanism holds that all individuals have equal moral worth, and that 
states or other collectivities have no fundamental moral significance. More specifically, 
three cardinal principles, individualism, universality and generality constitute the bedrock 
of cosmopolitanism. These are specified in the following passage from the work of 
Thomas Pogge, who is perhaps the most influential recent cosmopolitan moral theorist:       
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, 
individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or 
persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or 
religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of 
concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or 
citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern 
attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some 
subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, 
generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate 
units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, 
fellow religionists, or suchlike (Pogge 2008:175). 
Thus, under the first principle cosmopolitans prioritize individuals to the state or 
any other social political formations. The second principle emphasizes the equality of 
moral status held by all individuals, irrespective of their identities or geographical 
locations. The third principle stresses on the interdependence and quintessential linkages 
between individuals, and in reference to the first two implies that the ambit of 
responsibilities and duties that individuals have towards each other goes well beyond the 
socio-political and geographical identities by which they are ordinarily bound (see also 
Jones 2001:15; Beitz 1999; 2005; Caney 2005b: 4).  
Stan Van Hooft observes that ‘cosmopolitanism is a demanding moral position. It 
urges us, whether as citizens or occupants of position of political leadership, to embrace 




the whole world into our moral concerns and apply the standards of impartiality and 
equity across boundaries of nationality, race, religion or ethnicity in a way that would 
have been unheard of even fifty years ago,’ (Van Hooft 2009:8). The approach thus 
posits firm duties across national boundaries, and cosmopolitans hold that at times, (in 
exigencies or extreme vulnerabilities), duties owed to non-compatriots can be much 
more stringent than those owed to co-citizens (see Brock 2005; Cabrera 2009:3).  
Further, as Simon Caney notes, cosmopolitans may broadly affirm the three core 
principles but differ considerably on their moral prescriptions (Caney 2005b:4). Some 
adopt, for example, a utilitarian approach which seeks to enhance global welfare in the 
aggregate, while others endorse a rights-based which focuses on securing at least the 
most basic rights for all individuals (Caney 2005b:5).  My own arguments about 
cosmopolitan motivation are informed by Caney’s right based cosmopolitan 
understandings, which I will elaborate in chapter four of this thesis. Caney further 
delineates the differences between moral institutional and cultural variants of 
cosmopolitanism (2010b:146-163) to which I will return shortly below in section (1.5) 
but for the sake of continuity of arguments here it is worth mentioning Charles Jones 
who following Charles Beitz (1994: 123-36) adds ‘impartiality’ is as a distinct feature of 
cosmopolitanism (Jones 2001: 15).  
As a moral theory, cosmopolitanism gained ascendency after the end of the Cold 
War, when a number of theorists saw it as providing the necessary normative grounding 
for a globalized world order (Delanty 2006: 36-38; Van Hooft 2009). The overall 




tradition, of course, has its genesis in ancient philosophy (Cohen and Fine 2002; Pagden 
2000; Van Hooft 2009: 14).  
Diogenes, the Cynic (412-323 BC), who declared that he was a ‘citizen of the 
world’ and spent a lifetime challenging local custom, is often cited as a seminal early 
source of cosmopolitan thought (Nussbaum 2002: 6-8). His work inspired Stoicism - a 
school of philosophy that around 300 BC in Athens very systematically articulated and 
defended the ideas and visions of ‘a world city’ and ‘a world Citizen’. Zeno (334/33-262-
61 BC) of the Stoic school was perhaps the most passionate exponent of 
cosmopolitanism. Stoicism emphasized the innate rationality of men, who being 
children of God, shared his common attribute of reason. Thus, all were connected in a 
global human community, or were citizens of the world obeying the ‘law of the nature’ 
(Ramaswami 2015). In fact, similar ideas can also be found in non-western ancient 
philosophy. Particular reference in this context could be made to the ancient Indian 
Sanskrit phrase of ‘Vasudeva Kutumbakum’ which in terms of its literal translation in 
English language means ‘the world is one family’. 
In the Middle Ages the writings of William of Ockham and Dante kept 
cosmopolitan ideas alive. Dante went beyond an imagined human community to argue 
for a world government in the form of confederation of states under a global monarch 
(Ramaswami 2015:225). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued for a broadly similar but 
weaker global confederation, and in his work cosmopolitan ideas blossomed and 
received their best and perhaps the most fervent endorsement (Kleingeld, 1999). In his 
famous essay ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ (1795), Kant outlines his liberal 




cosmopolitan confederation of states.  Kant hoped that sovereign states would willingly 
surrender their lawless freedom and become part of the confederation much the same 
way as the social contract theory envisages giving up of unregulated freedom to establish 
a political authority mandated to put an end to internal strife (Fine 2003).  
A citizen under the schema proposed by Kant would follow her local laws while 
simultaneously co-regarding cosmopolitan law. Slowly but steadily the contradictions 
between the local and the international law would cease and citizenship would acquire a 
universal status, and ‘the highest purpose of Nature will be at last realized in the 
establishment of a universal Cosmo-political Institution, in the bosom of which all 
original capacities and endowments of human species will be unfolded and developed (cf 
Linklater 1982:115). Kant however was not supportive of a binding world government, 
as he feared the concentration of powers in one authority -- a concern that characterizes 
cosmopolitan theorization even today, and perhaps is at the root of generating different 
interpretations (Scheffler 2001).   
The recently renewed focus on cosmopolitanism can be ascribed to many factors, 
but globalization is arguably the primary driver. Powered by the operation of a highly 
complex and interdependent global economic system, and ever continuing technological 
innovations in the fields of information technology and transportation, globalization has 
shaped the ways in which local, regional and national consciousness is framed and 
expressed. This has not only resulted in shrinking of time and space divides, famously 
expressed under the aphorisms ‘Global Village’ (McLuhan 1989), ‘Flat World’ 




(Friedman 2006) and ‘End of Geography’ (O’ Brien 1992), but has also led to massive 
convergences in sentiments.  
While the benefits of enhanced technology, trade and financial integrations 
cannot be denied (Johnson 2002; Bhagwati 2007), the tensions, dilemmas and crises 
arising out of its lopsided impacts and spread cannot be ignored (Solimano 2000). 
According to Stan Van Hooft  
the world is facing crises in global politics and international relations 
that have only recently begun to be discussed in the philosophical 
literature…because of globalization we all have a part to play in 
addressing problems of global governance, management of the 
environment, maintenance of peace, equitable global distribution of 
social goods and resources, humanitarian assistance, intercultural 
tolerance and understanding, and the protection of human dignity 
around the world. Accordingly, it could be claimed that we are 
“global citizens” and that we should develop a “global ethics” 
through which we can articulate and exercise our global 
responsibilities as such citizens’ (Van Hooft 2009: 2-3).  
 
Cosmopolitanism seeks to provide such a global ethics, and it is a particularly apt 
moral framework to apply to fully global problems such as climate change. The next 
section offers further details on variation in contemporary approaches to 
cosmopolitanism, and on problems of motivating compliance with cosmopolitan 
prescriptions in the absence of global cosmopolitan institutions. 
1.6. Cosmopolitanism and Climate Change 
It is significant to note that along with the ever growing consensus amongst the scientific 
community on the possible deleterious impacts of climate change, there is also a 
simultaneous realization amongst social scientists on the need of an encapsulating moral 




framework for grounding action specific to resolving its impacts. Turning to morality 
assumes utmost importance here as human actions and behavior patterns are much 
grounded on our moral beliefs. The need thus settles down to the development of a 
motivating moral philosophy that is strong enough not just in encapsulating global 
worries but also equally robust in accommodating diverse local traditions within its 
folds. To a large extent, cosmopolitan ethics alongwith the idea of global justice - taking 
both individuals and states as the basic unit of concern – has been seen as being capable 
of providing the required moral framework (Harris 2010: chap 5).  
 According to Ulrich Beck ‘Climate change - like ancient cosmopolitanism 
(stoicism) the ius cosmopolitica of the Enlightenment (Kant) or crimes against humanity 
(Arendt, Jaspers) releases a cosmopolitan moment and momentum…tear down national 
borders and mix the local with the foreign, not as a consequence of migration but rather 
as a consequence of interconnectedness’ (Beck 2010: 259).  The transborder impacts of 
climate change imply that humans are bound together not just the ‘thinner’ chords of 
humanity (Linklater 2006) but by ‘thicker’ bonds of moral responsibilities and the 
requirements of Justice (Shue 2010, 2011; Dobson 2006; Caney 2005a, 2006a). The fact 
that the living conditions of people across political communituies are impacted by the 
acts of those with whom they share no social cultural or political space and that too, 
without their knowledge or participation, effectively creates ‘a cosmopolitan community 
of duties as well as rights’ (Elliott 2006: 350-351). According to Attfield (2006) only 
cosmopolitanism can do justice to the objective importance of all agents heeding ethical 
reasons. Such concerns have also been shared by Derek Heater (1996: 180) who argues 
that the relationships with the distant others cannot be only through the state if we are 




concerned about the ‘integrity of planetary life’. The point has further been endorsed by 
Simon Caney for whom any understanding of environmental justice must have a theory 
that encompasses the causes and consequences of climate change (Caney 2006: 53; 
Vanderheiden 2008:104). Accordingly, the imperative then is to work out duties of 
Justice involving ‘individual and institutiions who are interrelatted in a variety of 
different ways’ (Jamieson 2002:306). According to Paul Harris ‘cosmopolitanism as a 
moral framework, provides us ‘a pathway by which to escape the tragedy of the 
atmospheric commons.  
 Alongside the acceptance of the cosmopolitan framework however, arguments 
have also been advanced for actualising its theoretical concerns. I have provided details 
of literature on cosmolitan motivation in chapter 6 of this thesis but suffice is to say that 
the framing of such questions have normally been on two main accounts namely (1) 
causative - advanced as the harm principle (Poggee 2005,2008 ) i.e individuals have a 
moral duty not to harm each other and compensate for it wherever and whenever, the 
causality is tangibly substantiated and (2) morality – advanced as the humanity principle 
(Singer 1972, 2004; Campbell 1974), i.e the duty of providing help to sufferers wherever 
they may be. On both accounts the question of moral motivation becomes important as 
the application and execution of both causality and morality is significantly hindred by 
the operation of state sovereignity. I argue that given the extent of sacrifices that 
resolving the issues thrown open by climate change necessitates, neither causality nor 
humanity can provide the impetus required to resolve it. I instead, endore a rooted 
understanding of cosmoplitanism which in being sensitive to the needs of larger human 
communities, negotiates its way by strengthening and activising the traditional and 




cultural precsriptions of some of the revered and historic icons also seen as ambassadors 
or moral exemplars. 
1.7. Implementation and Compliance: Moral, Institutional and Cultural 
Cosmopolitanism 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will treat cosmopolitanism accounts as grouped under 
three broad sublabels: moral, institutional, and cultural. Moral cosmopolitanism is 
equivalent to the general cosmopolitan approach presented above. It emphasizes equal 
moral consideration for all persons, in line with principles of individualism, universality 
and generality. According to Brian Barry, the distinctiveness of moral cosmopolitanism,  
is in its denial that membership of a society is of deep moral 
significance when the claims that people can legitimately make on 
one another are assessed (Barry 2010:101) 
 
Consistent with this belief then is the demand for certain distributive principles for global 
equality of opportunity (Caney 2001, 2007) or a minimal level of guaranteed provision 
for all persons (Jones: 2001). The key is that moral cosmopolitanism is to be viewed as a 
set of principles for moral assessment, providing the backdrop against which 
international institutions and their practices are to be evaluated (Beitz 1994: 124). For 
Beitz, two primary features of the moral cosmopolitan outlook are: (1) decisions made in 
international practices should be focused on individuals who would be affected, rather 
than solely on how they would affect states or other collectivities; (2) the concerns 
should be fair and independent of various particularistic, state-based interests (Beitz 
1994: 124). Moral Cosmopolitans again believe that as humans, individuals are 
bestowed with certain natural moral duties and concerns towards each other which are 




both negative and positive in nature. Not unnecessarily harming the other (Linklater, 
1998), not supporting unjust institutions (Pogge, 2008) being compassionate and 
empathizing (Linklater, 1998) or attempting to create just social order (Jones, 2001) are 
clear examples of such duties. 
Institutional cosmopolitans argue that achieving cosmopolitan moral objectives 
require the creation of global institutions specifically devoted to those purposes. There is 
no unanimity on the nature and type of institution that would be required to achieve 
these objectives, and prescriptions range from endorsing the idea of world government 
(Cabrera: 2004; 2010), or somewhat less comprehensive schemes of global political 
integration (Pogge 2008, Ch.7; see Caney 2005b, Ch.5), to promoting more 
cosmopolitan aims at the regional level (Habermas 2006). According to Beitz, ‘the 
distinctive common feature is some ideal of world political organization in which states 
and state-like units have significantly diminished authority in comparison with the status 
quo and supranational institutions have more’ (Beitz 1994: 124). In simplest terms, 
institutional cosmopolitans look at the kind of governance structures that would be 
required at the global level to deal with some of the most pressing global issues of our 
times (Beardsworth 2011: 4). 
By contrast, cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on the spread of cultural norms 
and practices across borders. It views individuals as significantly moved by their cultural 
influences. It is not, however, static or dogmatic. On the contrary, the starting point of a 
cultural cosmopolitan perspective is the idea of ‘cultural fluidity’ (Scheffler 1999, 2007): 
that the identity of an individual is not confined to and shaped by any one particular 
culture but to many cultures with which she is connected on various counts. By adapting 




and accommodating different cultural practices, individuals demonstrate [the] ‘capacities 
that make it possible for human beings to create culture in the first place’ (Scheffler 1999: 
257). Cultures in this sense are open constructs, constantly adjusting and incorporating 
new ideas, and the focus of cultural cosmopolitanism thus is on promoting hybridity. A 
cosmopolitan life accordingly is one that is ‘lived in a kaleidoscope of cultures’ (Waldron 
1992:762).   
Each of the approaches has limitations. The most salient point to observe about 
moral cosmopolitanism would be that it does not demand large-scale institutional 
changes in the global system. It seeks to promote cosmopolitan outcomes within a 
system much like the present Westphalian one of independent sovereign states. A 
problem some have identified with the adoption of such an approach is in application, in 
seeing that the principles are translated into real behavioural practices. According to 
Andrew Dobson ‘there is indeed a motivational problem with these principles’ (Dobson 
2006: 165). 
Institutional cosmopolitanism seeks in part to answer compliance concerns 
through setting up global institutions to monitor, regulate and ensure cosmopolitan 
policy outcomes, e.g., transfers of resources, ensuring action on common problems.  It 
endorses restructuring of the existing state systems in a way that they fall within 
authoritative jurisdictions of just supranational institutions actually capable of ensuring 
the outcomes. These institutional ambitions however, create feasibility issues of their 
own. Achieving the kind of fully global integration that actually could achieve 
cosmopolitan aims could need many generations, and it might never be completely 
realized. It would face steep collective action problems, besides some significant North-




South problems. That is, developing states, especially those which were subject to 
colonization and/or imperialism, often view even existing global institutions as 
instruments of western hegemony and dominance. They could be expected to view much 
deeper global institutional integration through sceptical lenses. The Stalemates between 
developing and developed states over UN reforms, trade negotiations, lends support for 
such a claim. Even from the developed states perspectives, the institutional mechanisms 
do not offer much hope, especially when looked from the perspective of some of most 
recent political developments like the UK’s decision to part ways with the European 
Union (BREXIT). 
Cultural cosmopolitanism is sensitive to cultural particularities but 
simultaneously remains open to plurality of experiences and good human practices that 
can be developed through confluences. In the context of globalization, it helps us 
understand how multiple cultural influences can shape individual world views. 
However, reliance on cultural openness to promote cosmopolitan values, and especially 
cosmopolitan policy outcomes, can be problematic as well. This is because cultural 
openness and the transfer of cultural norms across state boundaries may have beneficial 
effects, but these also may be relatively weak. Or, they may amount to little more than 
‘consumer cosmopolitanism’, as some critics have suggested – an expansion of access to 
cultural menus for the global elite, but not a transformative dynamic that could promote 
acceptance of demanding moral cosmopolitan norms or duties (see Calhoun 2002). 
Further, in more conservative cultural contexts, a promotion of cultural 
cosmopolitanism in the form of outside influences could provoke alienation or trigger 
social distrust more than greater openness.  




1.8.  Rooted and Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism  
Having laid out the broad features as well as some limitations of three prevalent variants 
of cosmopolitanism, I will now turn to describe my favoured approach, ‘Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah, 2006). I see rooted cosmopolitanism as providing a way out 
of the abstractness and infeasibility which confront the moral, institutional and cultural 
approaches. I discuss this approach in some detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Here, I will 
present it in basic outline, as a way of contextualizing the overall argument of the thesis. 
Rooted cosmopolitan operates according to three primary suppositions: (1) human 
identities are constituted, situated and defined with reference to particularities; (2) 
elements of universalism can be located within particularistic traditions; (3) prioritizing 
duties and obligations to those with whom we have shared identities in no ways means a 
dilution of our cosmopolitan responsibilities. Whilst acceptance of the local attachments 
allows rooted cosmopolitanism to free itself from the accusations of abstractness, an 
emphasis on finding the universalistic elements within local traditions allows it to 
substantively retain its cosmopolitan content. In combination, it means that fulfilment of 
our particularistic responsibilities can be compatible with universal commitments and 
duties. The acceptance that the local and global responsibilities can coexist and conform 
to each other only adds to the feasibility quotient of rooted cosmopolitanism. According 
to Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘a cosmopolitanism with prospect must reconcile a kind of 
universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of partiality’ (Appiah 2006:223).  
 Though the rooted cosmopolitan approach comes off as a morally persuasive 
approach, certain issues still needs flagging. It is indeed true that individuals have very 
strong commitments and attachments to their local mores and traditions, and that their 




decisions relative to others depends on understanding of their own social context 
(MacIntyre 1988; Benhabib 1992:89). It is quite possible thus, that in certain cases, the 
non-rational markers of a community may simply blindfold them from undertaking their 
universal commitments, impeding the development of common sensibilities and 
agreements amongst communities which is so essential for triggering meaningful action 
on collective issues (Kymlicka 2003). Similarly, rights accorded to individuals are also to 
some extent community centric, in the sense that under a similar set of disagreeable 
circumstances, rights trade-offs seen as acceptable may be significantly different (Bell 
2006:61). In the absence of common moral consciousness or feeling of communal 
belonging (Kymlicka 2001: 225), it is not clear how the sacrifices demanded for resolving 
vexed collective action problems can be made and enforced. Further, it is also true that 
local practices in themselves do not constitute a homogeneous core, which means that 
the need first, would be to have a syncretic understanding of the local, for a possible 
alignment with the universal principles of cosmopolitanism.  
In other words, the need then is to be able to bring out the cosmo-political aspects 
of local cultural traditions and apply them in ways capable of generating support for 
more cosmopolitan solutions. It is in this context that ambassadorial cosmopolitanism 
offers help. I see cosmopolitan ambassadors as popular figures who are flag bearers of 
indigenous traditions, but who also, by providing syncretic interpretation of the local, 
facilitate its transcendence to the universal. As powerful anchors of popular sentiment, 
these individuals hold immense persuasive capabilities to catalyse meaningful collective 
action. The iconic status of the cosmopolitan ambassadors thus makes them both the 
agents and stewards of change. Their stature and the influence of their thought, and its 




connections to cosmopolitan moral principles, are such that it would be feasible to adopt 
cosmopolitan ambassadors in working to generate support for cosmopolitan policy 
outcomes. 
1.8.1. Gandhi: A Cosmopolitan Ambassadaor  
In the particular context of climate change in India, I take Mahatma Gandhi as an 
ambassador of cosmopolitanism. While Gandhi did not set out to formulate any 
particular form of cosmopolitan theory, a coherent rooted cosmopolitan theory is 
embedded in his moral and political principles and practices. Gandhi’s emphasis on 
nonviolence as a means actually arise out of his convictions regarding the essential unity 
and interdependence of the biotic community of which individuals were a part of. 
Further, an emphatic sense of global human community is evident in Gandhi’s political 
thinking. As India’s leading nationalist, Gandhi, waged a prolonged nonviolent battle 
against colonialism, but throughout his life, he never displayed any ill feeling or hosti li ty 
towards the colonizers (George 2010:69).  Gandhi’s life practices resonate strongly with 
cosmopolitanism and could be highlighted in promoting domestic support for actions 
consistent with cosmopolitanism in the context of climate change mitigation in India.  
More specifically, Gandhi’s cardinal concepts of Ahimsa (nonviolence), Satyagraha 
(soul force), and Swaraj (self-rule) each connect in significant ways to cosmopolitan 
thought.  Whilst, the political connotation of Swaraj meant self-rule and political 
independence, for Gandhi, Swaraj in ethical sense, implied self-control, and contentment 
from worldly illusions (read materialism). A swarajist (follower of swaraj) is expected to 




undergo internal self-purification to be a Jitendriya (overcome worldly materialistic 
desires) in order to transform herself into a moral agent capable of understanding the 
dignity and equality of the other. Swadeshi dwells on self-reliance and Sarvodaya not only 
calls for the upliftment of the weakest of the weak but argues for an integrated way of 
life, with all elements in sync with the other.3 Emphasizing the purity of means, it 
appeals to one to be a karmayogi (duty bearer).  A karmayogi is well aware of his/her 
responsibilities not just with the fellow beings but also remains guarded in terms of the 
consequences his/her action would have on the nature and other beings.  This feeling of 
companionship is the foundation on which Gandhian ethics stands and could provide 
the required motivational impetus to cosmopolitan principles. It dwells not just upon 
restraints but more than that it focuses on responsibility.  
 
To see the all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to 
love the meanest of creation as oneself.... Identification with all that lives 
is impossible without self-purification; without self-purification, the 
observance of the law of Ahimsa must remain an empty dream. (Gandhi 
1927, 453)  
 
I will argue that given the veneration Gandhi enjoys amongst Indians, highlighting 
such principles and their connections to cosmopolitanism, along with his more explicit 
statements on a global human community, could help to reinforce ways in which policy 
prescriptions on climate change which are consistent both with moral cosmopolitanism 
                                                                 
3 Hinduism stresses that human as well as all other creations draws from Panchbhuta or the five elemnts of 
life. These are Prithvi (Earth), Jal (Water), Agni (Fire), Vayu (Air), and Aakash (Aether). The first four 
elements are symbolic of the material world whereas the fifth signifies the non-material world. On death a 
body gets dissolved back in them.    




and an influential body of thought in Indian culture and politics. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
1.9. The Structure of the Argument 
The thesis will seek to elaborate and address the problem of cosmopolitan moral 
motivation as follows: Chapter 2 offers background detail on the problem of harmful 
climate change and the efforts made by states and international community to address it.  
The chapter highlights how attempts towards resolving the problem have been plagued 
by short-term and narrow state interests, rather than being marked by a concern for the 
welfare of the biotic community as a whole.  
Chapters 3 and 4 address issues of fairness, effectiveness and motivation, all of 
which are critically important in resolving a vexed issue as climate change is. Since 
resolving the impacts of climate change demands that both the developing and developed 
states share mitigation related burdens, or take additional responsibilities for adaptations, 
it is crucial to be able to identify an equitable distribution of burdens and benefits. 
Chapter 3 thus attempts to provide an appropriate normative framework for approaching 
climate change. It surveys and critically engages some prominent approaches to 
establishing fair burden sharing in climate mitigation, including principles which have 
informed some prominent past proposals or agreements.  
Chapter 4 details and defends a hybrid cosmopolitan approach to climate fairness 
as the most coherent and morally defensible for determining fair distributions of burdens. 
A hybrid approach seeks to hold polluters appropriately to account, while also allocating 
responsibilities to those able to contribute, while prioritizing the basic rights of the most 




vulnerable globally to be protected against the harmful effects of climate change. The 
approach is notable for its sensitivity to human rights, conferment of responsibilities on a 
broad range of actors, and most significantly, for appropriately focusing on both the 
responsibility and ability of agents. It is also highly practical, in that it takes into account 
the full range of moral complexities associated with climate change, including historical 
wrongs and the developmental rights and priorities of the poor, principles of national 
sovereignty and the structural inequalities that characterize the power relations between 
states. The hybrid approach has been presented as an exemplar cosmopolitan approach 
for addressing the problems of harmful climate change. 
Chapter 5 begins the discussion of motivating support for cosmopolitan policies 
and outcomes. It details and critically engages some leading accounts of motivation in 
the cosmopolitan literature. These include ones which focus on the development of 
empathy and understanding for distant others, and on highlighting harms caused to 
others through routine actions which ostensibly support an unjust global order.  The 
chapter develops the argument that moral concerns must be connected to possible and 
feasible political action. It makes the case for rooted cosmopolitanism as the most 
promising variant for generating support, with emphasis on the ambassadorial version. 
The main objective of the chapter is to show that it is possible indeed, to provide a 
motivational impetus to moral cosmopolitan concerns within existing institutions by 
highlighting those particularities within specific cultures that have the potential of 
triggering our universal commitments and duties.  
Chapters 6 and 7 then aim to show how the rooted, ambassadorial approach to 
cosmopolitan moral motivation could be applied to the politics of climate change, 




specifically in the Indian context. As noted, this involves an exploration of the 
potentially transformative influence of the political thought and exemplary life practices 
of Mahatma Gandhi. Chapter 6 provides a sketch of salient biographical details from 
Gandhi’s life and career. It also provides the core tenets of his still highly influential 
social thought, emphasizing the cosmopolitan strains in it. I portray Gandhi as 
potentially an exemplar Cosmopolitan Ambassador – a thought leader whose ideas 
resonate with cosmopolitanism and could be employed in social and political discourse 
to help generate support for policy outcomes consistent with cosmopolitanism.  
Chapter 7 offers an application of the Gandhian ambassadorial cosmopolitan 
framework developed in Chapter 6, showing how Gandhian thought could be deployed 
in the context of India’s actions in relation to climate change mitigation. It discusses the 
changes India would need to make to fulfil its commitments under the Paris Climate 
Treaty, which in fact is consistent in many ways with the demands of a hybrid 
cosmopolitan approach to distributing the burdens and benefits of climate change 
mitigation. It then examines how Gandhian ideas could be used to help generate support 
among the Indian population for shouldering the burdens that would be necessary to 
meet climate commitments.  
 Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter of this thesis, which apart from 
recapitulating the major arguments made in the preceding chapters also offers some very 
important questions for future research and identifies some other contexts in which 
ambassadorial cosmopolitanism might be applied.   
 





Overall, the thesis seeks to show that many issues raised by motivational critics of 
cosmopolitanism could be addressed through an emphasis on cosmopolitan strains in 
vernacular moral traditions. It argues that the normative credibility and acceptance of 
cosmopolitanism in the contemporary world much depends on the extent to which it is 
able to answer some of the most pressing global collective action issues. These include 
the issue of resource usage, sharing burdens of environmental harms, right to 
development and so on. In grappling with these issues, from a feasibility point of view, 
cosmopolitanism requires innovative and novel constructs such as ‘ambassadorial 
cosmopolitanism’ which in being logically consistent with its overarching aims is also 











2. Climate Change: Impacts and 
Impasse 
2.1. Introduction 
In the foothills of the snow-clad mountains, the Himalayas, lies the Indian State of 
Uttarakhand. Also, known as Dev Bhoomi or the Land of the Gods, it is host to the four 
sacred Hindu shrines of Gangotri, Yamunotri, Kedarnath and Badrinath. Numerous 
Hindu devotees (almost half a million) from all across the length and breadth of the 
country, as well as from the other parts of the world, undertake a long and arduous 
mountainous trek every summer to offer their obeisance and prayers to the Gods so as to 
achieve spiritual salvation. Of the four sacred shrines, the temple of Lord Shiva at 
Kedarnath is understood as the most consecrated one4. Set in the picturesque Garhwal 
valley, with the Chorbari Glacier atop it, the temple at Kedarnath is located at a height 
of almost 3583 meters above sea level and remains inaccessible for the major part of the 
year, opening only during summers (May to October) when people undertake a long and 
testing uphill trek of 14 kilometres to reach it.  
On June 16 and 17, 2013, however, the entire Kedarnath valley turned into a site 
of catastrophe and severe misery after it was lashed by intense and unprecedented 
rainfall. The average rainfall in the Kedarnath valley in the preceding five years 
measured 71.3 mm/day, but in the first eighteen days of June 2013, it went up by 400 
percent to 385.1 mm (Dobhal et al., 2013).  The intense downpour resulted in faster 
melting of the Chorbari Glacier, which in turn caused a glacier lake outburst, massively 
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flooding the rivers Mandakini and Saraswati. The waters of the river Mandakini gushed 
into the valley at tremendous speed, sweeping and swallowing anything and everything 
that came on its way. The floods and the accompanying landslides are estimated to have 
killed at least 10,000 people, though the actual number may never be known, as 
numerous settlements, villages and hamlets still remain buried under silt and debris.  
These details are presented here because there are indications that the 
catastrophic rains in the Kedarnath valley were caused by changes in the heating patterns 
of the Tibetan Plateau north of the Himalayas (Madhura et al., 2015). Researchers at 
Stanford University have similarly established strong linkages between climate change 
and the unprecedented flash floods that struck the Kedarnath Valley in June 2013 (Singh 
et al., 2014).  In fact, a growing number of climate scientists have warned in recent years 
that India and other states will increasingly be threatened by such super-storms as the 
effects of human-caused climate change increase (IPCC 2013).  Just a week before the 
flash floods, a report prepared for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research and Climate Analytics very clearly outlined India’s increasing 
susceptibility to extreme weather phenomenon such as variable and erratic monsoons, 
destructive flash floods and enduring heat waves (World Bank 2013).  
Further, a study of meteorological data (Rao et al., 2004; Kothawale and Kumar 
2005) has confirmed that the rise in annual mean temperature over India is consonant 
with the increase in global surface temperature (Rajeevan, et al., 2008). The relationship 
between extreme weather conditions and climate change has also been very recently 
highlighted by James Hansen who concludes that the likelihood of extreme weather 
conditions would have been ‘exceedingly small’ but for global warming (Hansen et al., 
2012). Similar studies elsewhere, linking the average rise in earth’s temperature to 




extreme weather conditions, only confirm the possibilities of reoccurrence of such 
conditions and along with it the devastating impacts of climate change.5 
Whilst local factors such as deforestation, soil erosion and other adverse effects of 
unsustainable and unplanned developmental activities in the valley, along with poorly 
managed infrastructure, also aggravated the tragedy, climatologists have increasingly 
referred to the deluge and many other similar disasters ( the floods in  Mumbai and 
Chennai in the year 2005 and 2015 respectively, as well as the ever increasing frequency 
of droughts across the Indian subcontinent), to highlight further potential calamities that 
could result from continued climate change. In fact, a study conducted by the Council on 
Energy Environment and Water (CEEW), India’s premier climate and energy research 
group, has found a substantial causal relationship between climate change and 131 major 
incidences of flooding, 51 instances of cyclones, 21 cases of heat and cold waves, and 
many other incidences of droughts in different parts of India (Dholakia 2015).  
The threats faced by India from climate change are felt and shared, albeit on 
different scales and manner, by almost all the states in the world – from low lying states 
such as Maldives, Bangladesh, and almost two dozen island states in the Caribbean; to 
the temperate zone states of the Northern hemisphere, to the ones located in the dry and 
semi-arid climatic locations of Africa. The impacts of climate change are both 
geographically dispersed and dramatically divergent. In the forthcoming chapters of this 
thesis I will attempt to uncover the normative significance of the impacts, on my way to 
suggesting the ways in which cosmopolitan moral theory could contribute to addressing 
                                                                 
5 A very recent study by Seth Westra at the University of Adelaide reveals that not only have the chances 
of extreme rainfall been increasing over the last millennium, but they are becoming more and more intense 
and recurrent. ‘If extreme rainfall events continue to intensify, we can expect to see floods occurring more  
frequently around the world…most of these tropical countries are very poor and thus not well placed to 
adapt to the increased risk of flooding, which puts them in a larger threat of devastation’. For details see 
http://theconversation.com/increases-in-rainfall-extremes-linked-to-global-warming-11933 




harmful global climate change. My immediate purpose in this chapter, however, is to 
present a brief description of the phenomenon of climate change and the enormity of the 
problem posed by it. The chapter will provide important context on climate change and 
the efforts made by states and international community to address it. I will conclude by 
arguing that these efforts have been caused by the short term and narrow state centric 
interests, not by a concern for the good and welfare of the biotic community as a whole.  
2.2. Understanding Climate Change 
The phrases ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ are meant to denote the same 
phenomenon, i.e., an increase in the average temperature that is caused by human 
activity. Initially, Global warming was the preferred phrase (due to temperature 
increases), but owing to the fact that the impacts are variable (e.g. dry areas becoming 
more dry, wet areas becoming more wet; also, the potential of the reversal of the gulf 
stream resulting in an ice age in Europe) the term ‘climate change’ has been adopted by 
most scientists as more accurate than warming and will be used here. Climate change 
thus as a phrase is frequently used to narrate the extremely complex, erratic and harsh 
variability in Earth’s weather conditions exemplified by heat waves, hurricanes, 
tsunamis, cloud bursts, flash floods, rise in the sea levels, early arrival of spring, heavy 
snowfalls, droughts, fires etc. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) refers to it as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time 




periods’6. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) similarly defines it as 
‘a statistically significant variation in the mean state of the climate or its variability, 
persisting for an extended period’, typically decades or even longer’ (IPCC 2001:788)7.  
I will use the definition given by the IPCC for two reasons. Firstly, the IPCC, about 
which I will provide further details in the following sections, is the most authentic and 
universally accepted scientific and intergovernmental body, exclusively mandated by the 
United Nations to provide a systematic and objective understanding of climate change 
and its potential socio-economic and political impacts. Secondly, the assessments of the 
IPCC are wider, as it takes natural internal processes, as well as the external forcing or 
the persistent anthropogenic changes, into account in outlining the composition of the 
atmosphere or land use (IPCC: 2001).  
  Climate change is a product of the ever-increasing rise in Earth’s atmospheric 
temperature over the last millennium and to more alarming levels in the present period.  
The earth’s atmosphere has gases such as Water Vapour (H2O), Carbon dioxide (CO2) 
Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O) and Halocarbons and Ozone (O3) which allow 
sunlight to enter the earth’s atmosphere but act as a blanket to prevent heat from 
escaping it. The blanket formed is scientifically referred to as the greenhouse effect.  
Though most of the sun’s energy is absorbed by the oceans and land, the greenhouse 
effect is a natural phenomenon that keeps earth’s surface warm to support life forms on 
it. It is believed that without the natural greenhouse effect the average temperature of th e 
                                                                 
6 UNFCCC, Article 1, Para 2, 1992) [Online] Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.  [September 13, 2013]. 
 
7 Climate change, as defined here, may be caused by natural internal processes or external forcing or by 
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or land use. Appendix I - Glossary. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/518.htm.  [Accessed 
September 13, 2013].   




earth would go down by almost 33 degrees centigrade (Riebeek:2010)8. The 
concentration of greenhouse gases, however, is increased by human activities such as 
carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels, deforestation, methane emission from 
agricultural activities, etc.  The increased concentration of these gases mean that the 
blanket thickens and traps more and more heat and in the process warms the Earth’s 
surface beyond manageable limits.9  
Studies conducted by the European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica have found 
a persistent linkage between the presences of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere 
and the rise in global atmospheric temperatures.10 According to a report by the IPCC 
(2013) ‘[H]uman influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the 
ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global 
mean sea level rise, and in, changes in some climate extremes… [I]t is extremely likely 
that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the 
mid-20th century’. Many of the impacts of such changes are already evident. It is 
pertinent to note here that if the average mean temperatures continue to exhibit their 
current upward trajectory, (a business as usual scenario), it would result in extreme 
calamities ranging from, on the one hand, inundation of massive populated areas 
because of rising sea levels, melting of glaciers and frequent flash floods caused by 
extreme precipitation; and on the other, the expansion of drought zones on account of 
extended and recurrent heat waves (IPCC 2013). The socio-economic implications of all 
                                                                 
8 Available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GlobalWarming/page2.php [Accessed 
September 12, 2013].  
 
9 Also known as anthropogenic or human induced greenhouse effect.  
 
10 European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) (1974-2014). Summary. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.esf.org/index.php?id=855.  [Accessed January 15, 2014]. 




these is massive and range from depleting food reserves to mass migration, to species 
extinction (Battisti and Rosamond 2009; Windisch 2008).11  
2.3. Origins of the Crisis  
The first attempt to study the warming effects of the atmospheric gases was made nearly 
200 years ago, by Jean-Baptiste Fourier in the year 1827. Though Fourier’s work was 
focussed on understanding the transition between a habitable world and the ice age 
preceding it, nevertheless it indicated the presence of certain gases in the atmosphere as 
plausible factors behind the transition (Garvey 2008: 17). Fourier called it natural 
greenhouse phenomena, something essential in making the planet habitable.  Later, in the 
year 1870, John Tyndall, through his experiments in measuring the heat absorbing 
capacity of CO2, water vapour and other gases, argued that  
the solar heat possesses the power of crossing an atmosphere, but 
when the heat is absorbed by the planet, it is so changed in quality 
that the rays emanating from the planet cannot get with the same 
freedom back into space. Thus, the atmosphere admits of the 
entrance of the solar heat but checks its exit; the result is a 
tendency to accumulate heat at the surface of this planet (quoted in 
Garvey 2008: 18).  
 
The understanding that human induced factors could well be responsible for the 
changes in weather patterns can be traced in the Western world as far back as 1896, 
when Svante Arrhenious, a Swedish Scientist claimed that burning of fossil fuels like 
coal could contribute to a rise in carbon dioxide composition in earth’s atmosphere, 
triggering a rise in earth’s average temperature (Crawford 1997: 6). It is however, not to 
                                                                 
 
11 Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States [Online] 
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf  [Accessed January 15, 2014]. 




say that the natural disasters or the relationship between weather change patterns and the 
human factors behind it were entirely unknown to generations preceding Arrhenious. 
Hindu religious texts abound with descriptions of the consequences of the cutting of trees 
and the natural disasters that follow from it (Paranjape 2013). Similarly, it is widely 
believed that one of the most plausible reasons for the decline of the Indus valley 
civilization (1700-1500 BC) could well be due to the frequent flooding of the Indus river 
(Giosan et al., 2012). In his essay entitled ‘The Development of the Dangerous 
Anthropogenic Climate Change’ Spencer Weart, describes an account from 
Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle, who outlined how the draining of marshes had 
made a particular locality more susceptible to freezing or how lands became warmer 
when the clearing of forests exposed them to sunlight (Weart 2011:67). Weart also 
mentions the accounts of C.F. Volney, who while travelling in the United States was 
informed by the settlers about the climate there becoming warmer and milder as a result 
of deforestation. The bulk of these linkages however at best could be described as 
speculative and lacking credible substantiation.   
The climate issue started receiving significant attention in the mid years of the 
20th Century, when measurement of CO2 levels in the atmosphere began to be recorded. 
Charles David Keeling is credited with being the first scientist to make systematic and 
precise such measurements. When Keeling started recording C02 levels in 1958, they 
were about 316 parts per million (PPM). By the year 2005 however, (also the year when 
Keeling died) the levels had already gone up to 380 PPM. Keeling was very 
apprehensive about the pace at which the CO2 levels were rising in the atmosphere and 
could foresee it reaching the 450 PPM mark within few decades (Walsh 2013). Today, as 




it is, the levels stand around the 400 mark12 and if it continues to rise at the present rate 
of increase of 2 PPM annually it will soon cross the bench mark of 450 PPM in not so 
distant future.  
The 450 PPM threshold is critically important given the now near-consensus view 
that any further rise in CO2 levels could result in an increase of approximately 2 to 3 
degrees centigrade in the earth’s current temperature. 13 In an interview published in the 
Los Angeles Times, Ralph Keeling14, notes that in terms of the consequences of 
enhanced levels of CO2 in the atmosphere, ‘we are already in dangerous territory as far 
as consequences. It’s a concern that we keep marching forward and burning fossil fuels 
as though it had no effect’ (Banerjee 2013).  
Equally important to note here is that even when CO2 is understood to be 
responsible for the majority of the human induced greenhouse effect, there are other 
gases that contribute to it as well. Methane, for instance, is seen as being far more 
dangerous in the sense that even one molecule of it causes about eight times the 
greenhouse effect as caused by carbon dioxide (Garvey 2008: 20). Methane emissions are 
ascribed both to anthropogenic and natural causes. Their atmospheric levels have been 
rising on account of enhanced activities such as livestock domestication, large scale 
cultivation of rice, landfills etc. Agricultural activities also lead to the release of nitrous 
                                                                 
12 NASA (2013). Global Climate Change: News. [Online] Available at: http://climate.nasa.gov/news/916 . 
[Accessed January 10, 2013]. 
 
13 The ‘Stern Report’ authored by Nicholas Stern is taken as one of the most credible basic reference 
reports on the Environmental Campaign. Published first in 2006, it pointed to a 75% chance that global 
temperatures would rise by between two and three degrees above the long-term average.  
 
14 Son of Charles Keeling and someone who has been constantly monitoring the Co2 levels after his 
father’s death at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.  




oxide concentrations in the atmosphere which further contributes to Global warming 
and climate change extremes.  
2.4. Potential Impacts 
The fifth assessment report of the IPCC released in 2013 very clearly states that between 
the years 1880 and 2012, the earth’s temperature rose by 0.85oC i.e. from 0.65oC to 
1.06oC (IPCC 2013:194). The warming has been unequivocal and  
[M]any of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to 
millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts 
of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased (IPCC 2013:4).  
 
Consistent with the claims of the IPCC, some other climate scientists also foresee 
potentially catastrophic consequences from unchecked climate change. According to  
Nicholas Stern15 of the London School of Economics, ‘it is an externality like none 
other. The risks, scales and uncertainties are enormous…. There is a big probability of a 
devastating outcome’ (Stern 2009). Translated in to social life climate change implies 
miseries and calamities on an unprecedented scale in the form of deaths, devastations, 
destruction and extinctions.  
According to scientific estimates, between 1.1 and 2.8 billion people in the 
developing and 700 million and 1.2 billion in the developed world could be exposed to 
water scarcity because of rising temperatures (Arnell 2006). Water shortages would 
naturally imply prolonged droughts, which in turn could heighten levels of poverty, 
malnutrition, and starvation. It has been suggested that an average temperature increase 
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of 2.5°C would by the year 2080 expose an additional 45-55 million people to hunger 
and poverty (Hare 2006). It also implies that more people would be exposed to bacterial 
and viral diseases. Furthermore, a warmer earth means that there would be more chance 
of increased precipitation over a shorter interval of time, which in turn could result in 
flash floods in many river basins. 
Sea levels also would be likely to rise to catastrophic levels under conditions of an 
average rise of two-degree Centigrade increase in temperature above pre-industrial levels. 
This would primarily be caused by the thermal expansion of sea water caused by 
warming of earth’s atmosphere and the melting of glaciers and ice sheets as a result. 
According to key indicators obtained from satellites and sea level observations by 
NASA, it is now evident that the sea level has been rising at the rate of 3.26 mm per 
year, between 1993-201016. This is alarming when seen in the context of the average sea 
level rise, recorded around 1.7 mm per year between 1901 and 2010. According to a 
survey done at the Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research, (Horton et al., 2013) if 
the greenhouse gas emission continues at the present rate, the sea levels rise is likely to 
be 70-120 centimetres by 2100 and a median rise of 200-300 centimetres by the year 
2300.17  
The rise in seal levels could have disastrous consequences not just for human lives 
but for biodiversity as a whole. According to estimates presented to the International 
Scientific Congress on Climate Change held at Copenhagen in the year 2009, about 600 
million people living in low lying areas such as Kiribati, Bangladesh, Maldives, Tuvalu, 
                                                                 
16 NASA (2013). Global Climate Change Vital Signs of the planet. [Online] Available at: 
http://climate.nasa.gov/key_indicators.  [Accessed January 9, 2014]. 
 
17 Science Daily (2013). Expert Assessment: Sea-Level Rise Could Exceed One Meter in This Century. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/11/131122103853.htm.  [Accessed January 9, 
2014]. 




and the Marshall Islands would be adversely affected by a modest sea level rise of fifty 
centimetres.18 A similar study examining the possible ecological impacts of a modest rise 
of one meter of sea levels (lowest possible scenario in this century) on some 1200 islands 
in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region found that ‘between 3 and 32 percent of 
the coastal zone of these islands could be lost, and consequently around 8 to 52 million 
people could become flood refugees’ (Wetzel et al., 2012). And, sea level rise could result 
not only in the inundation of fertile land; it also holds the threat of exposing many 
coastal areas to recurring damages associated with sea storms and surges. It would result 
in heat waves, life-threatening weather conditions and a consequent harm to 
biodiversity, wildfires, crop failures leading to droughts, cyclones and tsunamis, and new 
forms of deadly diseases, etc. As noted above, it is also estimated that it could result in a 
very faster extinction of many species from the planet itself.19  
No part of the world is expected to escape the impacts of climate change, and we 
can note that its impacts are not confined only to the areas of emission, but spill across 
local, regional and even trans- hemispheric divides.20 While predicting the possible 
impacts across different regions, the IPCC report states that in North America it could 
result in increased frequency of precipitation (IPCC 2013:5) and a reduced snowpack in 
the western mountains, as well as an enhanced intensity, frequency and duration of heat 
                                                                 
 
18 University of Copenhagen (2009, March 11). Rising Sea levels Set to Have Major Impacts Around The 
World. ScienceDaily. Available at :http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090310104742.ht. 
[Accessed Retrieved January 9, 2014] 
 
19 According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report 2005, Climate Change could result in a ten 
times faster extinction of many species.   
20 According to the (IPCC 2007) the emissions from any particular location are transported in a matter of 
weeks. Ocean circulations connects far distant parts of Earth; a slowdown or shutdown of  the 
thermohaline circulations in the North Atlantic Ocean (Gulf Stream) would cause regional cooling in 
Northern Europe but would increase the rate of warming in much of the southern hemisphere (IPCC 
2007) 




waves in the cities therein (IPCC 2007: 11). For Latin America, it predicts that the 
tropical forests in eastern Amazonia would be gradually replaced by savannah, and there 
is also the risk of significant biodiversity loss (primarily species loss in tropical areas). It 
also foresees a significant reduction in water availability for human consumption as well 
as for agriculture and energy generation (IPCC 2007: 11). The report projects a grim 
picture for Europe by predicting that it could be subject to increased risk of inland flash 
floods and more frequent coastal flooding. It could also see greater erosion from storms 
and a rise in sea levels, glacial retreat in mountainous areas, reduced snow cover, 
extensive species losses, and reductions of crop productivity especially in its southern 
parts (IPCC 2007 :11).  
The most damaging effects are however, expected to be felt in some of poorest 
countries, in particular in Asia and Africa. For example, the IPCC report states that in 
Africa by the year 2020, between 75 and 250 million people will be exposed to increased 
water stress. It states that yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 
percent in some regions by 2020, and agricultural production, including access to food, 
may be severely compromised (IPCC 2007: 11). Freshwater availability is projected to 
decrease in Central, South, East and Southeast Asia by the 2050s. The report puts the 
coastal areas in Asia at risk due to increased flooding. It also predicts that death rates 
from disease associated with floods and droughts are expected to rise in some regions 
(IPCC 2007:11).   
Although impact of climate change traverse national boundaries, its severity 
differs across regions and to a large extent depends on the general socio-economic 
capabilities of individual societies to mitigate and adapt IPCC (2007: 17). The rich states 
have far more resources at their disposal to lessen its impacts. For example, the United 




States government was able set aside $50.5 billion as a relief fund for rehabilitation and 
aid for those people affected by Hurricane Sandy, which was one of the most destructive 
storms on record, causing an estimated $70 billion in damage after it struck the East 
Coast in October 2012 (Hernandez 2013). In addition, another $500 million in aid has 
been given by the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) for upgrading of waste 
water and drinking water facilities damaged by the storm.21 We can note by comparison 
that a World Bank projection in the case of Bangladesh shows that its sea levels could 
rise by one meter by the end of this century, affecting approximately 17.5 percent of its 
total landmass.22 Approximately $4 billion dollars would be required by Bangladesh to 
adapt to these disastrous impacts, and yet the annual budget outlay of the entire country 
for the fiscal year 2013-14 was only around $28 billion.  
It does not therefore come as a surprise that climate change already has been 
found to contribute to an increasing number of environmental refugees every year. A 
study by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council found that almost 98 percent of the 32.4 million people who joined the growing 
count of refugees in the year 2012, had to be do so because of climate- and weather-
related events (IDMC 2013). As per the United Nations Development Programme,  
[T]he incremental risks created by climate change intensify over 
time, they will interact with existing structures of disadvantage. 
Prospects for sustained human development in the years and 
decades after the 2015 target date for the Millennium Development 
Goals are directly threatened (UNDP 2007).  
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Available at: http://www.epa.gov/sandy/response.html.  [Accessed January 12, 2014]. 
 
22 World Bank, 2000. Bangladesh: Climate Change & Sustainable Development. Report No. 21104 BD, 
Dhaka. 




The uneven geographical spread of the impacts and the time scale factors as well 
as the differences in the socio-economic capabilities of states to mitigate them mean that 
only concerted and coordinated global efforts can provide a way out of the crisis. Making 
this happen however, is a daunting task, given persistent collective action problems at 
the heart of the crisis. Garett Hardin, very clearly outlined these sorts of problems in his 
classic essay, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. Using common grazing pastures as a 
metaphor, Hardin showed how, when individual actors rationally follow their own self-
interests in attempting to claim more of a common resource, their collective actions can 
have the effect of destroying the resource – an outcome none of them would want.  
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that 
is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in 
the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a common brings 
ruin to all (Hardin 1968: 1244) 
 
In the climate change context, individual states gain in the short run by defecting from 
emission reduction commitments, but in the longer run they end up harming themselves 
by destroying the very conditions that make the planet habitable. It may not then be 
surprising that, despite the broad realization of the need to stabilize carbon emissions at 
450 PPM so as to limit global warming to 20C, which in turn requires reducing emissions 
by almost 50-55% by the year 2050 (IPCC 2007), carbon emissions have been ever 
increasing (IEA 2015). And, the climate change problem is actually more complicated 
than a standard tragedy of the commons problem, given that neither the benefits accrued 
from the human activities on nature, nor the harms arising from it geographically, are 
evenly distributed. Divergences in the intensity of its impacts across geographical 




locations and differences in mitigation capabilities hinder the states from making binding 
mitigation commitments. According to Aaron Maltais,  
the problem of anthropogenic global warming environmental 
problem has bound us together worldwide in a morally distinct way, 
as we now face a set of exceedingly difficult global collective action 
problems both between states and generations that give rise to duty of 
justice to create new political project to address the human impact on 
our climate’ (Maltais 2008:597). 
 
The response, moreover, has to be multipronged in the sense that a scientific assessment 
of the problem needs to be buttressed with moral, ethical, legal, institutional and political 
responses. Solving such vexed issue as this demands serious concerted transnational 
coordination and cooperation.  
2.5. From Rio to Paris, via Kyoto, Bali, Copenhagen and Cancun 
States have not been oblivious to the potentially dreadful impacts of climate change. The 
existence of hundreds of treaties, agreements, frameworks, protocols, conventions and 
regimes bear testimony to their acknowledgment at least of the seriousness of the 
problem (Vidal 2012). Yet, a look at the record of global climate change negotiations 
shows clearly the challenges faced in overcoming collective action problems – and thus 
the need to be able to identify some means of motivating support for solutions which are 
in the global interest as well as the interests of individual states and their populations. 
It will be useful here to offer a detailed account of states’ attempts to come to 
some agreement. This will further clarify the issues at stake, as well as the challenges that 
have repeatedly arisen to reaching cooperation, and challenges that remain in 
implementation where some cooperation has been achieved, including in the recent Paris 
Agreements. It was in 1972, at the United Nations Conference on the Human 




Environment at Stockholm that environmental issues were first placed firmly among 
international policy priorities. This was spurred in part by the publication of path 
breaking works such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (Carson 1962) and Hardin’s 
‘commons’ work. The conference was attended by 113 state representatives, and 
numerous civil society groups also participated.  
Attempts at the global level made to address the specific issue of climate change 
can be traced to the first World Climate Conference in 1979, which brought together 
many scientists, as well as humanists interested in the subject. (Harris 2010: 109-14). A 
research programme emerged from the conference that eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. The 
World Conference on Changing Atmosphere, held in the same year at Toronto, was very 
candid in recommending a 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2005 and calling 
on the states to develop a comprehensive framework convention on the law of 
atmosphere.  
The creation of the IPCC23 and its endorsement of the need to adhere to the 
reduction of GHG emissions in a fixed time frame was a major step in the direction of 
establishing the gravity of the problem. Background research conducted by the IPCC 
(first assessment report) and the deliberations at the Second World Climate Conference 
(1990) did result in some stimulus in the direction of the realization of the problem, in 
the sense that in 1990 the Intergovernmental Committee for a Framework Convention 
on Climate Change was commissioned by the United Nations, with the objective of 
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drafting and negotiating an accord on which subsequent international agreements could 
be based. That led to the signing of the landmark 1992 Climate Convention at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.  
At Rio, 154 states agreed to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and pledged to commit to the values of precaution, equity 
cooperation and sustainability (UNFCCC, Art 3).24  The state parties reach agreement 
on the need to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations 
on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. The developed states were given lead 
responsibility in combating climate change and its adverse effects. The convention 
recognised the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, 
especially the ones that are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
Under the seminal ‘precautionary principles’, states agreed that in situations of grave 
threat or irreversible damage, the lack of scientific certainty would not come as an excuse 
for not undertaking or postponing mitigation efforts. 25 The objective of sustainable 
development was to be pursued through open and cooperative efforts. Significantly, the 
convention underlined the need of adopting mitigation policies in tune with the national 
developmental priorities and policies of states.  
                                                                 
24 UNFCCC (). Article 3 Principles. [Online] Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1355.php.  [Last Accessed 
January 12, 2014]. 
 
25 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. See: UNFCCC. (2006). Handbook [Online] 
Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf  [Accessed 9 Nov. 2016].  




The convention set out as its long-term goal to ‘stop dangerous anthropogenic 
interferences with the climate’ (UNEP 1992). The signatories agreed to accept set targets 
for reducing their GHG emission levels not harmful to the climate system. The 
developed countries, for their part, were expected to voluntarily stabilize and reduce 
their emission levels to those prevalent in 1990 by the year 2000. As might be expected 
under the collective action logic noted above, most did not keep to their pledges, and 
emissions continued to increase. In some states, the emissions did decline but that was 
generally from other factors, such as the collapse of the Eastern European economies in 
the 1990s.  
Even so, the convention was important in the sense that it recognised the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and respective capabilities by all 
states to address climate change, rather than attributing all of the responsibilit ies to the 
developed countries. The convention was candid in its assertion that the developed states 
should aid their developing counterparts by offering financial help over and above 
developmental aid in order to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, while 
simultaneously helping them adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The most 
significant outcome of the convention however, was the establishment of the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF), which was a joint endeavour of the UNDP, UNEP and 
the World Bank, with the objective of providing funds to developing countries in their 
mitigation efforts. It also, however, affirmed the sovereign right of states to use and 
exploit their resources (UNEP 1992). In other words, it highlighted the sovereignty of 
states as the fundamental principle of international cooperation in addressing the issue of 
climate change 




The UNFCC made some notable advances. Perhaps the most important of these 
was the establishment of a rolling ‘Conference of the Parties’  (hereafter COP) mandated 
with meeting every year, or at periodic intervals, to deliberate and negotiate terms, ways 
and means through which greenhouse gas emissions could be reduced. It was also 
supposed to suggest measures for implementing other decisions of the climate 
convention. The annual meetings of the COP served three main functions: to review the 
implementation of the convention, to adopt the decisions to further the conventions 
implementation and to negotiate substantive new commitments.  
The first COP meeting was held in Berlin in the year 1995. There, the Berlin 
Mandate confirmed that developed states would take the lead in the mitigating climate 
change under the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. In the year 
1996 the second Conference of the Parties was held at Geneva and the parties agreed to 
take steps towards legally binding protocols. These included not only outlining particular 
targets but also indicating time schedules for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of 
the developed states. The Geneva Declaration became the ground for negotiating a 
protocol which was finalized and signed at the 1997 Third COP held in Kyoto.  
2.5.1. Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was a landmark effort to addressing the issue of climate change, 
wherein the issue of legally binding commitment to reduce six major GHG emissions by 
5.2 per cent of 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012 was agreed upon.26 The protocol came 
into force on 16 February 2005 and currently has 195 signatories. Based on the idea that 
mitigation efforts should follow the norm of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
                                                                 
26 The emission targets were given to Annex I countries only.  




the Kyoto protocol sets individual emission targets for the developed countries. This 
meant that while USA, Canada, Japan, and the European Union, were supposed to 
reduce their emission levels, states such as Norway, Australia and Iceland could increase 
by one, eight and ten per cent respectively.  The commitments were in the form of net 
emissions, which implied that the greenhouse gas emissions can be balanced off through 
carbon sink activities and projects.   
Taking the developmental necessities of the developing countries into account, 
the protocol exempted them from undertaking legally binding commitments but 
expected them to adopt measures to reduce the emission levels of GHG. They were also 
expected to provide emission inventories to the UNFCCC Secretariat. To help the 
developed countries meet their targets in a realistic and meaningful way, the protocol 
created flexible mechanisms such as International Emission Trading (IET), the Clean 
Developmental Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI), whereby the 
developed countries could buy and sell emission credits amongst themselves, or 
alternatively could earn credits by funding emission oriented efforts in the developing 
countries.  
Making the protocol effective however, required that states emitting more than 
fifty-five percent of world’s CO2 emission ratify it, but that was not to happen 
immediately. The protocol continued to be in stalemate until 2005, when finally it was 
ratified by the requisite number of states. The United States, the largest emitter of CO 2 
(at that time) in fact never ratified the protocol, and Canada withdrew from it despite 
having initially ratified it. Exempting the developing states from legally binding emission 
cuts meant that China, (the second largest emitter then and biggest now), was not 
covered under the protocol.  




The agreements at Kyoto also left many key issues open, requiring further 
negotiation. These included the design of the flexibility mechanism, the rules for 
offsetting emissions with absorptions by sinks, methodologies for calculating and 
reporting national emissions, and systems for assessing implementation and compliance 
and for responding to compliance problems (Baylis et al., 2005: 471). 
2.5.2.  Kyoto and Onwards 
The fourth Conference of the Parties was convened in 1998 in Buenos Aires, with the 
purpose of resolving the deadlocks that arose during negotiations at Kyoto. With the 
objective of providing flexibility in emission cuts and to encourage collaborative 
endeavours between developing and developed states, new measures like emission 
trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and joint implementations were introduced. 
Despite these innovations, the deadlocks between states remained unresolved, though 
the negotiating states did agree on the adoption of a two-year action plan to continue to 
work towards mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol by the year 2000. The 
fifth COP was held in 1999 in Bonn, but the meeting ultimately was reduced to technical 
discussions with no major resolutions. The sixth COP organised in The Hague in the 
year 2000 got stuck in a political quagmire over the US proposal that ‘carbon sink’ be 
compensated against the quota for greenhouse gas emissions. Differences also arose on 
the issue of the consequences of non-compliance by states. But the biggest issue on which 
the states openly disagreed with each other was that of financial assistance to developing 
countries to enable them to adapt to as well as mitigate the impacts of climate change. 
The differences between states meant that no agreement was reached and the conference 
had to be suspended mid-way, though it was resumed later in the year 2001 in Bonn.  




The resumption of negotiations at Bonn was significant, given the fact that i t was 
happening in the aftermath of the US rejection of the Kyoto protocol. The US attended 
only as an observer state, not participating in the negotiations. The negotiations 
conducted in the opening year of the new millennium did result in some deadlocks being 
resolved in the form of agreements on the ‘flexibility mechanism’, under which 
developed and industrialized states could fund mitigation activities in the poor and 
developing countries and claim unlimited credits for it, subject to the condition that they 
also contributed significantly towards meeting their domestic cut targets. Similar 
agreements on carbon sinks – natural environments which absorb carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere -- were also reached in the conference. The most significant outcome, 
however, was the establishment of three new funds. These were a climate change fund to 
support mitigation measures, a fund for the least developed states to support their 
adaptation measures, and a fund to support Kyoto Protocol implementation. The 
conference also decided to push forward the operational details of the decisions made to 
the ensuing seventh COP.  
The seventh conference was held in the year 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, and 
the participants worked out the significant ‘Marrakesh Accord’ aimed primarily at 
settling details in a way that enough support27 could be mobilized to get the Kyoto 
Protocol into force by the year 2002, when the World Summit on Sustainable 
development would be held at Johannesburg. Though the United States remained non-
committal, attempts were made to satisfy the developing states through increased 
funding for the climate convention’s financial mechanism. However, the way the 
                                                                 
27 55 states including those which accounted for the 55 percent of developed-country emission of CO2 in 
the year 1990 were required to ratify the protocol.   




implementation mechanism was worked out, it was clear that ‘the actual cuts in 
greenhouse gas emission by developed nations would be far less than the already 
inadequate 5.2 percent agreed in Kyoto’ (Hansen 2009, 182-3 cited in Harris 2013, 46).   
The eighth COP, convened in New Delhi in the year 2002, was novel in the sense 
that it brought adaptation to the agenda of climate change negotiations. This in a way 
was a double-edged sword since on the one hand it implied that the developed nations 
would be required to transfer green technology to help the developing world to cope with 
the impacts of climate change, and on the other, it meant that so long as the developing 
countries were receiving that help, the developed states would not be under the pressure 
to cut emissions. The agenda of the developed states was to somehow delay the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and with an acute sense of its own advantage, 28 this 
time Russia argued that it needed some more time to think and consider the proposal.  
Adaptation remained the most important agenda item both in the ninth and the 
tenth Conferences held at Milan and Buenos Aires in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Both 
these meetings highlighted the need for capacity building through technology transfer as 
ways of supporting the developing countries attempt at adaptations to the impacts of 
climate change. The developed states did make strong pledges to provide funds to their 
developing counterparts, but without providing firm commitments or making access to 
those funds easier (Harris 2009: 47).  
                                                                 
 
28 The United States had already refused to ratify the treaty, and the refusal of Australia now meant that it 
could come into force only if Russia came on board, given that 55 states including those which accounted 
for the 55 percent of developed-country emission of CO2 in the year 1990  were required to ratify. In the 
year 1990, the Russian share of global emissions stood at roughly 17 percent. When coupled with 44.2% of 
1990 emissions share of the other developed states (those who had already ratified the Kyoto Protocol), 
that would be enough for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.  




By the time the eleventh COP was convened in Montreal in 2005, the Kyoto 
Protocol had already been ratified by the requisite number of states and had entered into 
force. The Montreal conference was unique not just because it was one of the largest 
intergovernmental gatherings, involving delegates from all the 189 states that were part 
of the UNFCCC, but also because it was simultaneously hosting the first Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP 1): those developed states which had ratified the Kyoto Protocol.29 The 
most important outcome of the conference was that rules and commitments that all 
states across world would have to abide by were specified and formalised. Significantly, 
the meeting agreed on the need to extend the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment 
period (2013-17).  
The twelfth meeting of the COP was convened in Nairobi in 2006, and a five-year 
plan to support the adaptation initiatives of the developing countries was agreed upon. 
However, it was very clear by now that the COP was not achieving much in terms of 
converting climate change aims into reality. If the proceedings and negotiations 
undertaken by the COP suggested anything, it was the disconnect between research-
based scientific findings on the possible impacts of climate change and the urgency of 
addressing it, and the unwillingness of states to commit to a binding agreement.  
2.5.3. Bali Road Map 
In the midst of the stalemate amongst the states, the IPCC issued its fourth assessment 
report, which not only very clearly outlined the alarming consequences of climate 
change, but also conclusively demonstrated its human causes. Australia’s ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol meanwhile provided further impetus for the conference negotiators. 
                                                                 
29 From here on the COP and MOP meetings were to be held simultaneously.  




Against this backdrop, the thirteenth COP got underway in Bali in 2007. The meeting 
resulted in the adoption of ‘The Bali Roadmap’ which was a general framework on 
which the states were supposed to carry their deliberations forward, with the expectation 
that a treaty would be in place by the end of 2009, in anticipation of the end of the Kyoto 
Protocol first commitment period in 2012.  
The negotiations at Bali were structured around two tracks, one under Kyoto for 
a second commitment period, and the other focussing on financial and technological 
support for climate related actions in developing countries. The latter was intended to 
ensure long-term cooperative action from all emitters, including the so called BASIC 
countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China, and not just the ones covered under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Kartha 2011: 513). Attempts were made at Bali to resolve the long 
standing disagreement between the developed and developing countries by the way of 
creating a fund that could help developing states adapt to climate change. There was also 
an agreement on steps towards measures to reduce tropical deforestation. However, the 
deliberations at Bali once again exhibited the old patterns and were marred by deep 
differences between states on the terms of references for future negotiations.  
For example, the United States vehemently opposed the European Union’s 
demands that required it to undertake fresh commitments, and the developing countries 
as usual demanded greater technical and financial transfers without giving any firm 
commitments on emission cuts (Pew Center 2007). The Bali Action Plan reiterated the 
need for cooperative action for achieving the long term global goal of emission 
reduction, but it shied away from mandating tangible emission cuts to achieve it. The 
developed countries did agree on measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation 
commitments, but that was subject to their ‘nationally appropriate’ actions taking into 




account ‘differences in circumstances’. The developing countries agreed to 
‘considerations not commitments’ subject to assistance from the developed states (Posner 
and Weisbach 2010: 66). According to Eric Posner and David Weisbach, ‘[I]n these 
circumstances, it is an understatement to say that the Bali action plan is more symbol 
than substance…nations were acting in accordance with their short-term domestic self-
interest as they perceived it’ (Posner and Weisbach 2010: 66).  
The fourteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, held in Poznan, Poland 
in 2008, was no different from the earlier ones as far as the rigidity in stances on 
emission cuts were concerned. There was, however, agreement on the need for a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  
2.5.4. Copenhagen Summit 
The much-anticipated fifteenth Conference of the Parties took place in Copenhagen in 
2009. It was historic in the sense that, in addition to the participation of thousands of 
delegates from almost all the states, it also had the participation of 119 heads of states. In 
fact, it was hoped that the conference would result in some agreement on the 
commitments for post 2012, the period after the first commitment period as entailed 
under the Kyoto Protocol were to expire. However, it was decided to put that matter off 
the conference agenda, focussing instead on less specific ‘politically binding agreement 
that would punt the most difficult issues into the future’ (Cooper 2009:14).  
The Copenhagen deal was novel in that individual states provided ‘pledges’ for 
mitigation action under the ‘Copenhagen Accord’, but these were voluntary and did not 
include specific targets. The conference did accept the position that global increase in 
temperature could not be allowed to escalate beyond 2oC, and the developed states 




committed to establishing a Green Climate Fund worth 100 billion dollars a year by 
2020 to help the developing countries in their adaptation efforts. However, the 
conference failed to provide any guaranteed commitments on emission reductions. In the 
end it could neither produce a binding target agreement nor any enforcement mechanism 
for the already weak commitments. John Sauven, the executive director of Greenpeace 
UK, described the outcome like this: ‘[t]he city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, 
with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport…It is now evident that beating 
global warming will require a radically different model of politics than the one on display 
here in Copenhagen’ (Vidal et al., 2009). 
2.5.5. Cancun to Paris 
The sixteenth Conference of the Parties took place in Cancun, in 2010 and reiterated that 
states should undertake urgent action to achieve emission cuts and the need to limit the 
global average temperature rise to less than 20C in comparison to pre-industrial levels. 
The Conference resulted in an agreement under which the developed countries30 would 
reduce their emissions by 25-40 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2020. At the 
conference, states agreed that emission trading, clean development mechanisms and 
joint implementation mechanisms, as envisaged under the UNFCCC, would continue to 
operate for ensuring emission reductions by the developed countries. All major 
economies, including China and United States, agreed to share reports with the 
UNFCCC on the progress made by them in meeting their national emission targets. 
Developed states also agreed to share with the UNFCC details of their financial and 
technological support to the developing states in meeting the latter’s respective pledges 
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regarding emission cuts. The developing states for their part agreed to strengthen 
reporting of their mitigation efforts and also accept international consultation and 
analyses of their action.  
The Cancun Conference moved one step ahead in terms of formalizing the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF). Aimed primarily at helping the developing states in their 
mitigation and adaptation efforts, the GCF had been proposed by the developed states at 
the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, and involved an annual mobilization of 100 billion 
dollars by the year 2020. Delegates reached consensus on the need for such a fund, but 
there were differences between parties on its implementation and funding mechanism.  
 The ultimately non-committal attitude with which states have dealt with the 
issue of climate change was evident again at the seventeenth meeting of the COP held in 
Durban in 2011. The conference was titled ‘Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’, but 
its outcome document had no provision for achieving such action. The intention had 
been that the states would agree to a legally binding treaty that would be drafted by 2015 
and could be made effective by 2020.31  Finally, in December 2012, the Kyoto protocol 
was amended at the eighteenth Conference, held in Doha, to include the second 
commitment period, 2013-2020. The amendment was limited in scope, as it accounted 
only for 15 percent of the global emission. This was because states like Japan, Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, New Zealand refused to give their commitment, the United States and 
Canada were not party to the protocol, and India, China and Brazil were not required to 
cut emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.   
                                                                 
31 It is disputed whether the term ‘legal force’ used in the document can really be understood as legally 
binding, or what it means in general. It was the first time that the phrase was used and that too because of 
a compromise between the EU and India. The EU wanted a legally binding treaty whereas India was 
opposed to it.  




The nineteenth meeting of the COP to the UNFCCC took place in December 
2013 in Warsaw in Poland. The disagreements between the developed and developing 
countries on issues such as technology transfer and capitalization of the Green Climate 
Fund was clearly evident in the negotiations.  The developing countries, as well as some 
of the international NGOs, actually staged a walkout during the negotiations to show 
their displeasure with the ways in which the negotiations were conducted. Two major 
outcomes of the conference were (1) the decision to hold a conference in Paris 2015 to 
outline the programme of action after 2020, when the Kyoto period expires, and (2) the 
Warsaw Mechanism, under which the developing countries were expected to receive 
both aid and expertise in dealing with harsh and extreme impacts of climate change. In 
Warsaw, parties also agreed to participate in a summit to be held in Peru in 2014 and to 
clearly outline their strategies by the first quarter of 2015 on their plans and 
commitments on emission reduction after 2020. The national Plans would be called 
‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDC).  
The twentieth Conference of the Parties took place in 2014 in Lima in Peru. 
Despite spending more than 30 additional hours on deliberations and negotiations, the 
conference in reality achieved nothing except appealing to the states to submit their 
respective INDCs before the 2015 Paris Climate Summit. The Paris Climate Summit,  or 
the 21st Conference of the Parties, was held in December 2015 and resulted in a treaty 
which has been acclaimed as ‘Landmark step’  (Johnston 2016) and a ‘Flame of Hope’ 
(Goldenberg 2016). The distinctiveness of the treaty emanates from its universal 
applicability and legal enforceability. It remains to be seen, of course, whether states will 
be motivated to honour their commitments under the treaty. I will provide a brief outline 
of the Paris Climate Treaty in the last section of this chapter and will take this up in 




detail in Chapter 7, which specifically considers the question of motivation. In the next 
section, I consider some of the factors inhibiting effective action on global climate 
change over the past several decades.    
2.6. Challenges to Achieving Effective Climate Action 
It should be clear at this point that climate change poses – and has been recognized 
globally as -- one of the most profound challenges to have confronted mankind. In the 
opening paragraph of the Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, John Dryzek has 
very aptly summarized the enormity of the issue: 
the stakes are massive, risks and uncertainties severe, the economics 
controversial, the science besieged, the politics bitter and 
complicated, the psychology puzzling, the impacts devastating, the 
interactions with other environmental and non-environmental issues 
running in many directions. The social problem-solving 
mechanisms we currently possess were not designed, and have not 
evolved to cope with anything like an interlinked set of problems of 
this severity, scale, and complexity. There are no precedents. So far,  
we have failed to address the challenge adequately. …One of the 
central social, political. And economic questions of the century are,  
how then do we act? (Dryzek et al., 2011:3) 
 
All the above-mentioned efforts are good examples of the human resolve to address the 
problem of climate change, but they also indicate the challenges associated with getting 
states to agree to and abide by an agreement capable of effectively addressing it.  Climate 
change negotiations require that the earth as a whole should be taken into account, but 
attempts at achieving effective collective action have been repeatedly hampered by 
competing national interests (Harris 2012: chapter 2). The differences in outlook between 
developed and developing states offers a further challenge, as the latter have often 
viewed climate legislation as an evil design on the part of the most powerful states of the 




world to scuttle their natural right of development (Carter 2001: 237; see also Kartha et 
al., 2012; Harris 2010).).  
Many other factors have been cited as reasons why climate change in particular is 
a difficult global problem to address. Each has implications for actually motivating 
compliance with agreements, as well as initially achieving them. For example, there is 
the tempo-spatial nature of the problem (Gardiner 2006, 2011; Garvey 2008). The spatial 
dimensions of climate change refer to the wide dispersions in the cause-effect 
relationship between the geographical/political areas from where emissions originate 
and the ones that are impacted. The temporal aspects refer to the time scales (across 
generations) in which the impacts are felt and realized. Other problems include those 
associated with clearly identifying and locating the offenders and the victims, as well as 
the complexities involved in generating compassionate and empathic concerns and 
feelings for trans-border people and communities (Dobson 2006). As discussed, the 
nature of the Westphalian international system and the tendency to free riding that it 
gives rise to especially in a collective action framework (Barrett 2003).  
Further, in terms of conflicts between developed and developing states, we can 
also note some fundamental issues of justice, appropriation, harm and accountability. 
The poor states argue that the rich states in the past have appropriated more than their 
fair share and more importantly use their financial and technical clout to continue this 
process of exploitation. They want the developed states to be held morally responsible 
for the damages, and that they should also be made to pay for the harms they have 
inflicted. The argument thus runs in the direction of compensations and reparations, and 
takes a complicated turn giving rise to accusations, counteraccusations and deadlocks.   




Globalization adds yet another element to the already tense relations between 
states. It is very clear now that the economies of some of the developing states have 
grown at much faster rates in the globalization period. They also have a better 
coordination mechanism today than in the past.32 This means that the developing states 
today are much better at blocking the moves of the developed states than earlier. The 
climate negotiations have also revealed a lack of trust amongst the developed economies 
themselves, as is evident from the divergent stand taken by the United States and the 
European Union at almost all climate change summits from Rio to Copenhagen. The 
same is true for the developing countries (BBC 2009). Low lying island states fearing the 
worst consequences of a rise in the seal level, seeking firm and guaranteed commitments 
on emission reductions, whereas states dependent on their oil production and exports are 
very wary of such moves, as was evident from Saudi Arabia’s stand at the Copenhagen 
Summit in 2009. The hard realities of international politics ensure that the drowning or 
survival of small and weak states do not figure in the top priorities of developed states. 
Emerging economies such as India, China and Brazil, realizing the vastness of their 
market and enjoying their new-found clout in the current global economic order, tend to 
put their efforts towards selective bargaining so as to ensure maximum gains for 
themselves rather than towards the overall good of planetary life.  
Another major problem that has confronted climate action relates to uncertainties 
in the demonstration of impacts. Calamities do not repeatedly occur in a specific region, 
which means that people tend to look at it as one contingent incidence of life. A calamity 
may become a hotly debated issue after it occurs, but the reactions then fade away. The 
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BASIC, BRICS, IBSA, comprising of competing developing states such as India, China Brazil South 
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predictions related to impacts similarly are drawn on the time scale of hundred years, 
which means that people tend to take it as the problem for future and this means that 
reactions to incidents do not result in motivations necessary for urgent and target specific 
changes in the lifestyles.  
2.7. The Paris Climate Treaty 2015 
Amidst all these constraining factors mention however, must be made of the COP held 
in Paris in December 2015 for generating a potentially effective agreement. The 
optimism generated by the Paris climate treaty can be understood with reference to the 
exuberant remark made by Laurent Fabius, France’s foreign minister and the lead 
negotiator of the treaty. For Fabius, the deal worked out at Paris is ‘balanced’ and ‘a 
historical turning point’ in resolving the hazardous impacts of climate change. 33  
As noted, the Paris Accord is universally applicable and was to be legally binding 
on the parties to the conference after a minimum of 55 states (parties to the convention) 
emitting 55 percent of estimated total GHG emission had ratified (UNFCCC 2015: 
Art.21). That threshold was reached on November 4, 2016 (UNFCCC 2016). The deal is 
both ambitious balanced.  The ambitiousness of the treaty is reflected in its declaration 
for holding of rise in the global average temperatures to less than the hitherto accepted 
20C (UNFCCC 2015: Art 2.1(a)). Further, by declaring that efforts be made to ensure 
that global temperatures do not to rise above 1.50C to the pre-industrial levels, the treaty 
puts forward a balanced approach that is equally sensitive to the existential problems 
                                                                 
33 For a detailed description see: UNFCCC, (2015). PARIS AGREEMENT. [Online] Geneva: UN. 
Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf   
[Accessed 21 Nov. 2016]. 




faced by small islands because of the immanent rise of sea levels (UNFCCC: Article 
2.1(a)). The deal is pragmatic in allowing the developing countries to peak their 
emissions levels as soon as possible and to undertake rapid reduction measures thereafter 
(UNFCCC 2015 Art 4.1).  
Voluntarism, however, remains the driving force of the deal, as the parties are 
expected to voluntarily declare their Intended Nationally Determined Climate Action 
Plans (INDCs) and to work towards realizing them. In doing so the treaty does take into 
account the principles of capabilities and needs (UNFCCC: Art 4.2). After every five 
years (commencing from 2023), national governments are expected to do a stocktaking 
by demonstrating and informing each other about ways in which they plan to execute 
further stringent measures. Transparency and accountability is to be ensured through 
non-institutional mechanisms of naming and shaming (UNFCCC: Art 7.14). Adaptation 
is one of the most important planks of the agreement, under which the developing 
countries are to get financial and technological help to cope up and avoid the hazardous 
impacts of extreme climatic variations. The adaptation capabilities of the developing 
countries are, however, to be strengthened in ways that does not in any ways threaten 
food production (UNFCCC 2015: Art.2.1 (b)). The developed states are expected to 
make efforts for mobilising 100 billion USD annually till 2025 to help the developing 
countries in avoiding the impacts (UNFCC: Art.9).  
The Articles of Agreement of the Paris climate treaty well demonstrate the 
cooperative and realistic intent of the international community, towards resolving the 
climate conundrum. The Paris Climate Treaty is surely, an important advance, but some 
significant questions related to delivery remain. An important one is whether it has 
achieved a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of climate change mitigation. 




Such a distribution is the subject of the next two chapters. Another important question is, 
again, whether and how states’ leaders and their populations can be motivated to 
actually fulfil their pledges under the agreement. 
  As Robert Falkner notes:  
The past record of climate policies around the world suggests that 
governments have a tendency to express lofty aspirations but avoid 
tough decisions. For the Paris Agreement to make a difference, the 
new logic of “pledge and review” and the subsequent “ratchet” will 
need to mobilize international and domestic pressure and generate 
realistic expectations for more substantial climate policies worldwide 
(Falkner 2016: 3). 
 
Chapters 5-7 deal centrally with motivational issues in helping to realize compliance 
with an effective and fair global climate change mitigation effort.  
2.8. Conclusion 
The issue of climate change impacts all and as such requires collective action. However, 
differences in the intensity of its impacts across geographical locations hinder  efforts to 
overcome persistent collective action problems. As well put by Dale Jamieson, the root 
of the problem has been that  
‘[H]igh-emitting rich countries do not want developing countries to 
follow in their footsteps, but developing countries want rich 
countries to take the first step in reducing emissions. Even between 
the rich countries there is a ‘you first, then me’ attitude... this 
behaviour simply follows from the logic of a collective action 
problem: for each of us, defection dominates cooperation however 
others act’ (Jamieson 2011:47).  
 
As detailed in this chapter, many times agreements reached in the many summits 
and global conferences on climate change are brokered by the powerful states (which 
reflects their global reach and might), but even those agreements do not get converted 




into policy actions. The noncommittal attitude of states in achieving the legally binding 
targets as specified under the Kyoto protocol, the state of affairs of the protocol after the 
Doha amendments, and the American reluctance in coming on board, are all cases in 
point. The Paris Agreement has been lauded as a high point in achieving climate 
cooperation, but important challenges remain for motivating its implementation, and for 
ensuring that it and subsequent efforts actually reflect a fair distribution. That is the 













3. Fairness in Climate Change 
Mitigation: Grandfathering, 
Egalitarianism, and Polluter Pays 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined some of the major political attempts made by the 
international community towards resolving the political difficulties associated with 
climate change.  As became clear, there has been a contrast between the large number of 
attempts made to reach agreements on climate change mitigation, and the actual number 
of agreements entered and states entering them. The Paris Agreement may represent a 
turning point, but as noted, it remains to be seen how far states will honour their pledges 
to act, and ultimately how fair the agreement will prove to be, in particular for 
developing states.  
Questions of fairness, effectiveness and motivation to comply, it is suggested here, 
are closely related. Until we have some sense of what a genuinely fair distribution of the 
burdens and benefits from climate change mitigation would be – and how any particular 
agreement may measure up to defensible fairness criteria -- we can’t know what sorts of 
challenges will have to be overcome in order to achieve it. This thesis argues that 
cosmopolitanism is the appropriate normative framework for approaching climate 
change. I provided a general outline of the cosmopolitan moral approach in the 
introductory chapter. In this chapter, I survey and critically engage with some prominent 
approaches to establishing fair burden sharing in climate mitigation, including principles 
which have informed some prominent past proposals or agreements. This lays the 




groundwork for the discussion in Chapter 4 of a specific cosmopolitan approach to 
climate fairness, which I will defend as the most coherent.  
Following Edward Page, I believe that any realistic attempt to resolving the 
climate conundrum must address three very important issues (Page 2013:232). The first  
is the amount of the GHG that can be cumulatively allowed to be emitted by individuals 
and communities across the globe to ensure that the global rise in temperature is below 
2oC (1.50C after the Paris treaty) (Shue 1993: 48-50; Caney 2009: 125-6). Second, but 
closely connected to the first issue, is determining appropriate principles and policies to 
ensure that the overall emission level is maintained both at present and in future 
(Gardiner 2006: 310; Page 2008: 556-7). That issue is highly salient to the large 
developmental disparities between individuals and communities within and across states, 
which renders them unequal in capabilities for shouldering climate centric 
responsibilities. The third issue is settling whether agency means the individual or states 
as the bearers of responsibility (Page 2013). This is important because the state has 
conventionally been seen as the most effective and realistic agency for shouldering 
international duties and commitments. However, it is also true that ultimately it is 
individuals’ conduct that actually impacts and is impacted by climate change.  
In relation to the first issue, there appears to be broad agreement amongst the 
scientific community that achieving the professed target of limiting the rise in global 
temperatures to less than 2oC would require that, by 2050, the emissions will need to be 
reduced by 40-70 percent at 2010 levels. Per the existing IPCC, estimates limiting CO 2 
emissions to below 450 ppm could well result in achieving the target of not allowing the 
global rise in temperature to more than 2oC. The general opinion amongst experts on the 
third question ranges from conferring the agency role on the state (Page 2013), to the 




individuals (Caney 2011a). The presumption in this thesis is that the agency role should 
be conferred both on the state and individual. Whilst the state has a massive role in 
generating policies, individuals play important role not only in complying with them but 
most significantly in creating support for the enactment of such policies in the first place 
itself.  
This leaves us with the fundamentally important second question regarding the 
appropriateness of moral principles in policies concerning climate change. It is worth 
noting that principles of fairness, or equity, have been treated primarily in terms of three 
core principles: equality, responsibility and capacity (Heyward 2007; Caney 2011a; 
Raymond 2008).  The principle of equality has been interpreted to either underline the 
equal right of each agent (individual or state) to the common atmosphere, or to stress the 
idea that states should be taken as coequals in terms of their contributions to resolving 
the catastrophic impacts of climate change (Heyward 2007: 520).  Similarly, the principle 
of responsibility has been invoked to stress historical accountabilities under ‘polluter 
pays’ and ‘beneficiary pays’ norms (Page 2013).  Under the principle of capacity, the 
focus has been on assessing the developmental levels (capabilities) of states, and to look 
to them as possible benefactors or beneficiaries.     
Each of the approaches to fair climate change mitigation distributions discussed 
in this chapter relates to those three principles, though most tend to give emphasis to one 
specific principle. The chapter is structured as follows: first, I discuss Grandfathering, 
where past emissions are given priority as a means of setting permissible emissions 
moving forward, effectively benefiting historically large emitters. I then take up equality -
based, or egalitarian, proposals, which would focus in part on allocating equal per capita 
GHG emissions. I then look at responsibility-based approaches, in particular ‘polluter 




pays,’ which would require states to contribute to climate change mitigation in 
proportion to their total past emissions. In the last section I introduce a ‘hybrid’ 
cosmopolitan approach. The next chapter presents and discusses that approach in detail 
as overall the most defensible. 
3.2. Grandfathering 
Grandfathering, is a policy formulation for applying exemptions or relaxations to large-
volume resource users, permitting them to continue with their usage volumes even after 
more restrictive agreements have come into force (Knight 2012:410; Bovens 2011:129). 
Grandfathering, in other words, follows a ‘rule of first possession’ and assesses a fair 
distribution accordingly (Nash 2009: 811).  
Historically, the practice of Grandfathering is associated with some types of ‘Jim 
Crow’ laws passed to reinforce segregation in many of the Southern states in the United 
States in the post-Civil War period. Some such laws provided exemptions to the white 
population from property and literacy requirements for voting. In other words, whilst the 
voting rights of the non-white population (mainly blacks, but in the State of Texas it 
included Mexican-Americans) was contingent on their property and literacy 
requirements, these were not applied to the white population (Robertson 1995). The 
justification for such a regulation was that the non-propertied and non-literate white 
population would have voting rights as a matter of inheritance, but the same could not 
apply to the non-whites, as their ancestors never possessed such rights.   
In the climate change context, Grandfathering operates by setting a benchmark 
base year to which all the states must reduce their emissions by some percentage 
amount.  It involves endorsement of the idea that the levels of emission in the past 




should determine the levels of emission in future (Knight 2012: 410; Paterson 1996: 184–
185). The approach accepts the current emission levels of the states as a starting point, 
but would gradually reduce that level by imposing strong regulatory mechanisms on the 
new emitters. The underlying rationale for the approach is that the states in their own 
specific ways should adapt and reduce their emission volumes in a way that corresponds 
to the level of the declared base year (Page 2013). According to Simon Caney, this 
approach has two features in that it sees a fair share of emission as determined by a 
state’s ‘past share of emission and, second, that these emission rights should be handed 
out free of charge to these actors’ (Caney 2011a: 61).  
The Kyoto protocol in fact partly endorses this approach by mandating all its 
ratifying states (Annexure I parties) to reduce their ‘collective emission of six key 
greenhouse gases by at least five percent below base year level of 1990 throughout the 
2008-2012 period’ (Carter 2001:235). That base level – the level of past emissions – 
serves to set the level of permitted emissions moving forward. Similarly, the ‘cap-and-
trade’ system developed under the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) of the European 
Union also reflects Grandfathering in the sense that it first sets up an optimum level of 
collective emission and then caps it.34 Emitters, in the form of firms, are then given free 
emission volume permits in proportion to their past emission records. Once a firm 
exhausts its permit, it can buy additional quotas from the other firms that have not 
exhausted their own permitted volumes.  
                                                                 
34 The cap-and-trade approach of late however, has been replaced by an auction based approach. Under 
the auction based approach emission permits are auctioned and not freely distributed as in the cap-and-
trade system (see Parker 2007: PP 1-25).  
 




The normative underpinning of Grandfathering as an approach can be 
constructed by combining two norms of entitlement: (1) the Humean notion of 
‘ownership via possession’ and (2) Lockean justification of ‘beneficial prior use’ 
(Raymond 2008). David Hume argued that, in the absence of any regulatory legal 
framework in the hypothetical state of nature, individuals, despite possessing an absolute 
right to property, continued to suffer massive insecurities which not only reinforced the 
feelings of selfishness but also created hurdles in the realization of social prosperity, 
cohesion and growth (see Forbes 1985: Ch. 1). For Hume, property in essence was the 
precondition for the creation of organizing principles of society, and as such, all the pre -
existing holdings of individuals who come together in a social contract must be 
recognised. A logical extension of Hume’s argument in the context of climate change 
would be that ‘nations are entitled to their current levels of GHG emission or at least 
that current levels are the base line from which any subsequent reductions must be 
prorated’ (Raymond 2008: 5-6).  
A similar defence of Grandfathering has been built on John Locke’s ‘labour 
theory of value’, which takes human labour (activity) as the source of all value (wealth 
and possessions).  A systematic application of such an account in the climate change 
context has been provided by Luc Bovens (2011: 128-129). Bovens holds that the 
atmosphere can be viewed in the same way as common, unmanaged and unproductive 
land in Locke’s approach. Individuals create value by mixing their labour with the 
natural resources. They are the legitimate controllers and appropriators of the value they 
created within the constraints of ‘enough-and-as-good and no waste conditions; many 
benefitted, nobody was made worse off, and all usage was productive usage’ (Bovens 
2011: 129). In the context of atmospheric emissions, Bovens argues, technological 




advances and entrepreneurial skills were employed by states to turn the atmosphere in to 
a productive resource by GHG emissions. As such, they should be able to continue to 
appropriate their existing percentage share of atmospheric emission rights. Similarly, 
according to Leigh Raymond,  
[p]rior use of a resource adds value through productive labour, 
thereby justifying a claim of unilateral appropriation to allocations 
based on prior use as pre-political that are recognized rather than 
created. Grandfathering, as such, can be conceived as a 
distribution of a resource according to historic entitlements, 
justified, in terms of ‘just acquisitions’ or ‘needs’ (Raymond 2008: 
6).  
In terms of policy acceptance, Grandfathering has some positives to offer. On a 
purely utilitarian ground, it can be defended as a necessary first step for an emission 
reduction scheme that can be overhauled and reformed over time to produce a more 
equitable distribution of emissions (Caney 2011a: 62; Gosseries 2007: 300–301). It is also 
consistent with presumptions that changing rules while the game is on is unfair .  
Grandfathering also is taken as something that can provide some sort of transitional 
relief (Huber 2011). Given the urgency involved in mitigating the disastrous impacts of 
climate change, grandfathering then appears to be a pragmatic construct emphasizing the 
need to start the journey.  It is also defended on the ground of urgent priority in the sense 
that giving relaxations is perhaps the most straightforward way to ensure the 
participatory commitments of the major emitters (Nash 2009:  812).  
Grandfathering as a principle of fair distribution has also been defended on an   
additional utilitarian account of marginal benefits. It has been argued that in comparison 
to the developing countries, the developed states are more capable of converting an 
additional unit of emission into enhanced welfare. This entitles them to higher emission 
rights. According to Carl Knight, ‘One extra unit of emission entitlements from a 




baseline of zero increases welfare to a greater extent where it is assigned to a high emitter 
than where it is assigned to a low emitter (Knight 2012: 418).  
3.2.1. Assessing Grandfathering      
Grandfathering has been criticized as both inequitable and environmentally insensitive 
(Vanderheiden 2008; Caney 2009, 2011; Page 2013; Moellendorf 2009; Meyer and Roser 
2010). It is seen by critics as a shock absorbing, compensatory scheme designed to secure 
the interests of states with high emission volumes.  By locating and fixing emission 
entitlements of states on the basis of their shares of emissions in the past, the approach 
appears to be grossly unfair to the states accounting for lower levels of GHG emissions 
(Gardiner 2011: 425).  
In other words, the approach disproportionately rewards polluters by accepting a 
very high baseline against which emissions are to be reduced. This has serious 
consequences for developing states, which because of their lower levels of 
industrialization and development have had very low levels of emissions historically. 
Such an approach could dictate lower levels of future emission for the developing states, 
which would hold a very high probability of blocking their chances of development.  
According to Simon Caney, Grandfathering is  
[v]ulnerable to two serious objections. First, it is insensitive to people’s 
needs and would lock members of developing countries into a 
permanent state of poverty and underdevelopment…and second (it) 
runs contrary to another deeply held principle of justice – namely, the 
principle of historical responsibility…by not making those who cause a 
problem bear a corresponding burden. In fact, it remunerates people 
for behaviour that has caused a problem (Caney 2011a: 61-62).   
 
This could also mean that even when the developing states are exempted from 
emission reductions, the per capita emission of the developed states would continue to 




exceed that of the developing countries (Page 2013). Further, Grandfathering appears to 
be a unidimensional distributive scheme for mitigation, in that it provides a basis for 
cutting and distributing the emission norms but has nothing to offer on how the burdens 
of adaptation may be shared between states. This is an important omission, given the 
growing salience of adaptation, amid the impacts of climate change that have already 
become evident. Overall, if high emissions are indeed catastrophic, as they have been 
proved to be, then allocating high emission quotas to high emitters only because they 
have been high emitters appears indefensible.   
3.3. Egalitarianism  
Egalitarian approaches see the atmosphere as a common good belonging to all persons 
(Singer 2004). It holds that people across political, geographical, lingual, ethnic, and 
cultural divides are entitled to equal claims on it (Agarwal & Narain 1991; Jamieson 
2006). More specifically, all humans are said to have an equal claim to the atmosphere in 
terms of emitting GHG gases, for the benefits it accrues to them. Second, since the 
earth’s atmosphere can cope only with a very limited amount of GHG emissions, it is 
required that ‘the global common be shared equally on a per capita basis’, so that the 
emissions volumes of states are proportionate to their respective population (Agarwal 
and Narain 1991:13; Baer et al., 2008).  
Taking that into account, it has been suggested that emissions corresponding to the 
levels of scientifically established limits should be fairly and equally allocated on per 
capita bases. According to Peter Singer, emissions could be stabilized at one metric ton 
per person per year (calculated in the year 2002). It could then ‘become the basic 
equitable entitlements for every human being in the planet’ (Singer 2004: 35). According 




to Singer, such a scheme would be beneficial to the developing countries in pushing their 
developmental imperatives by allowing them significantly greater emissions and getting 
the developed states to cut down theirs. As an example, Singer calculates that fixing the 
emission entitlements at 0.6 ton per person per year (worked out in the year 2002) would 
allow China to enhance its cumulative emission by 33 percent, whilst for the US it would 
mean a reduction by one/fifth of its present levels.  By highlighting the idea of common 
ownership, the egalitarian approach paves the way for equal access claims of all 
individuals across the globe. More significantly, in doing so it makes redundant all 
hitherto existing historical and territorial claims of appropriations and transfers (Singer 
2004: 35). An appeal to common ownership also provides legitimacy to equal human 
rights claims and paves the way for the need of protection of the most immediate and 
fundamental interests of all citizens.  
3.3.1. Contraction and Convergence 
Another egalitarian approach, which proposes in part per capita emissions standards,  is 
‘Contraction and Convergence’ (Meyers 2000). Under this approach, per capita emission 
volumes of each state should correspond to a particular set level, and individual states, 
depending on their current levels of emission, should mitigate or enhance their emission 
volumes to realize that set level. The proposal was first developed by the Global 
Commons Institute. It operates on two central presumptions: firstly, that in the context 
of the ever rising possibilities of catastrophic impacts from climate change, states should 
be made to agree on a set level of permissible emissions; secondly, that they should agree 
to cut or enhance their emissions in a way that the overall set levels would be realized on 
a particular date.  The developed states would gradually reduce their emission volumes, 




while the developing states would enhance their GHG emissions ‘[u]ntil, after a 
transition period everyone has the same emission rights as other’ (Caney 2011a: 64; 
Agarwal and Narain 1991; Najam et al., 2003).  
This egalitarian approach takes into account the differentiated levels of 
development between states and is flexible in terms of not just the time frame, but also 
the final emission levels required for achieving it. It therefore naturally appeals to the 
developing states, as it allows them to significantly raise their emission levels while 
simultaneously requiring their developed counterparts to curtail theirs. In doing so, the 
approach to a certain extent is also in consonance with ‘polluter pays’ principle both in 
historical and current contexts (Heyward 2007:526).  
3.3.2. Assessing Egalitarianism 
The egalitarian approach to GHG emission mitigation has generated support from a 
range of states as diverse as India, France, Sweden, Belgium, China, the Africa Group, 
and it was discussed during the Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP 15, 2009). It has, 
however, been enmeshed in the divide between the developed and the developing 
countries over both the rate of emission reductions and the time frame in which it is 
implemented (Evans 2011). It has also been subjected to some very detailed scrutiny in 
normative accounts.  
Caney has argued that the approach suffers from three limitations (2011b: 90 -97).  
Firstly, it is methodologically problematic, as it treats emissions in isolation from other 
requirements of a person’s well-being, failing to take ‘into account their access to all 
primary goods and resources’ (2011b:90; see Caney 2011a: 64). Secondly, it is too 
focussed on ends, i.e., on deciding on the emission levels and allowing quotas. Citing 




Amartya Sen’s capability approach as another ground on which the egalitarian approach 
could be subjected to scrutiny, Caney castigates it for focusing only on means and not 
the end of ‘furthering people’s ability to pursue various goals and to enjoy certain 
capabilities’(Caney 2011a : 65).  Thirdly, in granting equal emission rights it simply 
overlooks the differential requirements that agents have because of their  belonging to 
different natural, social and economic contexts. It would certainly be better to consider 
an individual’s  
[E]ntitlements as a whole, taking into account their access to all 
the relevant primary goods or resources… and then have a 
distributing rule applying to the whole package of goods 
contained therein.  Accordingly, an equal per capita distribution 
of GHG gases may fail in the task of ameliorating global 
inequalities as well as  enabling the fulfillment of basic interests 
of the sufferers and victims of the adverse impacts of climate 
change (Caney: 2011a 64).   
 
Further, such approaches face steep viability problems (Posner & Sunstein: 2008).  
Equalizing per capita emissions is based on the assumption that people all across the 
globe have equal emission requirements. The fact, however, is that the energy 
requirements of individuals are dependent on geographical, historical, cultural and socio-
economic factors (access to non-fossil fuel) (Caney 2011a: 65). By awarding equal 
emissions, the per capita approach fails in incentivizing the efforts and contributions of 
all communities towards mitigation of climate change (Caney 2011a: 66).   The 
developed states are also wary of the uneven cost implications. They argue that accepting 
it would mean that some states would gain at the expense of others who would have to 
bear the costs associated with it. Making the developed states accountable for bearing the 
cost associated with emission mitigation would first require the improbable task of 




working out a mechanism to determine the net gains of states in terms of their respective 
emission volumes in the past.  
According to Madeleine Heyward (2007: 521) the unviability of the egalitarian 
approach stems from the fact that it requires developed states with relatively small 
population to bear the massive cost of something to which they would never agree. 
Similarly, the approach appears to be promoting inequality in the name of equality by 
requiring both low and high emitters to converge on same per capita emission by the mid 
years of the century. This may be unacceptable even to the developing states, since it 
implies that the high emitters of the past would not have to make bigger sacrifices in the 
present, something which the developing states have been most vocal in demanding.  
3.3.3. Greenhouse Development Rights  
Another attempt at identifying a fair distribution of climate-change mitigation burdens 
and benefits which is focused on equality – in this case an equal global threshold of 
welfare below which individuals should not bear any burdens of mitigation -- goes under 
the heading Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR). It appears as a significant 
evolution over the equal per capita entitlement (contraction and convergence) approach 
in the sense that it provides a framework for eradicating poverty, while simultaneously 
endorsing developmental priorities cutting across demographic factors. Put forth by a 
team of climate researchers, including Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou of Eco Equity 
and Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict of the Stockholm Environment Institute - the 
approach was formally presented at the thirteenth meeting of the Conference of Parties 
at Bali. It received significant attention during the Copenhagen summit, and is largely in 
sync with the UNFCCC framework of ‘equity and in accordance with their common but 




differentiated responsibility’ (UNFCCC 1992, Article 4). The approach seeks to give due 
consideration to factors such as national circumstances, historical responsibility and 
capacity in transparently working out the fair share of a state’s burdens in ensuring that 
Global Warming is kept below 20C.  
The approach gives due importance to human rights by stressing the idea that the 
climate conundrum cannot be solved unless the issues of poverty eradication, and the 
right to dignified life is adequately addressed.  Drawing on the generally accepted 
argument that access to fossil fuel and thus to carbon emission is the only ‘proven route 
to development’,  the approach acknowledges the idea that that any successful attempt 
towards climate change can be made only by integrating economic development with 
climate protection. It has to be one where the pressing developmental needs of 
developing countries are seriously recognised and meaningfully pursued in an 
environment of genuine and mutual trust between the developed and the developing 
states. As Kartha, Athanasiou and Baer put it, ‘[T]he framework… presents one possible 
effort sharing approach in which responsibility (in terms of emission) and capacity (in 
terms of ability to afford mitigation and adaptation measures), are defined and quantified 
in a manner that seeks explicitly to safeguard a right to development and to account for 
the vast disparities found not only between but also within countries’ (Kartha Athanasiou 
and Baer 2012: 54).  
The GDR approach operates by identifying a ‘developmental threshold’ which is 
the ‘level of welfare, below which people are not expected to share the cost of the climate 
transition’ (Kartha Athanasiou and Baer 2012: 55). The threshold is kept slightly higher 




than the global poverty line’35, and reflects the appreciation for a life which is ‘beyond 
basic needs but well short of levels of affluent consumption’ (Kartha Athanasiou and 
Baer 2012:56). By insisting that anyone falling below the threshold is exempted from 
sharing the responsibilities related to climate change, the GDR framework ensures that 
the resources and income required for survival is not taken into account while 
calculating the percentage share of responsibility. People above the threshold are to be 
entrusted with the responsibility not only of paying for their consumption, but also to 
‘preserve the right for others’ (Kartha Athanasiou and Baer 2012:56). In other words, 
they are expected to  
as their incomes rise, gradually assume a greater faction of the 
costs of curbing the emissions associated with their own 
consumption, as well as the costs of ensuring that, as those below 
the threshold rise towards and then above it, they are able to do 
so along sustainable, low-emission paths. Moreover, and 
critically, these obligations are taken to belong to all those above 
the development threshold, whether they happen to live in the 
North or in the South (Kartha Athanasiou and Baer 2012:56).  
 
The capacity of a nation in aggregate terms thus is determined by adding all 
individual income excluding the income below the threshold. Similarly, responsibility is 
set up in terms of cumulative emissions since the baseline year of 1990 and it again 
excludes the emissions below the threshold. By focussing on defining responsibility and 
capacity in individual terms, the approach attempts to take into account inequalities of 
income and wealth both within and between countries. It claims to be a ‘critical and long 
overdue move [over] the usual practice of relying on national per capita averages [which] 
                                                                 
35 The exact percentage by which the threshold should be higher to the global poverty line is still being 
debated but it is set almost twenty-five percent above the global poverty line of 20 USD per day.  




fails to capture either the true depth of a country’s developmental need or the actual 
extent of its wealth’ (Kartha Athanasiou and Baer 2012: 58).  
Having outlined the parameters of capacity and responsibility, the approach then 
proceeds to identify a ‘Responsibility Capacity Index’ (RCI) to work out the 
differentiated percentage contribution of each state in carrying climate change related 
responsibilities (mitigation and adaptation). The approach is however, very candid in i ts 
acceptance of ‘trust’ and ‘spirit of political accommodation’ between the developed and 
the developing states as the two vital factors behind an effective actualization of the 
mechanism. Building genuine ‘trust’ is difficult but not impossible, only if the developed 
states were ready to take exemplary lead (at least for a short interim period) in 
demonstrating serious mitigation action, while the ‘foundation of trust on which broader 
cooperation is based is worked out in the interim period’ (Kartha Athanasiou and Baer 
2012:63).  
3.3.4. Assessing Greenhouse Development Rights 
The GDR is a novel attempt towards identifying a mechanism that neatly fits in the 
UNFCCC framework of ‘equity based common but differentiated responsibility’. By 
intertwining the goals of greenhouse stabilization and development it ‘produces a clear 
answer to those who seek to separate and contrast these goals, and who sometimes 
suggest that humanity should choose between them and should focus on poverty rather 
than on greenhouse gas mitigation’ (Attfield 2009: 152). The approach is an 
endorsement of the idea that the most disadvantaged have an extra emission right for the 
realization of their right to develop (Caney 2011b: 98). Equally important is its 
adherence to the idea that global warming cannot and should be not allowed to exceed 




more than 20C by ‘requiring larger emission reductions by rich industrialized countries’ 
but allowing them to ‘contribute to emission reductions in other countries in order to 
achieve their total emission requirements’ (Moellendorf 2009: 260).   
  Edward Page offers a detailed and useful critique of the GDR approach, raising 
four key objections (Page 2008:572-73). The first is that the weight put on the ability and 
responsibility in the ratio of 60:40 requires a morally persuasive explanation (Page 
2008:572). Second, the target of achieving a whopping 80 percent reduction in emissions 
by 2050, with a peak CO2
e of 470 ppm, appears a bit too ambitious especially in context 
of the fact that the GHG concentrations reached 430 CO2 
e in 2006 and continue to grow 
at the rate of 2.3 ppm per year without any sign of contraction (Page 2008:572). Third, in 
stressing on income in framing the responsibility capacity index (RCI) the approach 
undermines other significantly important issues such as relative poverty or non-income 
aspects of human well-being (Page 2008:572). Fourth, its philosophically questionable 
for counting only recent historical emissions (1990–2005) as the basis of its responsibility 
component (Page 2008:573). It is dependent on ‘unprecedented international 
cooperation in implementing stringent atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
and would be in the danger of collapse, even if agreed, in the event of any significant 
defaulting’ (Attfield 2009:152).  
3.3.5. Egalitarianism Modified: Equal Mitigation Sacrifice  
Within the larger framework of egalitarianism, the idea of equal mitigation sacrifices or 
‘fair chore division’ (Traxler 2002), has been put forward as politically plausible way of 
addressing climate change concerns (Page 2013). Equal mitigation sacrifices entail that 
prosperous states should undertake mitigation efforts over a period of fifty years in such 




a way that they all suffer a two percent loss in their respective national incomes. In other 
words, they all bear similar costs in terms of ‘foregone national income or well-being 
over the 2000-50 period, though in real monetary terms the costs would still be different 
to them’ (Traxler 2002; Miller 2009: 147).  The approach attempts to build on the basic 
needs principles by arguing that emissions should be categorised as subsistence emissions 
and luxury emissions.  
Subsistence emissions are defined as those minimally guaranteed basic emission 
rights necessary for an individual’s existence and the fulfilment of vital needs (Shue 
1993: 55). According to Traxler, subsistence emissions are ‘psychologically and socially 
necessary emissions’ (Traxler 2002:106). Luxury emissions, on the other hand, are those 
produced for the attainment of other materialistic and consumptive desires (Shue 1993: 
56). Steve Vanderheiden argues that, once subsistence emissions have been distributed, 
luxury emissions could then be equally distributed (Vanderheiden 2008: 26).  He holds 
that basic needs include a ‘basic right to climate stability’, a right to a ‘minimum per 
capita level of emissions’, and a ‘right to develop’ (Vanderheiden 2008: 64). These rights 
are to be considered inalienable and non-transferable, and their fulfilment is subject to 
the condition that every person (present and in future) would have access to the required 
basic minimum emissions, within the overall carrying capacity of the atmosphere. For 
Vanderheiden, each state should be given equal per capita emission rights and be 
allowed to trade in them as well. However, the trading system must be regulated so as to 
ensure that the unused survival cannot be by any means whatsoever be bought for the 
luxury emissions of the rich states (Vanderheiden 2008: 243). Accordingly, the right to 
develop can never be prioritised over the right to survival (ibid).  




According to Martino Traxler (2002), the approach holds that rich states with  the 
ability to render aid have a moral obligation to help others in situations of distress. The 
obligation emanates from ‘two universal moral duties – not doing wrongful harm to 
others –and a duty to assist those who need help in order to avoid harm and suffering’ 
(Traxler 2002: 101). Traxler believes that these two universal duties in turn generate two 
distinct moral arguments for allocating benefits and burdens while dealing with climate 
change. The first duty of not doing wrongful harm (non-maleficence) paves the way for 
compensations and rectifications in a situation of its violation.  
A practical implication of the proposal is that more developed and affluent states 
would be required to reduce their emission levels. They could also help the developing 
states by undertaking remedial measures proportionate to their superior economic 
capacity. I will suggest that, whilst at first reading the argument looks persuasive, i t runs 
into the problem of feasibility when considered in the context of differences in the 
burden bearing capacities of the developed states themselves. As Moellendorf notes, the 
approach is best with three moral problems: first, it takes the present circumstances of the 
agents as the starting point and in doing so ignores their unequal background conditions.  
Second, in equalizing the opportunity costs, it sacrifices the right to development as the 
poor may have to forgo comparatively inexpensive essentials, rather than requiring rich 
countries to forgo expensive luxuries. And third, in requiring all countries to share some 
burden in reducing emissions it may simply result in stalling all developments in least 
developed countries. (Moellendorf 2009:252-53).   
Similarly, given the temporal and spatial dimensions of the impacts of climate 
change it is difficult to exactly pinpoint the scale of the impacts. Equally difficult is the 
task of identifying the violator and fixing responsibilities, which means that all states 




have to bear a cost irrespective of their historical responsibilities or otherwise. The task 
becomes extremely difficult within the existing Westphalian framework of sovereign 
states, especially in the absence of an ‘overseeing supra-national authority with the power 
to police and enforce any agreement that nations of the world may reach’ (Traxler 2002: 
101). In comparison to the duty of non-maleficence, or avoiding harm, the duty of 
assistance ‘falls equally on all who can help those who will otherwise suffer [and] are 
better suited to equitable or fair allocations or chore divisions’ (Traxler 2002: 102).  The 
approach does not attempt to equalize the volumes by which states should uniformly or 
otherwise cut their GHG emissions. On the contrary ‘the actual pattern of greenhouse 
emissions over this period is permitted to vary so long as loss borne by the average citizen 
of each state caused by changes in lifestyle and consumption associated with effective 
international mitigation is equalised’ (Page 2013 : 231).  
At the outset, the approach looks very appealing. However, as Stephen Gardiner 
has pointed out, the difficulty is with its operationalization. It would be extremely 
difficult to specify between what would constitute basic and luxury emissions (Gardiner 
2011: 424-5). For example, a right to develop could be construed in various ways, from 
the fulfilment of the most basic conditions of existence (human rights) to the right of 
knowledge, research, or even social capital and democratic governance.  Similarly, it 
may even be interpreted to include the existence of socio-cultural rights necessary for 
collective existence.    
3.4. Historical Responsibility: Polluter Pays Approach 
The third broad approach focuses on responsibility arising from past actions. The idea 
that past emissions of states should be taken into consideration while deciding and 




allocating responsibilities on GHG mitigation was introduced formally in 1997 by 
Brazil.36 The historical roots of the approach however, can be traced to the 1972 UN 
Earth Conference and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(Under Article 16), where the idea was discussed under the heading, Polluter Pays 
Principles (PPP). It stands in contrast to Grandfathering principles that seek to distribute 
mitigation responsibilities commensurate with existing levels of GHG emissions, and 
with egalitarian principles which focus primarily on states’ abilities to contribute to 
mitigation. 
The approach proceeds from the presumption that agents possess equal emission 
shares in the atmosphere and then moves backward by assigning remedial 
responsibilities to those who for different reasons may have used more than their fair 
share (Neumayer 2000: 187-188). It operates on a straight forward acceptance of 
remedial responsibilities for usurpation of rights and puts premium on compensation for 
the violations done. Polluter Pays holds that, since the current generations in the 
industrialized nations have disproportionately benefitted from the emissions of their 
predecessors, they are more liable to pay for the cost of mitigation. 37 According to Henry 
Shue, perhaps the most influential proponent of the approach: 
[W]hen a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others 
by imposing costs upon them without their consent, those who 
have been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to demand 
that in the future the offending party shoulder burdens that are 
                                                                 
36 In 1995 the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was entrusted with the task of preparing a 
proposal for discussion and adoption at third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto in 1997. Brazil acted on 
this mandate and sent in a proposal titled Proposed Elements of a Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
 
37 Under Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol differentiated responsibilities 
for GHG  mitigation have to be set taking into account past share of GHG emissions.  




unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously 
taken, in order to restore equality (Shue 2010: 103) 
 
The approach is normatively persuasive in fixing responsibilities on agents for 
their past and present contributions to the problem and then calling on them to 
undertake remedial action for the harms and deprivations caused. In other words, the 
polluter pays principle operates by establishing a direct relationship between the causal 
responsibility and the agency to generate outcome responsibility (Barry 2005: 212).  A 
key implication of Polluter Pays is that states which have gained on account of unlimited 
free emissions in the past should now make radical cuts, whereas those who missed out 
on such free emissions for a variety of reasons can now permissibly increase their GHG 
emissions (Shue 1999: 536-7; Caney 2011a: 68). 
Also, acknowledging the moral responsibilities of the present generation towards 
the future, it endorses sustainable development, along with supporting key strategies for 
mitigation and adaptation. Similarly, the acceptance of the Polluter Pays Principle in i ts 
essence is an acknowledgement of the principle of punitive/corrective justice as well as 
the disincentive of not polluting. To that end it endorses the setting up of a compensatory 
‘Penalty Fund’ where money is to be deposited by states responsible for climate change, 
and from which costs of adaptation in developing and vulnerable societies could be 
funded.  The allocation of mitigation burdens for present as well as future generations 
has to be worked out by fixing the emission volume share that is commensurate with 
GHG emissions in the past. By stressing the requirement of fairness and inclusivity the 
approach recognizes the importance of procedural equity as well.  
 




3.4.1. Beneficiary Pays Principle 
A related but distinct way of fixing historical accountability is the Beneficiary Pays 
Principle (BPP). The underlying assumption of the approach is that agents owe remedial 
duties for harming others in proportion to the actual benefits that may have been derived 
in harming (Baatz 2013; Page 2008, 2013). In the context of climate change, the 
approach proceeds from the presumption that all states have been involved in emission 
in some form or the other, though a small number of developed states have been 
historically responsible for the largest volumes of emissions. Since present generations in 
the developed states have actually benefited from their past large volumes of emissions, 
they should be assigned greater responsibilities for bearing climate burdens. According to 
Edward Page, ‘their high development can be traced fairly directly to past and present 
activities, such as access to abundant energy supplies sourced from fossil fuel 
combustion, that drive climate change’ (Page 2013:240).  
The BPP is presented as an improvement to the PPP because it does not simply 
require present generations to pay for the harms of past ones, regardless of present 
benefits. And, in contrast to some egalitarian approaches, it does not hold that present 
mitigation actions are owed simply because an agent is able/developed/ wealthy, but 
because an agent is deriving present benefits from past harms. The BPP thus attempts to 
provide a ‘bridge between the historical responsibilities and present abilities by 
connecting benefits unintentionally derived with present capabilities to assist’ (Eckersley 
2015:487). 
 




3.4.2. Assessing Historical Responsibility Approaches 
One objection raised to the historical responsibility approach is that past generations, 
when emitting GHG gases in their own time, were ignorant of the consequential ill 
effects of such emissions (Vanderheiden 2008: 190; Caney 2011a: 69). As noted earlier, it 
was not before the mid-years of the twentieth century that conclusive evidence of the 
possible harmful impacts of GHG emissions was scientifically established. Further, 
considerable divergence of opinion on fixing the baseline year makes the issue much 
more complicated. Further, it is noted that the people responsible for the rise in 
emissions during the industrial revolution are long dead, and that it would be unfair to 
punish the future generations for the acts of their predecessors (Caney 2005a :756). It can 
be noted also that there was no regulatory authority or agency during the time the 
emission appropriations were being made. These appropriations, one could argue, are 
more akin to appropriations made in the Lockean state of nature with the condition that 
enough be left for the posterity (Raymond 2008:175). The Lockean argument on strict 
liabilities however, does not hold good in this case, as the appropriators could plausibly 
argue that they were ignorant of the fact that not enough would remain for the 
generations to come (Caney 2005a:757). It is also difficult to establish whether the past 
emitters were the only beneficiaries of the GHG emissions, and that the benefits of 
emissions from the industrialized states percolated down to the now developing states as 
well, in the form of enhanced access to decent standards of life. The issue of historical 
responsibility gets further enmeshed in the complex web of causes, effects and 
implications, especially in the context of globalization and the resultant outsourcing of 




the centers of production. This means that the emissions in one state could well be for 
products that are consumed by another (Ashton and Wang 2003). 
The BPP to a certain extent appears forward looking, but it also faces challenges. 
One is that it may place unfair demands on present generations by requiring them to 
surrender the very same privileges that their predecessors enjoyed (Caney 2006b:473). 
Another challenge is that the BPP faces difficulties in actually determining that exact 
proportion of the wealth of the present generation that has been inherited by them and 
could be marked as arising out of the harmful acts of their predecessors.  
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented and assessed three broad types of proposals for fairly 
distributing the burdens and benefits of climate change mitigation. First, I examined the 
Grandfathering, which would permit large emitters to ‘inherit’ an effective right to 
continue to emit a large proportion of GHG.   I argued that the approach might be 
defended on purely instrumental grounds, as a first step to inducing large polluters to 
actually join an agreement. As a principle of fairness, however, it is flawed, largely 
because it appears simply to reward harmful behavior. I then looked into the egalitarian 
principles operationalised through equal per capita share worked out through a slew of 
proposals like contraction and convergence, the Green House Development Rights and 
the equal mitigation sacrifices. Whilst each of the proposals reviewed under 
egalitarianism appear to be persuasive, they suffer from the issue of coherence and 
practicalities as well. In the last section I looked into the principle of histor ical 
responsibility and the straight forward Polluter Pays Principle and the Beneficiary Pays 
Principle, arguing that the principles appear logically straight in assigning causal 




responsibilities but in the case of climate change it gets lost into the quagmires of other 
complexities.  
It is pertinent to say that all the approaches detailed in the preceding pages of this 
chapter have been well intended, novel attempts towards solving the climate conundrum. 
To a large extent, they have been successful in pointing out the intricacies involved, in 
dealing both with the impacts of climate change as well as that of sharing the 
burdens/costs associated with it. They have not, however, stood up to scrutiny of 
whether they actually outline a fair distribution of burdens and benefits in climate change 
mitigation efforts. The next chapter presents and defends a cosmopolitan approach to 
fair distribution which, I will argue, is more coherent and defensible and can inform 








4. Fairness in Climate Change 
Mitigation: Defending a Hybrid 
Cosmopolitan Approach  
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the ‘Hybrid Account’ of distributing climate mitigation burdens, 
as developed by its key proponent, Simon Caney, and I defend it as providing a coherent 
and defensible set of principles for establishing a fair distribution of burdens and benefits 
in the context of climate change mitigation. Specifically, I argue that the Hybrid Account 
has three essential components that set it apart from rival approaches. The first is its core 
commitment to providing a minimal standard of dignified living for all, i.e., its sensitivity 
to human rights. The second is its conferment of responsibilities on an appropriately 
broad range of actors, including individuals, regional governments and NGOs. Third, 
and most significantly, it combines the merits but not the defects of the Polluter Pays 
Principle (hereafter PPP), and an Ability to Pay Principle (hereafter ATP).   
In the sections that follow, I will first outline Caney’s understanding of 
cosmopolitan concerns that inform his views on climate justice.  I will then offer some 
further details on PPP approaches, as well as ATP.  I then present the main 
presuppositions of Simon Caney’s Hybrid Account of climate justice and the ways in 
which it addresses some very important concerns related to both PPP and ATP, on its 
way to providing a framework for a defensible distribution of burdens and benefits from 
climate change mitigation efforts. Following that, I address some possible objections to 
the account, arguing that none is decisive against it. 




4.2. Caney’s Cosmopolitan Concerns 
In a series of well-informed scholarly writings Caney, (2005, 2006, 2009, 2010 2012, and 
2014) has worked to construct and defend an account of climate change justice that is 
grounded in liberal egalitarian ideals and informed by his core belief that persons, as free 
and equal moral agents, must be treated fairly and that their capacity for choice must be 
respected (Caney 2014b: 71).  The issue of climate change, according to Caney has 
immense practical importance as it simultaneously raises some very practically 
significant though theoretically complex and puzzling issues. Its practicality emanates 
from the fact that both human activities and climate change mutually impact each other.  
Climate, as discussed here in previous chapters, is severely impacted by human 
activities like burning fossil fuels and climate change impacts people’s lives by limiting 
their access to the basic amenities of life. The issue is theoretically complex, puzzling 
and significant because addressing climate change not only requires that we undertake 
activities linked to mitigation and adaptation, but most significantly, given the uneven 
levels of development and capabilities of states, it requires us to identify actors who 
should be asked to share the burdens related to it. Given that it is an intergenerational 
issue, climate change involves a moral understanding of our past responsibilities and the 
duties that we owe to the future generations and as a global collective action problem, it 
necessitates the application of principles of global justice (Caney 2014b: 72).  
Caney draws on Joseph Raz’s influential interest theory of rights, which grounds 
individual rights in relation to vital human interests, to argue for individual rights to be 
protected from climate change impacts, and corresponding duties on others (Caney 
2005a:767). He highlights climate change-related threats to individuals, including (1) 




drought and malaria, (2) heatstroke (3) Infectious diseases such as malaria, cholera and 
dengue (4) flooding and destruction of homes and infrastructure (5) enforced relocation 
and (6) rapid, unpredictable and dramatic changes to their natural social and economic 
world. His overall claim is that ‘persons have the human rights not to suffer from the 
disadvantages generated by global climate change’ (Caney 2005a:768).  
Caney thus defends a human rights-based approach to climate justice that is 
consonant with his convictions on cosmopolitan global distributive justice. It is an 
integrationist and minimalist approach to climate justice (Caney 2012). It is 
integrationist in the sense that the issue of burden sharing is worked out by taking into 
account the totality of relevant factors, such as actors’ responsibilities for past actions 
and current liabilities, poverty and current developmental levels, capabilities and 
potentials, context and geographical locations. According to Caney, these issues are 
equally important, and can easily be validated from a human rights perspective that 
underlines the possibility of certain minimum standards of living necessary for a 
dignified life for all individuals cutting across geographical and ethnic divides. Caney’s 
endorsement of a human rights approach that ‘takes each person’s life with the utmost 
seriousness and gives it equal standing and protection’ irrespective of the geographical 
location that s/he belongs to, underlines his cosmopolitan concerns.  (Caney 2014b: 73).  
Caney’s understanding of minimalism is purely guided by the concerns of 
feasibility, as a maximalist position is akin to an ideal and might just be rejected on the 
grounds of being impractical and unfeasible. The minimalist approach, on the contrary, 
is concerned with the morally relevant issue of providing basic resources to all, with an 
added degree of urgency given the fact that some of the negative consequences of climate 
change are already being felt by the poor and the vulnerable. The approach is sensitive to 




local needs and the respective capabilities of different actors before identifying and 
allocating burdens and benefits associated with climate change mitigation. 
Caney points out that the weighty impacts of climate change generate 
duties/burdens of both mitigation and adaptation. The mitigation burdens can be 
interpreted as the costs for not undertaking emission activities that contribute to the 
phenomenon of climate change. The non-involvement of an individual in such 
endeavours results in an opportunity cost on them, i.e., the losses arising on account of 
foregoing of opportunities. The costs can also be understood as the additional 
resources/burdens that apply for avoiding and adapting to the impacts of climate change 
(Caney 2005a: 751). In an attempt to identify the actors who should bear the burden of 
climate change, Caney accepts that the polluter pays principle has the ‘immediate 
intuitive appeal and should play a role in any plausible account’ (Caney 2010a: 205). 
However, he also points out the practical problems associated with the implementation of 
PPP, to which I will now turn. 
4.2.1. Polluter Pays Principle 
As discussed in the previous chapter, PPP is effectively based in the claim that it is fair to 
charge actors for a mess created by them: those for polluting must make up by paying for 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. The approach attempts straightforwardly to offset past 
harmful action with current duties and liabilities. The idea that past emissions of states 
be taken into consideration while deciding and allocating responsibilities on GHG 
mitigation is a robust, equity-based moral argument, advanced in climate change policy 
deliberations.  




In an attempt to identify the potential actors that should bear the burden of climate 
change, Caney accepts that the polluter pays principle has the ‘immediate intuitive 
appeal and should play a role in any plausible account’ (Caney 2010a: 205). He also 
notes, however, some practical problems associated with the implementation of PPP. 
First, in a situation where it is difficult to predict or point to the exact nature of harm, i t 
would be extremely difficult to link it to the actor that caused it (Caney 2010a:205). This 
is significantly important because the predictions made by the IPCC are in the form of 
probabilities, marked and ranked in terms of their happening on a scale that varies from 
95 percent to 5 percent.  Second, it is unfair to assign all the cost to states implicated in 
past emission of GHG gases, where emitters may not have been aware of the disastrous 
consequences of their acts. Further, there are problems with fixing responsibility on the 
emissions of past generations who are long dead.  PPP also faces challenges related to 
non-anthropogenic warming, i.e., the rise in temperature which may not have been 
because of human actions/emissions but whose catastrophic impacts could still fall on 
human beings. In all such situations, PPP appears seriously challenged in providing a 
clear answer to the questions of who should take on the burden of mitigation and why. 
Finally, an important limitation of the PPP is related to the misconception that the 
polluter is always affluent. According to Caney ‘there is not a perfect correlation between 
high emissions and wealth, and in some instances making people pay in proportion to 
their emissions would perpetuate the poverty of some and reduce others to poverty. This 
is true, for example, for many in China and India’ (Caney 2010a:212).  
Caney endorses the adoption of a modified strict liability principle, which holds 
that if people engage in activities which jeopardize other people’s fundamental interests 
by emitting excessive amounts of greenhouse gases then (i) they should bear the costs of 




their actions even if they were excusably ignorant of the effects of their actions, if they 
have benefited from those harmful activities and (ii) their costs should correspond to the 
benefits they have derived (Caney 2010a:210). A modified liability principle thus in 
prescribing the cost a duty bearer has to carry first looks into the degree of benefits that 
may have accrued to the agent on account of the GHG emissions. However, it is also 
poverty sensitive in the sense that in prescribing the cost, it ensures that the duty bearer 
does not get pushed ‘beneath a decent standard of living (Caney 2010a: 218). Caney 
refers to this modified liability principle as PPP*. The duties thus ascribe only to those 
people in rich states who in carrying them do not in any sense suffer themselves. The 
ability to pay according to Caney supports this modified or suitably configured principle 
of historical accountability.  
4.2.2. Ability to Pay Principle 
The ATP approach, as presented by Henry Shue (1999) holds that (1) the most 
resourceful actors should contribute the most in a common endeavour (Shue 1999: 537) 
and (2) that in a situation where resources are sufficient, distribution should be arranged 
such that all have a guaranteed access to resources essential for a minimal level of decent 
life, even if this means that some will have more than the others (Shue 1999: 541). 
Simply stated, the approach argues that ‘the duty to address some problem (in this case, 
bearing the burdens of climate change) should be borne by the wealthy, and, moreover, 
that the duty should increase in line with an agent’s wealth’ (Caney 2010a: 213).  
The assignment of responsibility is not dependent on any guilt or fault; rather i t is 
based on the positive moral duty to assist. States are expected to shoulder the burdens of 
adaptation and mitigation in accordance to their respective capabilities of doing so. The 




more able they are, the more should they contribute (Shue 1999: 537). ATP thus looks to 
the developed states (rich and technologically efficient and thus able ones) as flag bearers 
of climatic responsibilities. In seeking to allocate the bulk of the responsibilities for 
mitigation and adaptation costs to the developed states, it not only takes the 
developmental prerequisites of the developing states into consideration, but in doing so it 
also demonstrates its inherently welfaristic orientation towards them.   
Within his Ability to Pay Principle, Caney carefully drafts certain conditions so 
as to make it sensitive to the concerns of responsibility, capability and need. First he 
argues that among the wealthy, those who earned their wealth through activities that 
‘endangered the earth’s climate’ should bear greater responsibility in carrying out the 
burdens of mitigation and adaptation than those who amassed their wealth in ways non -
endangering to the climate. Second, the ATP also entails that the ‘duties to bear the 
remainder should be borne by the wealthy but again ‘those whose wealth came about in 
unjust ways’ should carry greater responsibilities and burdens than ‘those whose 
amassed their wealth in unjust ways (Caney 2010a:218). 
4.3. The Hybrid Approach 
Having outlined the two broad features of PPP and ATP and the issues involved in strict 
adherence or application of either of them, Caney, moves towards combining the two in 
a distributary scheme for addressing the dreadful impacts of climate change. Caney’s 
main objective is to work out a mechanism which in generating causal responsibilities 
also plays on the moral responsibilities of agents.  The starting point of Caney’s 
formulation is the belief that ‘those who caused the pollution are morally responsible for 
it and the duty to rectify this situation or compensate the victims therefore rests with 




them (Caney 2006b: 467). From that perspective, then, Caney forwards his favoured 
‘Hybrid Account’ that is built on a modified Polluters pays principle, and augmented by 
a revised Ability to pay principle.  In other words, his ‘Hybrid Account’ builds on the 
modified PPP but dovetails it with a forward-looking concern, i.e., the Ability to Pay 
Principle. The ‘Ability to Pay’ (ATP) principle according to Caney is ‘forward looking’ 
because unlike the PPP, which is focussed on identifying the actors responsible for 
climate harms, it is concerned with the actors who could possibly ‘rectify the harm’.   
The hybrid, account according to Caney, is harm avoidance justice as ‘it takes as 
its starting point the imperative to prevent climate change, and works back from this to 
deduce who should do what. Its focus is primarily on ensuring that the catastrophe is 
averted…[and] is concerned with the potential victims—those whose entitlements are 
threatened—and it ascribes responsibilities to others to uphold this entitlement’ (Caney 
2014a, 126).  The approach thus focuses on an understanding of the measures necessary 
for adaptation and identifying the actors who have the ability to fund them. It has an 
intuitive appeal in that it requires the most advantaged (the most able) to pay the greatest 
contribution, though with the rider that doing so should not in any way result in their 
sacrificing a great deal of their own interests. Moreover, it is not a rejection of the PPP, 
rather it has been put forth as a support principle to address hitherto uncovered issues.  
The ATP, according to Caney, can well accommodate what he calls the 
‘Remainder’, or some challenges noted above to PPP. These include (1) holding present 
generations straightforwardly liable for the emissions of the earlier generations, (2) non-
anthropogenic impacts of climate change and (3) the (legitimate) emissions of the 
developing world (disadvantaged). Within his Ability to Pay Principle, Caney also 
carefully drafts certain conditions so as to make it sensitive to the concerns of 




responsibility, capability and need. First, he argues that among the wealthy those who 
earned their wealth through activities that ‘endangered the earth’s climate’ should bear 
greater responsibility in carrying out the burdens of mitigation and adaptation than those 
who amassed their wealth in ways non-endangering to the climate. Second, the ATP 
also entails that the ‘duties to bear the remainder should be borne by the wealthy’ but 
again ‘those whose wealth came about in unjust ways’ should carry greater 
responsibilities and burdens than ‘those who amassed their wealth in unjust ways’ 
(Caney 2010a: 218).  
The hybrid account of distributing the burdens of mitigation and adaptation thus 
consists of PPP and ATP38 arranged in lexical order, PPP* applied first and ATP** 
applied only to the remainder left by PPP* (Knight 2011: 5). Caney argues that his 
hybrid approach can be put into practise at all levels, i.e., by states, international 
institutions, sub-state governments, national and multi-national companies, as well as 
individuals. This is based on his understanding that causal responsibilities can be the 
grounds for generating moral responsibilities and so if different agents can be shown to 
have had causal responsibilities, they can be expected to have moral responsibilities to 
undertake mitigation related responsibilities and help in adaptation measures as well.  It 
does not preclude even the poor or the developing states from undertaking their own 
contributions though it is massively inclined towards allocating them roles according to 
their abilities as well as their social context of their limitations. The Hybrid Approach 
thus is in tune with all existing policy measures of mitigation and adaptation as well.  
                                                                 
38 According to Simon Caney this would be his preferred PPP and ATP something that he illustrates as 
PPP* ATP** respectively. 
 




4.4. A General Assessment of the Hybrid Approach  
The hybrid account at first sight appears to be a credible, integrationist, account of 
distributing the costs and burdens arising out of the impacts of climate change. By 
dwelling on issues such as responsibility, capability and developmental needs, on the one 
hand, it affirms that people involved in pollution must be held accountable for their acts,  
and on the other attempts to create a fair balance by reposing its faith in the liberal 
egalitarian principle that assigns fair opportunities to all. The PPP* and ATP** thus are 
brought into a complementary relationship with each other. The ‘remainder problems’ of 
PPP* are covered well by the ATP** and the historical insensitivity of the ATP** can be 
tackled well by the PPP* (Knight 2011: 5). The two used in conjunction with each other 
generate morally plausible outcomes. As Edward Page (2013: 244) suggests, in cases 
where it is difficult to assign clear moral responsibility and liability, assigning the 
remedial burdens to the most capable is a fair option and demonstrates commitments to 
tackling climate change (Page 2013: 244). 
Significantly, displaying its inherent cosmopolitan orientation, the hybrid 
approach is open to assigning responsibilities not just to states but to individuals, sub-
state actors, multinational bodies, institutions and corporations alike. The affirmation 
that those agents who have the capability to bear the burden should carry the majority of 
it means that climate change related duties could well be assigned to the rich in 
developing states as well. Further, as Caney notes, though the most advantaged have 
leading responsibilities, it does not preclude the duties of the least advantaged, who have 
the choice of pursuing alternate low energy developmental paths.  




The approach also works to address the issue of inter-generationality in terms of 
balancing the most urgent and specific needs of the poor people in the present, and 
ensuring those future generations are not impacted by such efforts. This is important, 
because taking recourse to the social discount rate emphasized under orthodox economic 
theory, it has been argued that since life conditions improve over a period of time, and 
future generation become more capable then the present ones, it is better to keep 
mitigation responsibilities in abeyance for the time being and leave it for the future 
generations to resolve (assumingly) in more efficient ways. Citing the works of Harold 
Barnett and Chandler Mose’s path breaking study ‘Scarcity and Growth’, (1963) to 
substantiate the argument that the standard of living improves with every passing 
generation, Julian Simon for example, argues that ‘because we expect the future 
generation to be richer than we are, no matter what we do about, asking us to refrain 
from using resources now so that future generations can have them later is like asking 
poor to make gifts to rich (Simon 1996: 295). Caney rejects this, noting that the cost of 
mitigation and adaptation is far less today than what it would be in future, and as such, it 
is only rational and judicious that the present generation shares and carries the burdens 
responsibilities associated with climate change.   
 Caney’s approach focuses on the need of developing an individual-centric 
mechanism in which all those who can afford to take on the responsibility are expected 
to share climate related burdens. This seeks to ensure fair participation and 
accountability for the wealthy who live in developing states. A strict PPP approach 
focused on per capita state emissions could fail to hold such individuals to account. A 
hybrid cosmopolitan approach would appropriately require wealthy individuals in all 
states to contribute within their often-considerable means to mitigation efforts.  




The ability to pay approach does well in addressing many of the hitherto 
unaddressed issues. It has faced some objections, however, and those need to be 
addressed if the approach is to be adopted as overall the most defensible. According to 
Edward Page (2013) it is ‘questionable as a single-principle solution of the “justice in 
burdens” problem for at least three reasons’. First, an application of the approach in a 
situation where two states are roughly equal to each other in terms of their respective 
capacities of dealing with climate change, but diametrically apart in their respective use 
of climatically efficient technology, would mean similar if not identical burdens for both. 
‘This appears a rather implausible approach to the distribution of climatic burdens 
amongst rich states’ (Page 2013: 248). Second, a similar challenge could arise in the case 
of two developing states. Third, Page argues, the most important issue that the approach 
leaves unanswered is the ‘deeper, normative, question of why those who have the most 
resources should bear the greatest climate burdens other than because they can’ (Page 
2008: 561-2). Page also argues that Caney’s ‘methodological individualism’ is equally 
difficult in ‘operationalization’, given the fact that the focus of the current discourses on 
climate change has been state centric (Page 2008:570).  
The assignment of responsibilities to those most able to meet them has been 
critiqued as confusing, in the sense that it takes both mitigation and adaptation as a 
‘package deal’, and as such, fails to recognize that the motivation for action in the case of 
mitigation may be different from that of adaptation. Mitigation has common benefits but 
adaptation benefits are always local (Jagers and Duus-Otterstrom: 2008). As a matter of 
fact, with the climate change impacts becoming increasingly evident, the identi fication of 
adaptation related costs and the agency that could be entrusted with such responsibilities 
require careful but urgent attention. Critics have highlighted other potential problems, 




including assertions that (1) it would be arbitrary to draw the line for excusable 
ignorance at 1990 (since Caney employs an individualistic path it is quite possible that 
some agents even today remain ignorant of the consequences of their action); (2) Since 
identifying the most advantaged is a tedious job in the absence of the criteria set for it, it 
is also not clear when ‘a poor but developing emitter become[s] well-off enough to 
shoulder the burdens of its own emissions’ (Jagers and Duus-Otterstrom 2008). Like 
Page, they also contend that it is somewhat unclear as to what extent the hybrid model is 
feasible on a thoroughgoing individualist account, as it is well understood that the 
emission quotas and obligation to mitigate/adapt will in practice be the responsibilities 
of the states.  
Further, Caney’s hybrid account has been challenged by Carl Knight on three 
grounds (Knight 2011:531). First, for its inability to differentiate between emissions that 
can be easily avoided and those are difficult to avoid. Second, for a partial reference to 
all-things-considered justices (i.e. Caney’s neglect of social contexts in which people live 
and make decisions that impact climate), which means that it cannot provide a full 
account even of climate justice. Third, for excusing the poor from bearing cost burdens, 
even in contexts where they might have contributed to the problem, the approach only 
incentivises them to increase emissions (Knight 2011:531)39. Knight believes that the 
costs related to climate change should be allocated according to a pluralist scheme that 
‘best promotes advantage levels, with increases in the advantage levels of the worst off 
and those who have made better choices being more valuable than increases in the 
advantage levels of the better off and those who have made worse choices’ (Knight 
2011:539).  
                                                                 
39 Caney has responded to these criticisms (Caney 2011c) and Knight does accept some of them.   




The hybrid account has been developed by Caney to deal with the issues 
confronting the ATP and PPP. Critics, however, have seen it as continuing to face some 
of the problems associated with both of them. On the one hand, Caney argues that the 
exact extent of harms arising out of human induced climate change is not exactly known 
yet, and on the other hand, he expects the most able to undertake both mitigation and 
adaptation measures without providing (1) the exact nature and extent of work they need 
to do and (2) without providing strong and compelling reasons that would motivate them 
to act (Dobson 2006:169-70). The approach could lead to a situation, others argue, 
where the wealthy states not implicated in causing atmospheric degradations (harms) 
may refuse to shoulder remedial responsibilities, especially those of adaptation, on the 
ground that it is unfair and unreasonable to ask them to do so (Jagers and Duus-
Otterstrom 2008).  
Though Caney looks to the cosmopolitan morality of doing the positive duty of 
help, he does not provide a scheme or an incentive that would impel the wealthy to 
overcome the normal antagonisms between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ to the extent that 
they are motivated to give help to the poor wherever they may geographically be placed. 
It is well known that poverty and vulnerability walk hand in hand and that all societies 
have such sections of impoverished people. It can be expected that following the call to 
the positive moral duty of help, the rich and the wealthy look to help the poor of their 
own nation. However, the reasons, ways, manner, and the extent to which they would 
be motivated to expand the horizons of their actions to include the weak, poor and the 
vulnerable living in distant geographical locations, is something that Caney needs to 
clearly set forth. The point becomes immensely important given the fact that the impacts 
of climate change are likely to be disproportionately severe (potentially existential) on 




the regions (IPCC 2013) that are home to the bulk of world’s poor and vulnerable 
communities.  
Caney has not been able to demonstrate why it is obligatory for the wealthy states 
to compulsorily undertake mitigation and adaptation duties. This is important because 
the intensity and impetus of actions, more often than not are generated and triggered by 
the kind of mutual obligations actors have vis-à-vis each other. For example, legal 
obligations generate compulsory and binding action whereas moral obligations may 
result in voluntary obligations. I may help a poor and struggling person or may choose to 
ignore him or her and move on. Much would also depend on my social values 
orientations, as well as the nature of the socialization processes that I may have been 
through or simply on my temperament and mood at that moment. Voluntary responses 
thus could well be lighter, thinner or limited and are dependent on social cultural as well 
as psychological factors.  
The concerns and appreciations for humanity in other words, could be too thin an 
obligation to generate the required motivational impetus to act, and a referral to past 
harms could well lead us back to square one in terms of accepting the Polluter Pays 
Principles which Caney himself has been so doubtful of.  It is thus difficult to understand 
why and how the wealthy would undertake positive moral duties in the absence of any 
strong motivational impetus to act. It could give way to a kind of ‘you first’ syndrome 
wherein those whose wealth came in just ways pass the buck, arguing that it would be 
unfair to ask them to carry on the burdens. The actors whose wealth came in unjust ways 
would also not act, for the simple reason that acting would be tantamount to their 
accepting the argument that their past actions indeed were unjust.  




Some challenges might also be raised in relation to Caney’s ideas on just and 
unjust ways of amassing wealth, especially when looked at this through an historical 
lens. Since the ways of generating wealth are linked to the extent and intensity of duties, 
it is likely that this may result in a blame game between the wealthy themselves, wherein 
each would work towards projecting the other as actors whose ancestors amassed wealth 
through unjust means. It could well generate new kinds of tensions and turmoil.  It is 
true that Caney assigns greater responsibilities to those actors whose wealth came in 
unjust ways, but the idea of ‘unjust ways’ itself needs some more clarifications. If unjust 
ways primarily refer to those which harm the environment, and if responsibilities are to 
be fixed in proportion to the harm then then it would be difficult to distribute it amongst 
agents having similar emission standards but different wealth levels.  
Caney calls upon the wealthy (both whose wealth came in just as well as unjust 
ways) to undertake mitigation and adaptation duties. In doing so he very clearly accepts 
wealth as the distinguishing and outstanding feature of ability. A look into the historical 
efforts of mitigation and adaptation however, shows that quite often the situation has 
been the converse, with the poor and the vulnerable in many instances carrying out 
environmentally sound activities, and the rich in their desire for continuous 
accumulation causing some of the worst environmental damages.  The resilient efforts of 
the poor and the vulnerable in many African and Asian communities to ward off the 
impacts of climate change through their local, indigenous and innovative practises is 
now well recorded (cf Adger et al., 2003). As a matter of fact, the need is to recognize, 
popularize and universalize these experiences and practises so as to augment the 
adaptive capacities of the poor and vulnerable people in other communities.  




Caney himself acknowledges (Caney 2011b) that all issues cannot be simply 
addressed as issues of Justice; and yet he attempts to merge both the corrective and 
distributive aspects of justice within his Hybrid account, without considering the 
establishment of coordinating mechanisms and regulatory institutions and their 
acceptance at regional, national, supranational and universal levels. Though Caney looks 
to cosmopolitanism as the required moral philosophy and endorses the idea that ‘the 
most advantaged have a duty to construct institutions that discourage future non-
compliance’ (Caney 2005a: 769), he fails to develop an account of the ways in which the 
poor and disadvantaged could also be brought on board. This is crucial deficiency, since 
resolution of the climate conundrum not only demands effective coordination and 
cooperation between the developed and the developing states, it also requires bringing a 
host of other actors, civil society organisations, for example on board.  It necessitates the 
development of mutual ‘trust’ wherein all the deep concerns of the developing states 
regarding these attempts as constructs designed to hinder their right to development,  are 
effectively allayed. Bringing them on board is thus one of the toughest challenges that 
confront Caney’s approach. In later chapters of this thesis I will address this issue in 
particular as to how the poor can be effectively motivated to be part of the larger 
collective efforts to resolving climate problems.  
Lastly, Caney argues that the hybrid model can be put into practise at all levels 
i.e. by states, international institutions, sub-state governments, national and multi-
national companies, as well as individuals. However, he has not elaborated either on the 
mechanisms through which individual’s compliances can be ensured, facilitated and 
encouraged, especially in the context of the sovereign state system or the mechanisms 
through which these actions can cut across state-centric divides.  




4.5. Caney’s Own Defence 
In one of his more recent writings Simon Caney (Caney 2014a) has attempted to offer 
arguments that to a certain extent do deal with some of the issues raised above (more 
specifically, the issue of feasibility). Caney starts by a rejection of the principle of 
‘International Paretianism’ developed by Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2012), and 
‘efficiency without sacrifice’ argument developed by John Broom (2012). Interestingly, 
both these accounts have been developed keeping ‘feasibility’ as the most important 
factor in mind.  
The principle of ‘International Paretianism’ believes that, to satisfy feasibility, ‘all 
states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the climate treaty’ 
(quoted in Caney 2014a: 128). Calling it ‘unclear’ and ‘ambiguous’ Caney argues that a 
treaty based on the principle of ‘International Paretianism’ must address the question of 
what it is ‘Pareto Superior to’ (Caney 2014a: 129). Likewise, it also must be clear in its 
meaning, as ‘feasibility’ can have different interpretations i.e. it may mean ‘possible or 
(ii) ‘likely to happen, or (iii) will happen’ (Caney 2014a: 128). Caney believes that 
whichever interpretation may be used, Posner and Weisbach’s arguments are 
‘unsuccessful’ (Caney 2014a: 129) and that the attempts of address climate change 
require that ‘the members of the political unit as a whole to act in ways that reduce 
emissions’ (Caney 2014a: 131).   
Broom’s ‘efficiency without sacrifice’ approach holds that attempts towards 
resolving climate change should be aimed at breaking political deadlocks impasses and 
logjams (Broom 2012). According to Broom, one way of doing that could be by leaving 
fewer stocks of capital and goods for the future generations. Such a design would allow 




the present generation to consume resources (business as usual) without worrying much 
for the future generations (Broom 2012:44-46). Broom argues that because the costs 
involved in tackling the impacts of climate change would be less in future, hence passing 
them over to future people can be a plausible way out of the current impasse. Caney 
believes that such an understanding generates scepticism as ‘mitigation may impose costs 
on some for which they cannot be compensated’ (Caney 2014a: 132-33).  
 For his part, Caney asserts that it would be naïve to assume that agents on their 
own would comply with their duties of mitigation and adaptation and that ‘anyone 
serious about preventing climate change (and thus avoiding harm) needs to reflect on 
how to respond to current and future non-compliance’ (Caney 2014a: 134). He 
differentiates between ‘first-order and second-order responsibilities’, wherein the former 
‘include responsibilities to mitigate climate change (through reducing emissions and 
maintaining greenhouse gas sinks), to enable adaption, and to compensate people for 
harm done. Second-order responsibilities, by contrast, refer to responsibilities that some 
have to ensure that agents comply with their first-order responsibilities’ (Caney 2014a: 
135).  He specifies that current and future noncompliance should be responded to by 
ensuring that, in a situation where some actors have not been able to comply with their 
duties, others should cover some of it. However, in itself this is not enough and needs to 
be supplemented ‘with an account of second-order responsibilities’ which would require 
structuring and defining social economic and political ‘contexts in ways which induce 
agents to comply with their first-order responsibilities’ (Caney 2014a: 135).   
The second-order responsibilities require that all acts aimed at minimising the 
deleterious impacts of climate change be identified, and all possible agents, both best 
placed as well as possessing the right qualities (traits emphasis added ) to shoulder such 




responsibilities, be identified and entrusted with commensurate duties (Caney 2014a: 
136). This, Caney argues, is not just a different normative way of fixing responsibilities. 
It also facilitates a far more comprehensive understanding of the required actions and 
widens the ambit of identifying a large number of different agents who could be 
entrusted with different kinds of responsibilities (Caney 2014a: 136). The agents could 
well be in the form of individuals, corporations churches; civil society institutions, 
universities and research bodies, states, international institutions etc., and their actions 




4. Creation of Norms that Discourage High Emissions or Foster a Commitment to 
Adaptation 
5. Undermining Resistance to Effective Climate Policies 
6. Civil Disobedience 
7. Creating Norms to have efficient demographic policies  
In terms of identifying the traits required to shoulder these responsibilities, Caney 
argues that the agents ‘are to act as “norm entrepreneurs”, and to be effective in 
accurately conveying information and persuading people to act, then agents must enjoy a 
certain moral authority and enjoy good standing among others. They must be regarded 
as trustworthy by others and command respect’ (Caney 2014a: 141). Caney argues that 
such agents are valued and respected in society and as such are best suited to 
influence/compel/induce/enable others ‘to act in climate-friendly ways’(Caney 2014a: 
141).  Those who have the power to shoulder responsibilities effectively have the 




responsibility to do so. Caney says that the power/responsibility principle is an advance 
on a straightforward Ability to Pay principle in the sense that the ATP is generally seen 
in terms of financial resources, whereas in this case the agents could be entrusted with 
the responsibilities on the basis of their expertise, for example in ‘the political process 
(e.g., politicians or urban planners), or their knowledge and expertise (e.g., those capable 
of scientific innovations), or their powers of persuasion (e.g., norm entrepreneurs)’ 
(Caney 2014a: 142).  
 
 Caney’s power/responsibility approach thus appears as one developed to 
supplement his hybrid model from the feasibility point of view, and to that extent looks 
promising indeed. The identification of actors/agents and responsibilities that they 
should shoulder in order to prevent harms induced by climate change is praiseworthy 
however, from the vantage point of gaining wider acceptability and applicability it 
requires some fine-tuning and streamlining. 
4.6. Advancing the Hybrid Approach 
Overall, I will suggest that Caney’s re-formulation of the Polluter Pays Principle and its 
alignment with the Ability to Pay Principle offers a great deal in terms of coherence and 
overall defensibility as an approach to the fair distribution of burdens and benefits in 
climate change mitigation. It holds promise for accommodating both the concerns of the 
current and specific needs of different people living in different geographical locations 
under differing standards of development, and the complex issue of assigning 
responsibility.  




Questions however remain, on Caney’s seeming oscillation between concerns of 
moral fairness in distributions, and concerns of political feasibility. In terms of feasibility, 
we can recall his rejection of a maximalist approach) and yet at times Caney gets swayed 
by the concerns for moral uprightness and fairness. He says that his concern is not with 
‘which sorts of duties should be taken on, not whether they are likely to be taken on:  ‘Our 
question, though, is whether the principle at heart is a valid one’ (Caney 2010a:  206). 
Weisbach and Posner have very clearly brought this issue to the fore when they argue 
that  
It is idle to argue for a climate treaty on ethical grounds if the 
ethically required climate treaty will surely be rejected. The 
challenge for commentators and scholars ought to be to propose a 
climate treaty that is both ethically acceptable and politically 
feasible. However, there has been very little discussion of political 
feasibility. The focus on ethics alone has resulted in numerous 
proposals that have little chance of being accepted. Pursuit of these 
proposals has resulted in little progress in reducing emissions. The 
world would be better served, and a more ethical outcome achieved, 
if the focus were instead on feasible treaties that actually reduce 
emissions (Weisbach and Posner 2013: 348).  
 
 In what follows I attempt to bring forth certain key arguments and issues with 
which the hybrid approach could engage, towards providing a stronger normative 
justification of an agent’s responsibilities but also in significantly elaborating on the 
important question of why the identified agents would shoulder the responsibilities that 
they are supposed to. In other words, the power/responsibility principle must ground 
itself on some kind of a thick normative framework that is persuasive enough to generate 
meaningful actions. I am by no means suggesting that all moral theories must 
independently generate meaningful/rational action. Rather I am putting forth the 
argument that it would certainly be helpful if it could be shown how Caney’s moral 




theory could be put into practice. It is an issue with which proponents of global justice 
have long been struggling with, but in the context of climate change it becomes 
imperative to broaden them out, not only because of the involvement of a multitude of 
actors cutting across state divides, but also because of the uneven geographical spread of 
the impacts and the ever burgeoning differences of the causative agencies, which gives 
rise to blame games resulting in deadlocks and impasses.  
The understanding that emanates out of Caney’s approach is that whosoever can 
contribute towards preventing harms in whatsoever ways must act in accordance with 
their duty. Both the hybrid model as well as the power/responsibility approach converge 
on the point that those with abilities must bear the burden be it that of adaptation or 
mitigation. Caney understands and accepts that a significant percentage of emission now 
comes from developing countries themselves, and hence within his approach he assigns 
duties to the rich and the wealthy citizens of those states as well. A careful reading of the 
power responsibility approach also suggests that Caney pins his hope more on 
individuals and less on institutional and governmental arrangements, and given the 
current state of climate affairs that is acceptable.  
Now, the issue is this, how do we identify the traits that are required to be the 
kind of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ that Caney wants agents to become? What qualifications 
would be required and what are the ways in which such qualifications may be acquired is 
another issue that needs to be spelt out.  Caney accepts that such agents must possess 
moral authority, must be trustworthy and enjoy a good standing, and respect amongst 
people. What he does not outline however, is the practises that could be the basis of 
identifying such agents or what I call ambassadors. I believe that more than anything it 




demands the development of moral character, strength and competence to be able to 
morally encapsulate worries and concerns of the others.  
It requires approaching and resolving the apparent contradictions that exist 
between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, something that has for long been a barrier in resolving 
the climate conundrum. Equally important would be to know whether these 
ambassadors would be appealing to their fellow compatriots alone, or whether their 
appeal would have the power to cut across the local regional and national divides. In my 
understanding Caney’s approach in order to become feasible would require answering 
such issues.  
Climate change impacts necessitate development of trust between actors as 
crucial for the accomplishment of the ideal of preventing harm and solving the biggest 
collective action problem known to humanity. In light of a common humanity, it 
requires that everybody must come together and contribute in one’s own possible ways, 
irrespective of their inhabitation, though I do agree with the argument that in doing so 
no one should be pushed below their basics. Having enlightened ambassadors would 
certainly help and in this endeavour invoking the ideas strategies, teachings etc. of 
revered icons could be of help. I will elaborate further on this in the next two chapters. I 
conclude here by saying that it would certainly be an additional way of cosmopolitan 
motivation. It would also provide greater motivations to act on way to solving the 
climate conundrum.  
Central to this thesis is the question of motivating support for an approach such as 
Caney’s – a clearly cosmopolitan approach – to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. In the following chapters, I discuss ways in which moral motivation has been 
approached in the cosmopolitan context, and how an emphasis on local cosmopolitan 




traditions could help to generate concrete support for reforms in climate change and 
other areas of global justice, consistent with cosmopolitanism. That is, I defend the claim 
that each national culture has its own revered figures and that their ideas can be invoked 
in their respective contexts. My case study is India, where Mahatma Gandhi remains 
such a revered figure, and where cosmopolitan strains in his thought have been 
influential and could be employed in service of generating support.  
 




5. Ensuring Cosmopolitan Compliance 
through Local Universalism.  
5.1. Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on compliance with cosmopolitan prescriptions, in particular 
prescriptions such as those offered in the Hybrid approach to a fair distribution of 
burdens and benefits in climate change mitigation. I will begin by noting that, while the 
principles or approaches reviewed in chapter three and four have merit and normative 
appeal in their own respective ways, none, including the Hybrid approach, can be 
expected to simply generate universal acceptance. Such acceptance, however, is 
immensely important from the climate justice perspective. That is, given the gravity and 
complexity of problems posed by climate change, it is essential to know what it would 
take to foster support for a particular approach: moral concerns must be connected to 
possible and feasible political action.  
To that end, this chapter attempts to answer the question, ‘If we are indeed 
persuaded by the ‘Hybrid’ approach to resolving the climate conundrum, then, how 
might we realize it?’ A number of scholars have, in fact, sought to theorize cosmopolitan 
moral motivation and compliance. This chapter explores and engages some prominent 
approaches, on the way to presenting its own ‘rooted cosmopolitan motivation’ 
approach. The discussion is structured as follows: First, I briefly outline a very basic 
understanding of longstanding problems of moral motivation. In the second section, I 
specifically move to the issue of cosmopolitan moral motivation, surveying some of the 
main approaches in the literature and describing the ways in which cosmopolitan 




concerns have been articulated. I side with the moral cosmopolitan argument that it is 
neither desirable nor feasible to think of a complete overhaul of the current global 
international system to address the impacts of climate change. However, I argue that it is 
indeed possible to provide a motivational impetus to moral cosmopolitan concerns 
within existing institutions which can help ensure that individuals commit themselves to 
performing the required actions necessary for mitigating the catastrophic impacts of 
climate change.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, I believe that a hybrid approach is the most 
defensible in terms of providing a coherent approach to fairly distributing climate change 
burdens and benefits. It also is the most practical, as it takes into account the full range of 
moral complexities associated with climate change, including historical wrongs and the 
developmental rights and priorities of the poor, principles of national sovereignty and the 
structural inequalities that characterize the power relations between states. Yet, making 
it work would require moving beyond the realms of ideal theory, where full compliance 
with moral demands is presumed (Valentini 2012). It would require the identification of 
factors that might help not just to motivate agents to support policies consistent with the 
ideal of fairness and justice, but also to press their representatives/policy makers to adopt 
solutions consistent with cosmopolitanism.  
Such questions of ‘cosmopolitan motivation’ have been increasingly prominent in 
recent years, as a number of theorists have explored whether or how compliance with 
cosmopolitan moral demands might be achieved (Dobson 2006; Pogge 2007; Cabrera 
2009; Ypi 2012; Erskine 2008; Shapcott 2010). I assess some specific accounts below. 
First, I will reinforce that any approach which is to generate support must not only be 
morally defensible and acceptable to the parties concerned, but it must also reflect the 




realities of the context in which it is being invoked. Otherwise it runs the risk of being 
dubbed ‘utopian’ ‘unfeasible’ ‘impractical’ and so on. This is not to say that more 
demanding or difficult to realize principles are necessarily flawed and need not be 
theorised. On the contrary, I understand that these principles can provide guidance for 
judging social conduct as good or bad, acceptable or otherwise. They do have intrinsic 
moral appeal, but efforts to generate support for them may face steep challenges. The 
focus of my argument is to convey the understanding that mere acceptance of a moral 
norm in society doesn’t guarantee full compliance under any circumstances. But nor can 
we expect that full compliance will be obtained by coercion alone. Moral principles must 
be accepted – or plausibly acceptable – as social norms which help to guide and motivate 
action consistent with them. Thus, the aim here is to investigate how the acceptance of 
norms or attitudes supportive of cosmopolitan moral principles could be encouraged in 
the context of climate change.  
I will also note that, given the global nature of the problem of climate change, a 
cosmopolitan framework would be well suited to address it. The climate conundrum 
requires us to act in ways that are meaningful and intense enough to cross the territorial 
divides of the contemporary states system.  To that end, cosmopolitanism certainly 
appears to provide the required theoretical framework, though again, principles 
themselves cannot necessarily be expected to provide motivation to act, as discussed in 








5.2. Morality and the Motivation to Act 
In general terms, morality, understood primarily as other-regarding behaviour, plays a 
very important role in determining the ways in which individuals act on a host of issues,  
ranging from those that have immediate bearing on day to day existence to the ones that 
have larger national/global reach and consequences. Motivation refers to a combination 
of factors internal and external, conscious and unconscious that can lead to action.  
In the philosophical literature, there is a longstanding debate on whether moral 
principles inherently possess the ability to motivate action, or whether they are 
dependent on some other additional external factors (Brink 1996; Rosati 2006).  Known 
by the aphorism of motivational judgement internalism (MJI) and motivational 
judgement externalism (MJE), the debate largely revolves around the linkages between 
holding a moral belief and acting upon it.  Whilst the supporters of MJI argue that 
holding a moral belief in itself is strong enough to generate the motivation to act 
(Williams 1981; Smith 1994), proponents of MJE (Scanlon 1982: 116; Shafer-Landau 
2000) dispute such ideas and argue that belief is just one factor, and not even the most 
important one. In other words, extra-moral motivation is required for the achievement of 
moral-political demands.  
In both the interpretations however, motivation is seen as key to generating 
action. It could be because of desires (Smith: 1994) or simply based on a rational 
appreciation of the desired outcome (Parfit: 2011). What is interesting to note, however,  
is that even the strongest defenders of Moral Internalism do converge with the 
externalists in acknowledging the role of other factors such as lack of will, compulsions, 




etc., that may result in undertaking or hindering an action related to a moral belief 
(Rosati, 2006; Birnbacher 2009: 282).  
The issue of motivation, especially of mass motivation, is immensely significant 
in the context of climate change for two very important and interrelated reasons. The 
first is that mitigation and adaptations prescriptions are offered and/or agreed in a 
system of sovereign states. This makes voluntary action on the part of agents a necessary 
condition. Despite globalization, international politics is still grounded on the 
Westphalian principle of sovereignty and narrowly defined national interests, and not on 
enlightened interest -- something crucially required for resolving the potentially 
catastrophic impacts of climate change.  
Second, the existing structures in themselves generate and reinforce certain 
practical and self-interested demands that outplay the moral motivation of individual 
and collective actors. This can be seen in the ways in which major cities across the world 
fiercely compete with each other to establish global cities within their respective 
geographical limits. Saskia Sassen (2005: 41) for example, argues that this is primarily 
done to acquire ‘the control and command functions of the global economy’  i.e., strong 
networks of banking, financial, legal, technological networks- so essential for attracting 
capital. However, in the process, the civic governance structures of these cities may end 
up deemphasizing their moral responsibility of tackling climate change, as that may lead 
them to compromising their larger economic objectives (Trisolini and Zasloff 2009: 88).  
We can note that, in relation to a cosmopolitan approach such as the Hybrid one, 
which projects strong duties across national boundaries, motivation challenges could be 
even more acute and important to address.  I will presume here that the focus should be 
on moral cosmopolitanism, as institutional cosmopolitanism – the deep integration of 




the global system and creation of common political authorities – is not a near-term 
solution.  As noted in the introduction, moral cosmopolitans emphasize what individuals 
ought to do, but their primary focus is not on ways in which ‘ought duties’ would be 
transformed into actions. Institutional cosmopolitans focus on the likely need of creating 
global institutions to secure cosmopolitan moral outcomes globally. In the sections 
below I will examine three recent ways in which contemporary cosmopolitan theorists 
have theorized the realization of cosmopolitan aims within primarily an essentially 
moral cosmopolitan frame.  
The first approach attempts to achieve its objectives by promoting empathy and 
understanding, and stresses the role of education for promoting understanding of the 
other (Nussbaum 2002; Waldron 2003; Cabrera 2010). This approach is characterized by 
the belief that education could result in instilling cosmopolitan sensibilities and virtues 
enabling individuals to see themselves as citizens of the world, which would result in 
their being more motivated to carry out cosmopolitan duties. The idea is to promote 
understanding and a willingness to act for that ‘other’. A second approach to realizing 
cosmopolitan aspirations emphasizes the need of avoiding harm to others by focusing on 
negative duties (Pogge 2007, 2008; Shapcott 2008; 2010). A third approach pays 
attention to the network of connections between distant communities by highlighting the 
overlap and intersections between cosmopolitan and local moral traditions and 
sentiments (Appiah 2006; Parekh 2003; Erskine 2008; Kymlicka & Walker 2012). 
Aligned with this approach are also those (Ypi: 2012) who would not necessarily want to 
limit demands; rather, they would use the national civic sphere as a training ground for 
cosmopolitan morality. I analyse each of these strategies and discuss their limitations. I 




then outline my own alternative, which gives emphasis to identifying the cosmopolitan 
currents within national theoretical traditions.  
5.3. Strategy 1: Promoting Empathy and Understanding 
Promoting empathy in the moral cosmopolitan context requires the development of  a 
thought process in which individuals imagine themselves to be in the situation of distant 
others with whom they have no national or familial connections. This is akin to what is 
known as perspective taking, and involves collection and dissemination of information 
and knowledge about the condition of those others with whom we share our common 
humanity. This enables one to  
enter into the world of others and develop the ability to abstract 
from the local to the global (or even see the global in the local). 
Respecting what others have to offer and reaching out to those 
who experience suffering helps the moral growth of the Self as 
well. Empathy if practised meaningfully can become a habit that 
grows and results in inclusiveness and even solidarity with cultural 
Others’ (Aboulafaia 2010 Cf  Sobré-Denton & Bardhan 2013: 86).  
 
The idea behind this is to motivate agents to undertake positive remedial duties, with the 
larger aim of bringing others out of their plight and suffering. According to Martha 
Nussbaum it encompasses ‘an imaginative reconstruction of experience of the sufferer’ 
(Nussbaum 2001:327).  
Various ways of promoting such empathic responses have been put forward. 
These range from traditional methods of public advocacy, written narratives in the form 
of academic writings based on field investigations and reports, novels, opinions, 
reflective essays, travelogue etc.,  to more engaging and participatory methods involving 
media (Urry 2002) non-governmental organisations and theatre arts (Wilson 2010). 




Space constraints prohibit a detailed discussion of all these methods and so I will focus 
on only two particular ways in which the question of cosmopolitan sentiments has been 
approached by delving a bit into the works of Martha Nussbaum (1996, 1997, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2008) and Luis Cabrera (2009, 2010).40 Both Nussbaum and Cabrera argue 
that agents could be empowered for moral action by making them informed and aware 
of the situation of the sufferers. Nussbaum believes in the role of education in cultivating 
the moral virtues necessary for development of shared understandings and carrying out 
humane responsibilities. Cabrera focuses on the ways in which the narratives developed 
from field work Qualitative Political Theory (hereafter QPT) can be used not just to 
identify the set of persons to whom we owe duties, but also to ensure that the duties are 
actually discharged as well.  
5.3.1. Martha Nussbaum: Education for Cultivating Virtue  
In a widely read Boston Review essay entitled ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’  
Nussbaum put forward her initial understanding of the ways in which education could 
be the key to a more tolerant and coextensive world.41 The task at hand, according to 
Nussbaum, is to create a scheme of concentric circles in which individuals see 
themselves as grounded and defined by their own identity, but also relate themselves to 
the outer circle and ‘learn to recognise humanity wherever they encounter it, understand 
                                                                 
40 Cabrera is a firm institutional cosmopolitan who is primarily focused the promotion of global political 
integration – full world government in the very long term -- as a means of better promoting human rights 
and global justice more generally. I focus here on a specific argument he has offered in the context of 
education for global citizenship which would be applicable within a moral cosmopolitan frame.  
Nussbaum rejects institutional cosmopolitanism for diversity reasons.  
 
41 The responses to the original article and the replies later got published in the form of a book entitled ‘For 
the Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism’ first published in 1996 and republished in 2002 
with a new introduction. See ‘For Love of Country: Debating the limits of patriotism’ by Martha 
Nussbaum with Respondents. Edited by Joshua Cohen (Boston, MA, Beacon Press Books) 




the traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange 
guises’ (Nussbaum 2002: 9 cf Cabrera 2010: 241).  
In her work Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal Education 
(1997), Nussbaum examines ways in which empathically oriented education could help 
to bring the circles closer. According to Nussbaum one possible way of breaking the ‘us-
them’ mentality could be by designing the academic curriculum, especially at the 
University level in such a way that learners not only get to know about their own history 
and culture but also of the distant others (Nussbaum 1997: 89). Citing Rousseau, 
Nussbaum argues that education empowers an individual to be more sympathetic 
towards the others by making him/her aware of contingencies and vulnerabilities of life 
(Nussbaum 1997:92). Empathy, she believes, enables one ‘to comprehend the motives 
and choices of people different from ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and 
other, but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us’ (1997: 85).  
Nussbaum in particular endorses the inherent values and curriculum that 
constitutes a liberal education system. According to Nussbaum, by emancipating minds 
from the ‘bondage of habit and custom’, a liberal education helps in the inculcation of 
sensibilities and broadening of mind-set necessary for the cosmopolitan citizenship 
(Nussbaum 1997: 80). The Socratic virtue of critical self-reflection which forms the core 
of liberal education facilitates the transformation of a parochial and self-centred mind 
into one that approaches cultural and ethnic differences in considerate and sympathetic 
ways (Nussbaum 1997: 9-11). Self-examination also helps in a scientific and rational 
evaluation of cultural-narratives and counter narratives which in turn can help in 
alleviating the antipathies between human beings (Nussbaum 1997: 36). Additionally, by 
underlining the centrality and importance of rational thinking as a moral and political 




ideal, it also helps in strengthening of the reflexive and deliberative faculties which are 
essential for any open and democratic society (Nussbaum 1997: 19).   
Liberal education can also result in enabling a more informed understanding of 
different cultural practices by allowing individuals to better understand the motives and 
intentions of others. To that end literature and the arts have a critical role in widening 
the imaginative horizons of individuals and instilling in them intellectual curiosity to 
know and learn about cultures even beyond what could be manifested in the texts 
(Nussbaum 1997: 89).  According to Nussbaum, ‘without the training of the imagination 
that storytelling promotes’ it would be difficult to induce sympathetic attitudes, 
something absolutely essential for the development of a cosmopolitan outlook and 
orientation. Literature is one possible way of developing cosmopolitan sensibilities as ‘ i t 
can transport us, while remaining ourselves, into the life of another, revealing similarities 
but also profound differences between the life and thought of that other and myself and 
making them comprehensible, or at least more nearly comprehensible’ (Nussbaum 
1997:111). Learning about the others helps people to know themselves better as 
comparing and contrasting could result in their questioning hitherto unchallenged 
assumptions of social existence. Making individuals aware of the problems faced by 
distant societies thus could instil cosmopolitan sensibilities and motivate them to 
collectively shoulder responsibilities. It could also bind them together through shared 
commitments to democracy and its related values. Nussbaum is however, cautious in her 
approach towards literature and recommends that, before inclusion in the curriculum, it 
must be put to extensive moral and contextual analysis and deliberations (Nussbaum 
1997: 108).  




According to Nussbaum, the imaginative capacities of individuals allow them to 
reflect on their particularistic identities on the basis of shared feelings of humanity. It 
makes them both reflexive and responsive to each other’s needs while allowing them to 
retain their own autonomy, privacy and identity (Nussbaum 1997: 90). Such 
understanding forms the basis of the values of trust, tolerance and coexistence, which is 
the prerequisite of global citizenship. For Nussbaum ‘the goal of producing world class 
citizens is profoundly opposed to the spirit of identity politics which holds that one’s 
primary affiliation is with one’s local group, whether religious or ethnic or based on 
sexuality or gender (Nussbaum 1997: 109-110). From this perspective, cosmopolitan 
citizenship is a prerequisite for a deliberative and engaging international politics that is 
capable of resolving conflicts by identifying and building on the common threads of 
humanity, without negating or overriding cultural autonomies and affiliations. It is at 
core of Nussbaum’s idea of concentric circles42.  
5.3.2. Luis Cabrera and Qualitative Political Theory 
The idea that support for cosmopolitan outcomes can be promoted by strengthening 
empathy has also been supported by Cabrera (2009, 2010), albeit in a different way. 
According to Cabrera, cosmopolitan interventions can be both methodological and 
substantive (Cabrera 2009: 110). Methodologically, it involves adoption of a tool called 
‘Qualitative Political Theory’ (QPT). Through extensive field observations and the 
collection of interview and other means, the approach seeks to inform and enrich 
                                                                 
 
42 In terms of institutional arrangements Nussbaum is against radical transformation of existing institutions 
and instead supports status quo however, she argues for the need of global institutions sincerely taking up 
more responsibilities in promoting basic human capabilities in the areas where they operate.  




normative arguments. One use of the approach, Cabrera argues, is making actors more 
conscious of the suffering of the people living far away, which could contribute to 
understanding and possibly to motivational impetus. Cabrera believes that this could 
result in shrinking of the moral distance that exists between ‘us’ and ‘them’ something 
that is essential for achieving cosmopolitan objectives. 
In substantial terms, Cabrera’s focus is on outlining a comprehensively informed 
understanding of others, including those perceived as outsiders, which can lead to an 
acknowledgment of their moral standing and a greater willingness to discharge duties of 
contribution, accommodation, and advocacy on behalf of their interests (Cabrera 2010: 
238).  Cabrera believes that such understandings are appropriately promoted through the 
curriculum at different levels of the education system, and by other means which can 
contribute to the necessary conscientiousness and sensibilities for global citizenship.   
 
  [C]urricular outreach to young children is one among many kinds 
of efforts that can be undertaken to expand global citizenship. 
Informational actions by nongovernmental organizations, some 
faith-based groups, study programs aimed at university students, 
select media and film, as well as public justifications offered for 
street protests in support of unauthorized immigrants, can all be 
viewed as modes of global citizen education. Each can provide 
access to the world of those whose rights protections are tenuous. 
Each can challenge common perceptions about justifiable 
exclusions and rigid boundaries of citizenship. As such, they 
provide a foundation for the promotion of positive duties toward 
others, regardless of current institutional connections to those 
others. Some also hold the potential for promoting specifically 
institutional forms of global citizenship (Cabrera 2010: 238-39).  
. 
 
An interesting aspect of Cabrera’s QPT is its complementarity with his earlier 
expositions (Cabrera 2004, ch.7) on the possibilities for democratically accountable 
supra-state integration. The idea is to motivate individuals towards discharging their 




cosmopolitan duties and responsibilities within the existing international set- up, while 
simultaneously undertaking ‘advocacy duties’ for its systemic transformation.  
Cabrera has two overall aims salient here. The first is demonstrating the efficacy 
of qualitative political theory in helping the cosmopolitan theorist mount a challenge 
against nationalist theorists such as David Miller (2007). The second is to show that the 
material and understandings produced through the method of QPT can be employed to 
advance arguments aimed at a more general audience, public policy debates, etc. 
Overall, the interventions are aimed at ‘both highlighting and challenging ways in which 
some cosmopolitan sceptics, or those arguing for relatively strong priority to compatriots 
in distribution of resources and membership, often only superficially acknowledge the 
interests or human standing of the globally impoverished and excluded’ (Cabrera 
2009:110).  
5.3.3. Issues with the Empathy Approach 
The role of education as a possible way for promoting empathy and consolidation of 
cosmopolitan sensibilities is undeniable. At a fundamental level, I agree that 
cosmopolitan education at an early stage does have the potential for instilling broader 
and secular sensibilities allowing learners to empathize with the others. However, the 
larger issue that still needs resolving is about finding ways in which the gap between 
empathising with people and acting to do something to help them could be bridged 
(Coeckelbergh 2007:91).  Empathy may result in moral action, no action or even evil 
action (Coeckelbergh 2007:91). Seen in this context, the strategy does make an essential 
contribution, but a lot of issues related to its feasibility still need to be worked out. First 
and foremost of which is the need to develop a curriculum that could have some kind of 




universal appeal. Second, and most importantly, is the need to develop mechanisms by 
which such curriculum could be made universally acceptable. This is a very difficult 
proposition, as communities are not only very sensitive about their own curriculum, very 
often they use education as the most effective instrument for strengthening and 
promoting national feelings and values.  
In fact, such a strategy may end up igniting the existing value divides that 
characterize the contemporary world, with many non-western societies constructing it as 
yet another hegemonic attempt by the West to make the world confirm to the value of 
‘global liberalism’ (Meyer 2009:292). Seen in this context Nussbaum’s prescriptions 
would require to be filtered through, and balanced with, local sentiments need and 
practices. This is not an impossible task, but being evolutionary in nature it is time 
consuming. It may take decades for its realization, which puts it outside of the necessary 
time frame for action on climate change. The paragraph below from Jeffery Dill makes 
the dilemmas very clear 
At the level of these more fundamental moral purposes, a subtle 
contradiction lies at the heart of global citizenship education: it 
demands moral commitment and empathy beyond the individual 
and his/her own interests, but at the same time it sacralises the 
individual autonomous chooser above all other forms…Global 
citizens should minimize individual interests and demonstrate 
their commitment to an abstract group, but the underlying 
philosophical anthropology is highly Western and individualistic. 
The universal humanity that represents the deepest longings of 
proponents of global citizenship education requires significant 
commitment to others beyond the self. But its strategies undermine 
and erode local attachments and group belonging, important 
sources of identity, meaning, and commitment beyond the 
self…[U]pon closer inspection, it turns out to be the latest chapter 
in one particular narrative of Western modernity, a long story of 
liberating individuals from group identities. (Dill 2012: 541) 
 




The antagonisms between the self and others need to be transcended for 
cosmopolitan ideas to become effective in national contexts, and education alone does 
not seem to be the tool for this. I will come back to other ways this might be achieved 
later in the thesis, but allow me here to say that the kind of education Nussbaum favours, 
in itself, does not appear to possess the motivating power necessary for adoption of 
cosmopolitan principles in local contexts, especially in relation to climate change. 
Expectations, that the most capable agents would change their patterns of consumption 
and adjust lifestyles on the basis of a more liberal education are unrealistic, and bring us 
back to the problem of how to ensure voluntary compliance in the absence of an 
institutional enforcement mechanism.  
It has also been pointed out that merely having knowledge about the others may 
not be good enough to generate meaningful and realistic action. The development of the 
feelings of empathy based on a shared understanding that is broad enough to go beyond 
right and wrong is what is required (Walker 2006).  To a certain extent, Cabrera’s 
argument does take this into account, but his claims are primarily in the context of 
unauthorized immigration. The demand there is not to act on cosmopolitan distributive 
duties to geographically distant groups overseas, or make sacrifices (as in climate change 
mitigation) on behalf of those groups. Actually, Cabrera is acutely aware of this, but his 
primary focus is on the promotion of global institution building as a means of eventually 
overcoming distributive and other barriers that naturally arise in a sovereign states 
system.  
The ‘Empathy and Understanding’ approach depends on motivating positive duties 
to other humans in need, but for those duties to be actually carried out would require a 
change in attitude and outlook of the bearer towards the others. The point becomes 




important especially as there is no necessary and specific connection between the duty 
bearer and person in need. According to Gillian Brock (2009) the arguments modelled 
on ‘concentric circles theory’ may result in lighter obligations to people on the outer 
periphery.  In fact, Nussbaum herself understands and accepts such limitations and in 
one of her later works (2003) has argued for the need of generating compassion -- which 
she thinks is more effective in triggering positive action and response. Nussbaum 
believes, however, that generating compassion requires that empathy be simultaneously 
supplemented by an assessment and evaluation of genuine needs and conditions of the 
people. Compassion generated is effective, stronger and action oriented if buttressed by 
(1) knowledge of the need or suffering of others (Nussbaum 2003: 306-311), (2) 
understanding that the sufferer in no way is responsible for the suffering and (Nussbaum 
2003: 311-315) and (3) acceptance of the idea that one’s own wellbeing is seriously 
entwined with the other’s (Nussbaum 2003: 315-321). The third point is very important, 
specifically in the context of climate change. However, working it out would require 
creating convergences on the perceptions regarding the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. 
Interestingly, when it comes to suggesting ways through which such appraisals could be 
achieved, Nussbaum has nothing new to offer as she reiterates perspective taking and 
educating students as most effective ways of creating appraisals and judgements 
(Nussbaum 2003: 432).      
5.4. Strategy 2: Emphasizing Harm Avoidance to Others  
Emphasizing individuals’ moral duty to avoid harming others is another way of 
approaching the question of generating motivational impetus for discharging 
cosmopolitan duties (Pogge 2008; Shapcott 2008; Linklater 2006, 2011). This approach 




focuses on identifying and implicating the guilty and subsequently underlining the moral 
duty of undertaking appropriate remedial action. It views positive moral duties such as 
benevolence, aid and cooperation as important, but its core conviction is that individuals 
can be more strongly motivated towards discharging their cosmopolitan obligations 
through an emphasis on their moral duty of not harming other human beings. In the 
following paragraphs, I will attempt to provide an outline of the ideas of Thomas Pogge, 
the key proponent of this approach. I will then very briefly describe the complementary 
views of Andrew Linklater (2006) and Richard Shapcott (2008).  
5.4.1. Thomas Pogge and Harm Avoidance  
Pogge’s cosmopolitan orientations are inspired by his concerns for ameliorating poverty 
and the accompanying conditions of inequality, injustice, and exploitation at global 
levels that perpetuate the suffering of the poor, irrespective of their race nationality 
religion or region. His overarching concern is on developing a strategy that can prescribe 
a robust and action orientated morality which widens the ambit of responsibilities for the 
realization of human rights (Pogge 1992: 50). Pogge attempts to achieve this by 
contrasting what he calls ‘institutional’ and ‘interactional’ variants of cosmopolitanism 
(Pogge 1992; 50-53), favouring the former over the latter. I will note here that what 
Pogge calls ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ is roughly equal to what was described as 
moral cosmopolitanism in the Introduction: a means of assessing the justice of global 
institutions. What most other theorists call ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’, meaning an  
approach which prescribes the development of strong global institutions to achieve 
cosmopolitan moral outcomes, Pogge calls legal cosmopolitanism. I focus on his 




interactional/institutional distinction here as important background for his focus on 
negative duties. 
The starting point of Pogge’s motivational strategy is built on his differentiation 
between the institutional and interactional elements within the domain of moral 
cosmopolitanism. For the purpose of clarity, it is pertinent to reiterate his understanding 
of moral cosmopolitanism here. According to Pogge   
moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral 
relations to one another: We are required to respect one another’s 
status as ultimate units of moral concern- a requirement that 
imposes limits on our conduct and, in particular, on our efforts to 
construct institutional schemes (Pogge 1992: 49) 
 
Pogge then introduces the differentiations between the interactional and institutional 
versions of moral cosmopolitanism. The former are ‘first order’ ethical principles and 
apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups and ascribe direct responsibilities to 
individuals and collective agents (Pogge 1992: 50). The latter are second order principles 
in that being the essential principles of social justice, they apply to institutional schemes. 
They are standards for assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human 
interactions but they do not assign direct responsibility to the individuals. For Pogge, the 
second order principles confer indirect responsibilities on individuals in the sense that 
they ought not to be part of any institutional mechanism that might result in the non-
fulfilment or violation of human rights of others. Additionally, they must make 
reasonable efforts to protect the victims of such injustices and promote institutional 
reform (Pogge 1992: 50). 
On such a classification, then Pogge constructs his schema of negative and 
positive duties with the aim of generating action for his cosmopolitan formulations.  For 
Pogge, positive duties form the ethical principles of conduct between individuals and can 




be linked to the interactional elements within moral cosmopolitanism. They are duties of 
beneficence and not justice (Pogge 2008:177-8). Negative duties, on the other hand, can 
clearly relate to concerns with justice, on account of common membership and 
relationship within institutions. The negative duties to avoid causing harm are felt more 
strongly, and hence they are ‘sharper and weightier’ than positive duties. (Pogge 2008: 
135). According to Pogge, ‘injustices and other wrongs we commit against foreigners 
have the same weight as like injustices and other wrongs we commit against compatriots’ 
(Pogge 2008: 133). 
According to Pogge, the contemporary world is characterised by multiple 
institutional regulatory mechanisms, ‘an elaborate system of treaties and conventions 
about trade, investment, loans, patents, copy rights, trademarks, double taxation, labour 
standards, environmental protection, use of seabed resources’ (Pogge 2004:263). These 
institutional mechanisms he argues, have been detrimental to the interests of the poor 
across the world, and as such, those who have supported them or contributed to their 
maintenance have a weightier moral duty to help the others (compatriots as well as 
foreigners) and take up cosmopolitan duties and responsibilities. The compelling moral 
cosmopolitan obligation to help non-compatriots has been defended by Pogge on an 
additional ground. According to Pogge, ‘Human rights, then, are moral claims on the 
organization of one’s society’ (Pogge 2008: 70) and securing them is more a matter of 
organizational and institutional designs and functioning than the moral responsibili ty of 
individuals alone.  This is not to say that individuals have no responsibility in fulfilling 
moral obligations, but rather that the general stress of Pogge’s argument is that human 
rights are moral claims best realized through institutions and structures of governance. 
Accordingly, it becomes imperative on the part of an individuals to not to participate or 




uphold any institutional arrangement or mechanism that ‘leaves human rights unfulfilled 
without making reasonable efforts to protect its victims and to promote institutional 
reforms’ (Pogge 2008:176). According to Pogge each individual has a negative duty of 
not harming the other, and in cases where harm has been done, there is a corresponding 
remedial duty to compensate (Pogge 2008:177).  As such, despite not being directly 
involved in the violation of a right, each individual has a moral duty to provide remedial 
duties (positive duties) to compensate for the harm that may have been done because of 
institutional structures and practices.  
In specific terms, Pogge endorses the need for institutional reforms. This is borne 
out of his conviction that since individual citizens of the developed world have been 
benefitting from the existence of ‘unjust’ institutions and their practices, it is morally 
incumbent on them to undertake duties that result in ‘feasible institutional modifications’ 
(Pogge 2005a:5). The focus is on ensuring ‘that others are not unduly harmed through 
one’s conduct’ (Pogge 2008: 130). Accordingly, Pogge supports reforming existing global 
institutions43 and establishing new institutional mechanisms and frameworks with the 
larger objective of avoiding harm to the poor by the way of securing their basic human 
rights/interests in the most systematic and sustained ways. For Pogge the best way 
forward is to establish a network of supra-national institutions that could justly 
administer and implement his proposal of ‘A Global Resource Dividend44’ (Pogge 2008: 
                                                                 
43 Particularly in the World trade Organization which according to Pogge is an example of an institution 
which has done immense harm to the developing world by permitting developed states protectionism 
resulting in huge disadvantages to the poor states (See Pogge 2005b: 182–209). 
 
44 Under the proposal of GRD Pogge puts forth his ideas on how Global Poverty could be tackled. GRD 
essentially is a mechanism of taxation in which states are required to pay a fixed percentage (1% of the 
value of transaction) as fee for buying or selling natural resources. Pogge argues that the fee could be 
collected by a supranational agency and the payments could be disbursed to all the members of the world. 
It is one way of stating that the resources are owned by humanity, however  it is not to say that the earth’s 
resources should be shared among everyone, but to suggest that everyone has a share in the revenue 




ch.8), while also ensuring that authoritarian states and their leaders do not gain by the 
existing borrowing and lending mechanisms (2008: 153-155).   
Overall, Pogge identifies a moral imperative to avoid harm. He also believes that 
most individuals will have an interest in avoiding harming others. The motivational 
force for his cosmopolitan moral duties springs from that interest in harm avoidance. 
5.4.2. Linklater, Shapcott and Dialogic Community 
The need of avoiding harm, especially in the context of a globalized world has also 
occupied a prominent space in the work of theorists such as Andrew Linklater and 
Richard Shapcott. For Linklater, avoiding harm is a universally valid moral requirement 
that arises from the vulnerabilities of human beings to mental and physical pain 
(Linklater 2006: 20). Linklater asserts that all human beings do not suffer identical pain, 
but the mere fact that all of them are vulnerable is reason enough for subscribing to the 
principle of harm avoidance. Identifying harm with evil, that gives rise to grief, sorrow, 
pain trouble etc., Linklater, highlights the importance of dialogue and communication in 
solidifying the resolve for managing the causes of harms at global scales. Accordingly, 
‘the highest stages of moral-practical learning should promote a post-conventional ethic 
which defines the prima facie moral responsibility of engaging the whole of humanity  in 
open dialogue about matters of common interest’ (Linklater 1998:121). Dialogue 
between communities could result in an accommodating culture much needed for 
resolving the apparent contradictions between moral universalism and particularism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
generated by sale and purchase of earth’s natural resources. Pogge’s estimate is that such a fee could 
generate almost 300 Billion USD every year that could be used to ameliorate poverty and suffering of the 
poorest people living mainly in the poorest countries of the world.  For a general outline of the idea and a 
critical response see R. Finnin (2008). Dilemmas of the institutional thesis: Pogge vs. Risse on global 
poverty. Studies in Social and Political Thought, 42-51.     




This could also lead to a widening of the boundaries of communities. However, for this 
to be effective individuals must have a feeling of respect for difference.  
Linklater, argues that such dialogue can be effective and feasible only under a 
‘thin conception of universality, under which each individual has an equal right to 
participate in dialogue to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion which 
govern global politics’ (Linklater 1998: 107). Such a ‘thin cosmopolitanism’ encourages 
the development of wider communities of discourse which make new articulations of 
universality and particularity possible (Linklater 1998: 49). Accordingly, an ‘ethical 
foreign policy based on the ‘no harm’ principle is one way in which communities can 
reconcile their duties to fellow citizens and their obligations to distant strangers’ 
(Linklater 2002:135). In his more recent works, Linklater has attempted to identify 
agencies or institutions that could have the authority to resolve and monitor harm in 
world politics (Linklater 2011).  
The understanding that ‘thin cosmopolitanism’ and ‘dialogic community’ can be 
useful in the reconciliation of the divergences between moral universalism and 
particularism has also been emphasised by Richard Shapcott (2008). For Shapcott, thin 
cosmopolitanism ‘promotes universalism yet does justice to difference’ by identifying the 
universalistic elements within particularistic norms and making harm avoidance and 
humanitarianism the possible points of convergence’(Shapcott 2001; 2008: 185).  
A commitment on the part of states or bounded political 
communities to ‘do no harm’ invokes further obligations that go 
beyond a principle of mere tolerance or coexistence. A 
commitment to do no harm, because of the essentially contested 
nature of ‘harm’, requires a commitment to dialogue and 
consultation in order to fully assess the scope and nature of harms 
between political communities and to accommodate different 
understandings of what it is to harm and be 
harmed[...]cosmopolitanism understood as stemming from an 




ethical predisposition of universal friendship, which means that 
obligations to fellow nationals are not exclusive of obligations to 
outsiders, and which can be reconciled with anti-cosmopolitan 
concerns for plurality and communal autonomy (Shapcott 
2008:186). 
 
Thus, according to Shapcott, political communities (states) can continue to retain 
considerable political autonomy simply by adopting a harm avoidance position vis -à-vis 
the wellbeing of others. However, adopting such a position does not necessarily imply 
the existence of supra-national or global institutions, but a simple realization on the part 
of state and its people of the need to establish a non-dominating relationship with others 
(Shapcott, forthcoming: 2). It would require that states amend their domestic 
constitutions so as to allow their own external acts to be subject to the rule of law and 
give some legal status to outsiders. This requires states to be responsible enough to limit 
their capacity to dominate outsiders while preserving the benefits of their citizens 
(Shapcott forthcoming: 28). I will take this up in detail a bit later as part of my analysis 
of the third strategy that emphasizes cosmopolitan connections. But before I do this, I 
will outline some of the issues associated with the strategy of harm avoidance.  
5.4.3. Issues with the Harm Avoidance Approach 
The central issue here is whether a negative duties/harm avoidance approach actually 
would motivate action in the way that its proponents suggest. Pogge is firm in his claim 
that those within affluent states especially have harmed those in less-affluent states 
through supporting the imposition of unjust global institutions. It seems highly unlikely,  
however, that the claim would have much practical motivational force, given the fact 
that the harms themselves are indirect and all but invisible to the harmers. Pogge himself 




concedes that a ‘given individual’s contribution may be no more than one billionth of the 
moral responsibility for the avoidable under fulfilment of human rights caused by the 
existing order’ (Pogge 2005: 34 fn 41, Cf Cabrera 2010:93). Accordingly,  
if the harm that one person causes is not perceptible, it is hard to see 
how it can do so much more to motivate that person to press for 
change than will any understanding of natural positive duties to 
others. The fact that they cannot escape causing such harm, 
whatever action they might take, could also significantly lessen the 
motivational power of a negative duties approach’ (Cabrera 2010: 
93).   
Pogge understands that it is unrealistic to expect that individuals would 
discontinue their involvement with institutions that inflict harm by perpetuating 
inequalities of various kinds. Surprisingly, however, he expects that the same set of 
people who have benefited from the exploitative functioning of the international 
institutional mechanisms and orders, would compensate by working to reform those 
institutions or for the protection of their victims (Pogge 2008:49). The point becomes 
highly significant when seen in the context of the hegemonic control of the developed 
states over the international structures of governance.   
The other associated problem with the strategy of harm avoidance stems from the 
ambiguities surrounding the nature of harm, and by extension the nature and extent of 
harm avoidance duties themselves. In other words, it is not clear how particular 
individuals in particular context, are to evaluate the extent of their avoidance duties. 
Important here is the issue regarding the local factors that perpetuate exploitation and 
suffering of all kinds. It is true that the international structures of governance and 
institutional mechanisms do exert a certain degree of control over these conditions, but 
still it is unrealistic to ascribe all suffering to external agencies alone. The point is 




particularly valid in the context of climate change, where a lot of the harm result from 
policies pursued simply in the light of domestic factors.   
An assessment of the harm avoidance principle and the resultant lack of 
motivation to act has been provided by Andrew Dobson in his essay ‘Thick 
Cosmopolitanism’ (Dobson 2006). According to Dobson, the claim underpinning 
Linklater’s ‘thin cosmopolitanism’ is that human similarities are the principles on which 
friends and aliens can be treated equally. However, that claim, is not able to provide the 
impetus required to really treat the others alike. According to Dobson, in his 
overenthusiasm for supporting cosmopolitan ideas, Linklater leaves intact the 
institutional and other structural mechanisms that reinforce and perpetuate inequalities, 
and yet, expects that appreciation for humanity in itself to be the reason for people to act 
in harm avoiding ways (Dobson 2006: 171). Dobson argues that this means that 
Linklater does not provide cosmopolitanism with the required motivational impetus for 
putting principles into action. To demonstrate his point Dobson, quotes from Linklater’s 
later work (2006) that ‘belief in a moral responsibility to assist others is often stronger 
when evidence of causal responsibility for suffering exists’. For Dobson, causal 
responsibilities then ‘trigger stronger senses of obligations than higher –level ethical 
appeals can do’ (Dobson 2006: 172).  Dobson recommends a ‘thick cosmopolitanism’, 
focussed on identifying the causal responsibilities as an effective way of motivating 
individuals to act.  
A similar issue arises from Shapcott’s approach. Shapcott argues that domestic 
populations should act on negative duties not to harm those overseas by incorporating 
cosmopolitan clauses in their own constitutions. He does not, however, provide the ways 
and means in which this could happen. In democratic societies, the leadership is more 




often than not wary of any such move, for it may cause antipathy amongst voters. Non-
democratic societies would not bother to respond to larger global humanitarian issues. 
Even if one were to assume that citizen’s involvement could lead to such incorporations 
in democratic societies, the key issue of what would motivate them to do so would still 
remain to be addressed.  Shapcott’s arguments do have implications for climate change 
mitigation, but again an understanding of harms to others is, in itself, unlikely to be fully 
motivating.  
In the context of climate change, Pogge’s argument that one should compensate 
for the harm done makes sense, but acceptance of such a principle also runs the risk of 
getting lost in the quagmire of accusations and counteraccusations between the 
developed and developing states. Pogge’s harm principle also faces the risk of 
unworkability, given the fact that harms (emissions) especially, in the context of climate 
change, do not emanate from developed countries alone. There is growing evidence now 
that the cumulative emissions of some of the developing societies are significantly higher 
than those of the developed societies.  
As Caney notes, developing countries might have rich people who emit more and 
have more capacity to pay than many poor people living in rich countries (Caney 2009: 
136). It is really not understandable why the rich living in poor countries should be 
spared the responsibilities and obligations of mitigations, as they could under Pogge’s 
state-based negative duties scheme.45 Most importantly, there is a growing realization 
that a collective action problem such as climate change, cannot be analysed solely 
                                                                 
45 The per capita emission rate of the Shanxi province in China is 3.3 tonnes, almost equivalent to the per 
capita emission rates in Western Europe. See Gregg, Jay S., Robert J. Andres, and Gregg Marland. 2008. 
China: Emissions pattern of the world leader in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption and cement 
production. Geophysical Research Letters 35, no. L08806: 1–52008:3, Cf. Caney 2009: 136)  




through moral frameworks that are built on Western norms and values alone. Andrew 
Dobson has highlighted such a concern and it is worth quoting him at length here 
An apparently exasperated Thomas Pogge opens his influential 
book World Poverty and Human Rights with this question: “How 
can severe poverty of half of humankind continue despite 
enormous economic and technological progress and despite the 
enlightened moral norms and values of our heavily dominant 
Western civilization?(Pogge, 2002, p.3)”. One clue to an answer, 
of course, lies in the ‘despites’. Pogge implies that enormous 
economic and technological progress and enlightened Western 
moral norms and values provide the foundations for a just social 
and moral order, but any self-respecting Marxist, structuralist or 
political ecologist will hastily object that it is precisely that concept 
of progress and this set of moral norms and values that cause all 
the trouble in the first place. Indeed, Pogge himself hints at this 
kind of analysis when he implicates the global economic 
institutions designed in the West in the production of global 
poverty. (Dobson 2006:165) 
 
It is precisely at this point that I turn my attention towards an exploration of the 
third strategy for achieving cosmopolitan outcomes – something which focuses on 
bridging moral distances and the antagonisms between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ by 
exploring indigenous cultural practises, moral values and norms that are consistent with 
cosmopolitan concerns.  
5.5. Strategy 3: Emphasizing Cosmopolitan Connections  
A growing number of cosmopolitan theorists have started to emphasize the role of local 
practises and agencies in actualizing cosmopolitan ideals, or navigating between local 
and more universal moral principles, though they do differ on ways in which the ideals 
should be put into practice. This explains the different prefixes such as ‘anchored 
cosmopolitanism’ (Dallmayr 2003), ‘situated cosmopolitanism’ (Baynes 2007), 
‘embedded cosmopolitanism’ (Erskine 2008), ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ (Werbner 




2006), ‘republican cosmopolitanism’ (Chung 2003), that are attached to specific accounts 
of the accommodation that can and should be made for local traditions, and how 
cosmopolitan goals can be realized while giving due attention to such traditions.  
In fact, within the broad framework of connected, or ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, it is 
possible to discern three broad interpretations of how the ‘root’ should be characterized 
(Kymlicka & Walker 2012:8). The first sees the root as closely related to the institutional 
structures of the state (Brown 2011; Lea Ypi 2012; Shapcott, forthcoming; Pettit 2010; 
Beardsworth 2012; Bohman: 2004). The second approach equates the root with the idea 
of the nation (Nielsan 2005; Tan 2004; Lenard & Moore 2009) The third views the root 
as a broader conception of community (Erskine 2008). These approaches overlap in 
some significant ways, and they are mutually reinforcing as well. Space constraints 
hinder a detailed discussion of all these forms, but it is pertinent to say that most of these 
new approaches have been developed keeping in mind the feasibility of cosmopolitan 
aspirations; and to that end they attempt to reconcile particular attachments and 
commitments with larger humanity centric goals and objectives, e.g., addressing harmful 
climate change.  
In part, these endeavours have also been undertaken to absolve cosmopolitanism 
not just of its Western bias, but also from the charge of promoting abstract 
individualism. Overall, the accounts reflect three main concerns, or guidelines for a 
cosmopolitanism that is appropriately sensitive to the local:  
1) The enthusiasm for achieving larger humanitarian goals cannot and should not 
ignore or override immediate and particular needs and priorities.  
 
2) The idea of world state is neither feasible nor desirable  
 




3) The conviction that ultimately it is the nation state that remains the most legitimate 
and effective political agency commanding trust and political obligation of the 
governed and capable of bringing the required changes.  
 
These guidelines reflect a sense that cosmopolitan prescriptions are significantly relevant 
if we are seriously to address some of the most pressing normative issues and challenges 
that we face in the contemporary globalised world. They also give emphasis to the idea 
that the ways in which we pursue them must be broad and pragmatic enough not just to 
accept the role of the state as an important agency, but sensitive to local needs, priorities 
and attachments. In fact, ethnic attachments and commitments may reinforce 
cosmopolitan values and prescriptions by motivating individuals to comply with 
professed norms.  
In this section, I examine and assess some specific accounts of cosmopolitanism 
which seek to make use of local contexts – principles and institutions – in motivating 
support for some broader cosmopolitan aims.  
5.5.1. Appiah and Rootedness 
I will look first at ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ as developed by Appiah (2006).  The focus 
of this strategy is on underlining the linkages between indigenous socio-cultural norms, 
practices and universal moral values. The idea is that any tenable cosmopolitan 
prescription must take into account the particularities of lives in communities before 
formulating its normative concerns. According to Appiah,  
A form of cosmopolitanism worth pursuing need not celebrate 
human difference; but it cannot be indifferent to challenge of 
engaging with it. So, on the one hand we should distinguish this 
project from diversitarianism of the game warden, who ticks off 
the species in the park, counting each further one a contribution to 
his assets. On the other hand, we should distinguish it from simple 




universalism. You wouldn’t be a cosmopolitan – or, any way you 
wouldn’t share in what was distinctively valuable in 
cosmopolitanism-if you were a humanitarian who (to invert 
Marx’s slogan) sought to change the World, but not understand it.  
A tenable Cosmopolitanism, in the first instance, must take value 
of the human life, and the value of particular human lives, the lives 
people have made for themselves, within the communities that 
help lend significance to those lives. This prescription captures the 
challenge. A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile kind 
of universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of 
partiality’ (Appiah 2006:  222-223).  
    
The focus of Rooted Cosmopolitanism is on emphasizing the importance of special 
obligations and responsibilities towards people with whom we share genetic or socio-
cultural identities. However, this approach unambiguously asserts that doing so does not 
undermine our universalistic concerns or responsibilities. In other words, whilst 
emphasizing universal duties, rooted cosmopolitanism as an approach does license some 
relatively strong priority to compatriots in distributional schemes of goods and services.    
Appiah is conscious of the need for political arrangements that might be required 
at global levels. However, he takes a realistic stand by arguing that our duties towards 
strangers and others  
must be consistent with our being …partial to those closest to us: 
to our families, our friends, our nations; to the many groups that 
call upon us through our identities, chosen and unchosen; and, of 
course, to ourselves. Whatever my basic obligations are to poor far 
away, they cannot be enough, I believe, to trump my concerns for 
my family, my friends, my country; nor can an argument that 
every life matters require me to be indifferent to the fact that one of 
those lives is mine (Appiah 2007:163).  
 
The world would become 'flat and dreary place' if all efforts were to be spent on the 
others (Appiah 2007: 166). Contributions should be voluntary and in accordance with 




capabilities, but more importantly should contribute to causes that result in a general 
improvement in living conditions in a location. To a certain extent, Appiah’s approach 
resonates well with the capability approach in its focus on realistic transfers or help that 
could make the targeted people better off in the long run, without overburdening on the 
duty bearers.  
Appiah is critical of utilitarian right theorists such as Peter Singer. He argues that 
it is incorrect to presume that duties to all persons in the world are equally strong, and 
that no special duties attach to those with whom we share familial or citizen relations. 
Partiality towards those we are familiar with is rooted in human nature. He also argues, 
however, that it should not be taken to mean that we have no responsibilities towards the 
others. Following the Rawlsian difference principle (Rawls 1971), Appiah seems to be 
suggesting that partiality towards the known and familiar is legitimate so long as 
strangers have been given some base-level considerations, which would vary according 
to contexts (Appiah 2006: 225-26). Seen in this context, the focus of rooted 
cosmopolitanism is on a simultaneous fulfilment of both global and local responsibilities. 
This is pursued by promoting inter-cultural dialogue and understanding, something that 
is vital for fostering the spirit of openness, sensitivity and accommodation. For Appiah, 
inter-cultural conversations promote the spirit of pluralism and accommodation by 
allowing people to become familiar with each other (Appiah 2007:85). Once the 
familiarities have been developed in terms of what we share with others, things that we 
do not share can also be known. Thus, the heterogeneity of different cultures is 
recognised as an inevitable expression of human difference so long as the values of each 
particular culture are morally and politically defensible.   




Appiah’s uniqueness lies in his attempt to appropriate the ideas of moral 
cosmopolitanism within his idealization of cultural cosmopolitanism. Appiah believes 
that the particular values that would benefit human beings on the whole cannot come 
from one cultural tradition. These values should instead be seen as belonging to 
humanity as such, and put under its trusteeship. The focus of such an approach is on 
engaging with other cultures and celebrating differences as varieties of life (Appiah 
2006:222). In other words, Appiah’s rooted approach aims to bridge the divide between 
the cultural and political understandings of cosmopolitanism. As he puts it:   
I want, accordingly, to resist the sharp distinction that is 
sometimes made between “moral” and “cultural” 
cosmopolitanism, where the former comprises those principles of 
moral universalism and impartialism, and the latter comprises the 
values of the world traveller, who takes pleasure in conversation 
with exotic strangers. The discourse of cosmopolitanism will add 
to our understanding only when it is informed by both of these 
ideals: if we care about others who are not part of our political 
order – others who may have commitments and beliefs that are 
unlike our own – we must have a way to talk to them (Appiah 
2006: 222).  
 
5.5.2. Toni Erskine and Embedded Cosmopolitanism 
The idea that cosmopolitan ambitions could be made more realistic and feasible through 
accommodating the prescriptions of ethical particularism has also been endorsed by 
Tony Erskine (2008), under the label of ‘embedded cosmopolitanism’. Embedded 
cosmopolitanism acknowledges the importance of the local attachments and loyalties in 
shaping and defining individuals’ personal moral outlook, which in turn shape and 
consolidate bonds and ties between members of a given community. This approach 
however, insists that, even within such particularistic attachments and loyalties it is 




possible to accommodate and pursue cosmopolitan concerns that are driven by 
considerations of the equal moral worth of all human beings. Drawing on Marilyn 
Friedman’s idea of ‘dislocated community’ (Friedman 1989) and ‘complex self’ 
(Friedman 1993), Erskine has sought to highlight individuals’ multiple identities, 
common affiliations and overlapping memberships of different groups and associations 
(Erskine 2008:173).  
Erskine believes that the fact that individual and social identities are fluid and 
malleable could be effectively used to facilitate links between compatriots and distant 
strangers. The idea here is to get the equal moral worth of all accepted and rooted in the 
membership of common institutions and associations that cut across local and regional 
divides. Embedded cosmopolitanism therefore, is about ‘the combination of this idea of 
multiple identities … with overlapping and non-territorial affiliations’ (2008: 175). This 
not only relieves cosmopolitanism from its abstractive predispositions but could also 
result in the development of shared membership – something that is vitally important for 
human bonding and consequent affirmative action. The cosmopolitan –communitarian 
divide, according to Erskine, can be squared if the communitarian values are understood 
to have wider application beyond the nation state (Erskine 2008: 244).   
5.5.3. Lea Ypi’s Statist Cosmopolitanism  
Perhaps the most promising and innovative rooted approach to cosmopolitan moral 
motivation is offered by Lea Ypi in her book Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political 
Agency (2012). In contrast to the common understanding of the state as an impediment to 
the implementation of cosmopolitan moral prescriptions, Ypi situates the state as a 
potentially effective agent for realizing them (Ypi 2008, 2012). According to Ypi, by 




providing the context for democratic deliberations and other salient resources, (civic 
agencies, groups etc.), the state remains relevant to any schema designed or formulated 
for realizing cosmopolitan principles and obligations.   
As the phrase ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ suggests, Ypi attempts to combine 
universalist ethical considerations with her account of particularism, on way to 
endorsing the idea that distributive equality matters both within the state and on a global 
scale. Her approach is consistent with other cosmopolitan thinkers such as Kok-Chor 
Tan (2004) and Gillian Brock (2009) who maintain that accepting special considerations 
for compatriots is legitimate, provided that such considerations are in conformity with 
our moral duties towards non-compatriots. What makes Ypi’s work stand out is her 
insistence on the idea that any motivationally sustainable and pragmatic attempt towards 
achieving the larger goals of global distributive equality must accord primary importance 
to the state as the most effectively organised and potent political agency. The state is 
important because it has the capability (through its various institutions) to reorient 
individuals towards the norms and values through which the idea of world citizenship 
could be best promoted and pursued.  
Ypi supports her arguments by citing Kant’s rejection of world government, 
which she believes stemmed from a ‘deeper critique to the limits of any political theory 
that detaches abstract reflection on normative principles from an analysis of the political 
circumstances in which they can be realised’ (Ypi 2012: 33). Against this backdrop, Ypi 
then looks to the state as the foundational context for instilling in individuals the moral 
and ethical orientations necessary for the development of empathic norms and 
behavioural patterns. Individuals, according to Ypi, are intrinsically and emotionally 
attached to the shared cultural and historical sentiments within the state. The state 




influences individuals through the various institutions and practices that generate and 
reinforce ‘feelings of mutual trust’ (Ypi, 2012: 138). It is in this sense that the state is both 
distinctive and dynamic. It reinterprets its own historical and cultural narratives to 
generate fresher accounts which have the potential to inculcate allegiance to more 
cosmopolitan norms:  
Imperatives flowing from the new interpretations of the point and 
purpose of shared institutions would in this case not appear over-
demanding and citizens would not comply simply out of fear of 
coercive mechanisms. They would do so as part of their allegiance 
to political institutions to whose development they have 
contributed (Ypi 2012: 152) 
 
Since the moral orientations of individuals are shaped in part by the cultural and political 
narratives provided by these institutional agents, they can be effectively used for the 
promotion of more outwardly focussed moral principles.  
Ypi’s approach is refreshingly novel for she is critical of both ‘ideal’ and ‘non-
ideal’ modes of theorising which, according to her, lead to both impractical and 
conservative conclusions. I noted earlier Valentini’s treatment of the differences between 
ideal and non-ideal modes of theorising, where an ideal theory presupposes full 
compliance with its principles, and non-ideal theory presupposes conditions of partial 
compliance (Ypi 2012: 655).46 The ideal/non-ideal split for Valentini has implications for 
the intuitiveness of the theory, and its inherent potential for ensuring compliance. Given 
the urgency in resolving some of the most pressing collective action issues within a 
cosmopolitan framework, it is only natural that Ypi recommends a combination of both 
                                                                 
46 In the context of climate change, non-ideal circumstances of less-than-full compliance could arise from 
collective action problems, issues around historical and inter-generational responsibilities of individuals 
and states, uneven developmental levels of states, issues related to territorial sovereignty and citizenship 
rights, among a range of others.  
 




the ideal and non-ideal, or what she calls a ‘dialectical’ method. In practical terms, it 
amounts to combining political practices and norms in resolving emerging political 
problems, and ‘activists’ or a cosmopolitan ‘avant-garde’ for their contribution to 
political change through appropriate political agents (Ypi 2012: 40; see Bailey 2014: 
266).  
Ypi in particular points to the constructive and challenging roles that activists 
have historically played in making individual citizens aware of instances of wrongdoing 
and injustices and bringing some of the most demanding and radical changes. Something 
that  
initially appeared unacceptable to consolidated elites or was 
considered over-demanding by the larger mass of citizens 
progressively matured into a persistent popular request for 
modifying the scope and franchise of democratic citizenship. It is 
through the construction of similar political initiatives that other 
fellow-citizens came to progressively sympathise with the suffering 
of vulnerable subjects and that initially weak moral motives 
obtained political agency (Ypi 2010: 123) 
 
At a more descriptive level however, Ypi accepts that both cosmopolitanism and 
the state are afflicted with their apparent antagonisms. Cosmopolitanism, for example, is 
mistaken in its general belief that the state is an impediment to the realization of its 
prescriptions, something which has led to an increasing focus on individual moral 
agency. The conception of the state as inherently particularistic, however, has tended to 
entrench the national foundation of this particularism and leads states to become more 
parochial in their outlook. The challenge then is to work out ways in which states could 
be freed from such an outlook so that they can respond to the universalistic demands of 
cosmopolitan responsibility. For example, Ypi believes that instead of looking into the 
reasons for absolute poverty, it would be better if reasons for relative deprivation were 




investigated (Ypi 2010:116). This would then bring out not only the ways in which states 
are linked in a chain of cause and effect, but it would also help promote understanding of 
the ways through which deprivation could be sorted by collective state action.  
 
Ypi accepts that there could be many other agents (ordinary citizens, social 
movements within global civil society, etc.) who could be seen as avant-garde, and who 
could be entrusted with carrying out cosmopolitan prescriptions (2010: 167-68). These 
avant-garde agents ‘would be the innovators who would transform the society and in the 
process, would also be inspiring the emergence of new normative interpretations; 
enriching, correcting and adapting … taking the lead in persuading fellow citizens to 
endorse emancipatory political projects’ (Ypi 2010: 155).   
5.5.4. Issues with Accounts Emphasizing Cosmopolitan 
Connections  
The strategy of emphasizing local affiliations and loyalties to drive home broader 
cosmopolitan outcomes is innovative and potentially significant. Certain issues, 
however, require flagging here. It is true that elements of universalism can be located in 
local traditions. However, the mechanisms through which consistent local beliefs could 
be filtered to promote some cosmopolitan norms requires some serious consideration. It 
is important because individuals have strong sensitivities, loyalties, attachments and 
commitments towards their cultural norms, and they may view cosmopolitan 
prescriptions sceptically. According to Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker  
our particular biases are too deeply engrained to be balanced with 
more universal concerns, such that our cosmopolitan will always 
be tainted by roots that rooted cosmopolitanism requires and 
endorses. Or, conversely, perhaps the universalizing imperatives of 




cosmopolitanism will always run rough shod over respect for 
cultural differences and local autonomy, operating as a hegemonic 
and imperial force’(Kymlicka & Walker 2012: 11).  
 
It is true that dialogue is important in the development of virtues of tolerance and 
accommodation, which themselves are vital for solving some of the most complex global 
issues that confront us. However, given the contentious nature of cosmopolitan 
principles, the interactions could also trigger tensions and conflicts. In fact, Appiah 
himself is aware of such possibilities (Appiah 2006:8), but he has not been able to clearly 
chart specific ways in which immediate attachments and loyalties could be slackened 
and bonds of solidarity widened to cover both the compatriot and the foreigner. Even if 
one were to assume that dialogues and conversations are the ways in which the ambit 
could be extended, still, the institutional mechanisms through which they will be carried 
on would require to be spelt out. Overall, Appiah focusses on cultural norms, but he 
does not necessarily give sufficient attention to ways in which particular cultural 
traditions can actually connect with cosmopolitan ones. In the context of resolving 
urgent and pressing global issues, the need is to marry both the civic concerns and the 
cultural concerns, emphasizing ways in which domestic political cultures can be moved 
in a more cosmopolitan direction.  
It is noteworthy that the significance of dialogue in building emancipatory and 
accommodative social, contexts, has been endorsed by Jurgen Habermas within his 
broader construct of ‘communicative rationality’ (Habermas 1984). However, even 
Habermas acknowledges the need of ‘suitable circumstances’ as preconditions for the 
actualization of the dialogues (Habermas 1984: 17). The point is significant, especially in 
light of the huge inequalities that characterize living conditions both between and within 
states. Rooted cosmopolitanism maintains that the nation state is still the most effective 




agency of transformation and change, but it does not detail the ways in which the gap 
between cosmopolitan thinking and state practices could be bridged (Brown 2011: 53). 
Rooted cosmopolitanism focuses on cultural overlaps and connections but the ways in 
which it could be used to achieve meaningful political action, especially on vexed global 
issues like climate change, is not very clear.  
Erskine’s argument that identity overlaps emanating from shared membership of 
different communities could be the connecting point sounds convincing. However, her 
theory is found lacking in situations where the so-called overlaps are either absent or are 
too thin to be effective. In her enthusiasm for balancing the abstract and the particular, 
Erskine leaves to the individual the task of resolving the conflicting influences emanating 
from simultaneous membership of different communities, and so ‘the notion of 
community that she deploys in the service of ‘embeddedness’ is not sufficiently robust to 
cope with the weight of commitment that she wishes to derive from it’ (Dobson 2006: 
166). Erskine herself acknowledges that her proposal is not ‘problem free’ from a morally 
inclusive point of view (Erskine 2008: 177).  Her acknowledgement is laudable, but it 
also brings us back to the beginning in terms of the development of strategies that could 
provide plausible ways in which cosmopolitan prescriptions could be realized.  
Similarly, Ypi focuses on the state’s civic context. I believe she is right to 
emphasize ways in which domestic political cultures might be reformed to embrace more 
cosmopolitan norms. It is possible for political communities to develop a more 
cosmopolitan outlook through internal self-re-interpretation, by identifying and 
conforming to particularistic values that are consistent with larger cosmopolitan values.  
Also persuasive is Ypi’s argument that domestic ‘avant-garde’ agents, through their 
active political interventions both at the level of theory and practice, can play a role in 




helping to motivate individuals to comply with cosmopolitan obligations. The avant-
garde agents are ‘[those] whose position in society renders them particularly vulnerable 
to the effects of specific political and institutional conflicts and therefore particularly 
relevant in informing the theorist’s diagnostic enquiry’ (Ypi 2008:5).  
In other words, avant-garde agents are supposed to perform two very important 
roles: (1) informing theorists about their own vulnerabilities so that an effective 
assessment of political institutions can be made by the latter in the light of their claims 
and (2) theorists must play the role of activists in mobilizing their support group for 
actualizing the demands. According to Ypi’s understanding, once theorists have been 
informed about such vulnerabilities, they can make final decisions that are consistent 
with global issues and could be realistically pursued as part of global justice project. The 
assessment of claims and their juxtaposition with globally relevant standards and values 
thus have to be made by the theorists, while the activists have the responsibility for 
mobilizing their support groups and undertaking collective struggles for the actualization 
of identified demands.  
As a strategy, this holds appeal, but it faces challenges, especially in situations 
where vulnerabilities themselves might have been diffused and there are differing and 
contradictory narratives about them. If that were the case, then the information shared 
by the activists, as well as the judgements passed by theoreticians would first need to be 
put through counterfactual analyses before being accepted as the building block behind 
individual actions. I accept that traditions provide ‘substance’ to human li fe and that it is 
practically impossible to live without these in the sense of attachment and belonging that 
cultural forms of ethical life provide to the individual. So, if there is to be a cosmopolitan 
organization of human life, this has to find its way into the substantive forms through 




ways in which our sense of obligation, responsibility and respect are organized. 
However, I believe that communities not only need to conduct an internal self -re-
interpretation as suggested by Ypi, but also through a process of internal self-
transformation in the Gandhian sense. I will elaborate this in the next two chapters, but 
suffice is to say here that the process involves cultivating moral sensibilities that are 
strong and intense enough in motivating individuals to take on responsibilities and duties 
aimed at protecting the basic human rights of every individual both near and far away. 
In the context of climate change this has an added relevance in terms of preparing agents 
to be willing to share the burdens in accordance with their capacity and responsibility, 
rather than be among the free-riders.  
5.6. Local Universalisms and Cosmopolitan Compliance 
Whilst each of the rooted, connected or overlapping approaches discussed in the 
preceding section is commendable, each also faces some limitations, as noted. I propose 
here a modified version of rooted cosmopolitanism. It draws on domestic traditions 
which have some strong universalistic elements. Specifically, I argue that, in the context 
of global justice and more narrowly of robust action on climate change, we can proceed 
most effectively by:   
1. Seeking to identify the universalistic elements of national cultures, religions and 
civil society institutions 
 
2. Attempting to use these as a way of articulating the nature of the responsibilities 
and  
 




3. Identifying potentially effective modes of promoting such principles of 
cosmopolitan responsibility within domestic civic discourse  
 
This approach is influenced by Ypi’s and other rooted or statist accounts but seeks to 
go beyond them in giving emphasis to the potential importance of local universalisms – 
domestic traditions of thought which connect in significant ways to cosmopolitan 
principles and could help to motivate support for them. It is a rooted cosmopolitan 
strategy which actively seeks out traditions which resonate with cosmopolitan notions of 
connections among all humans and communities.  It holds that emphasizing and further 
developing these connections and promoting them in the domestic political culture and 
civic discourse, can help in the promotion of cosmopolitan principles. It should be a 
significant way of promoting cosmopolitan norms and a willingness to support and/or 
comply with cosmopolitan moral requirements in climate change and other contexts.  
The exemplar for the approach is Gandhian political thought in the Indian 
context. I will work to show that, in that context, a turn to Gandhian moral philosophy 
could plausibly provide us with the resources for building theoretically robust and action 
oriented strategies to effectively resolve theory- action dichotomies that inherently 
characterize cosmopolitanism. Conjoining the roles of theoretician and activist into one 
could be one way to relieve moral cosmopolitanism from accusations of being too 
abstract. Gandhi’s innovative and successful political experiments, as those carried out in 
the context of India’s anti-colonial campaign, can I believe, provide some resources for 
that. Through a case study, involving India’s expected commitments and duties and 
responsibilities in the context of climate change and the adequacy of Gandhian 
principles in helping it to realize them, I would attempt to show how such an approach 




could actually be applied. The next chapter will focus on a possible application of this 
culturally rooted cosmopolitan approach, involving Gandhian thought.  
It might be argued that an approach to cosmopolitan motivation such as the one I 
am outlining here runs the risk of simply reinforcing the narrowness, complacencies 
prejudices and biases against ‘others’ that could possibly arise from a rooted 
understanding of the social self. It has been argued in fact that such rooted 
understandings fail to ‘endogenize the movements of individuals across social 
formations’ and engender antagonisms and conflicts’ (Frazer 1999: 1). According to 
Kymlicka and Walker ‘perhaps our particular biases are too deeply engrained to be 
balanced with more universal concerns, such that our cosmopolitan aspirations will 
always be tainted by the roots that rooted cosmopolitanism requires and endorses’ 
(Kymlicka and Walker 2012:11). The argument is significant, as all human societies tend 
to be particularistic diffused, and segmented, implying susceptibility to conflicts - both 
within and without.  
Against such a backdrop then it is only natural to expect that individuals would 
not have the motivation to rise above the divides of ‘self’ and ‘others’ by conforming 
equally to their ‘associative duties’ (owed to kin-based relations and other members of an 
ethnic group or community) and ‘general duties’ (owed to human beings qua humanity).  
There is always a possibility that the demands of associative duties may subsume the 
general ones. According to Samuel Scheffler, ‘the values of justice and equality, on the 
one hand, and the values of personal friendship and communal solidarity, on the other 
hand, derive from mutually exclusive and fundamentally opposed systems of ethical 
thought’ (Scheffler 2001: 94).  




Whilst I accept that individuals have natural leanings, commitments and 
attachments towards their cultural roots and social identities, I do not endorse the idea 
that differing cultural perceptions necessarily give rise to opposition and clashes. On the 
contrary, I will argue that invoking the teachings, prescriptions as well as discursive 
political practices of some of the most revered social and political icons (ambassadors) 
within societies can plausibly result in a syncretic construction of moral values and 
beliefs that are effective in generating meaningful actions.  
Two clarifications are necessary here. First, in arguing for the efficacy of the 
ambassadorial approach – where Gandhi would be an exemplar -- in facilitating a 
syncretic understanding between local and more universal traditions, I am not limiting 
the possible number of ambassadors. Instead, I accept that there could be many such 
icons both within and across societies. My second clarification is connected with the 
first, in the sense that just as I accept the plurality of icons, I also agree that the intensity 
or degree of their influences in motivating people for moral actions would also be 
different both within and across cultures and societies. It is precisely because of this that 
the need is to identify ambassadors or icons that are able to generate the most effective 
motivational influence in a particular socio-cultural and political context.  
Within the Indian context itself there could be many moral exemplars/icons who 
could be used as ambassadors for motivating people to perform duties consistent with 
cosmopolitan prescriptions. The Great Nobel laurete Poet Rabindra Nath Tagore – a 
contemporary of Gandhi, for example, could be thought of as well. In fact, Gandhi and 
Tagore shared a great relationship ‘vyingwith each other in demonstration of affection 
and regard’ (Natesan 1994: 236). Holding Gandhi in reverence, whilst Tagore bestowed 
on him the title of Mahatma or the Great Saint, Gandhi respectfully used to address 




tagore as a Gurudev, - the greatest of the teachers.  It is equally true however, that there 
was a fundamental difference in their respective approaches and perceptions about the 
unity of mankind. Whilst Tagore stood for and openly advocated a universalist or 
cosmopolitan humanist prescriptions deriding nationalism as ‘morally dangerous and 
subversive of the very goal its sets out to achieve -  national unity that is based on the 
worthy ideals of  justice and equality (Nussbaum  1996:4), Gandhi’s thought and action  
epitomises and understanding of nationalism that is built upon a subtle the simultaneous 
deconstruction of Western modernity and its replacement with an indegeneous one 
(Godrej 112). For Tagore an understanding and opertainalization of the idea common 
humanity necessitates the destruction of Gandhi’s ‘distruptive politics’ (ibid). A cursory 
glance at the respective stands taken by the two Indian luminaries on nationalism and 
universalism may easily portray them as adeversaries but that would be too simplistic an 
understanding. According to Farah Godrej ‘a wider reading of works of both the thinkers 
provides us the resources to treat Gandhi’s thought as sympathetic and complimentary 
to Tagore’s universalist cosmopolitan goals’ (ibid).  
In section 6.7 of the next chapter I will attempt to bring out the cosmopolitan 
strands in Gandhian thought, but suffice is to say here that I believe that taking Gandhi 
as exemplar of cosmopolitan motivation for the purpose of this thesis in no ways 
precludes the possibilities of identifying similar others.  I do however, contend that 
Gandhi would likely be a more effective cosmopolitan ambassador than Tagore, simply 
given the very wide reverence for Gandhi across many sections of Indian society – rich, 
poor, upper caste as well as the marginalised and vulnerable communities.  Plausibly, it 
would be even more effective to have multiple ambassadors, especially in a country so 
large as India. Tagore, for example, could be a very effective ambassador in Bengali -




speaking regions, while B.R. Ambedkar, who remains a great champion of the country’s 
marginalised communities could be an effective ambassador as well.  
My simple submission here is that a syncretic understanding of cultures is 
possible and necessary to forge cohesion and solidarities. It also can foster mutually 
respectful and harmonious relationship both within and between groups, which is 
instrumental in solving global problems afflicting humanity as a whole. Additionally, it 
not only holds the potential for relieving cosmopolitan prescriptions from their inherent 
naiveté about actually motivating change, but also could help to emancipate 
particularistic traditions from their narrow commitments, promoting shared values (see 
Etzioni 2007:24).  
As far as the question of the apparent irreconcilabilities and contradictions 
between local and global, between the near and the distant, between the associative and 
other general duties etc. is concerned, my understanding is primarily guided by the 
persuasions that they can be essentially made to converge and that the persistent 
antagonisms between the ‘self’ and ‘other’ can be resolved. Recall that in chapter 4, 
whilst defending the hybrid approach as being morally persuasive on account of its 
fairness I underlined the efficacy of what Caney calls “norm entrepreneurs”. As with 
Caney, my own understanding of such norm entrepreneurs is of agents who are valued 
and respected in society and possess the required moral authority, and charisma to 
influence/motivate both individuals and communities to undertake humanistic missions 
by enabling them to broaden their attitudes and orientations.   
The need thus is to underline ways in which transformations within an agent 
could be brought about so that her moralist commitments could take priority over 
rationalist ones. It is in this context that in Chapter 6, I refer to the effectiveness of 




Gandhian ethics as the most pragmatic strategy for providing a cosmopolitan impetus in 
the Indian context. Gandhi’s prescriptions on the moral autonomy of persons is 
premised on the concept of duty something he derives from a non-dualistic interpretation 
of the cosmos. Gandhi would offer a conception of autonomous persons having capacity 
to practice voluntary poverty, simplicity, and strict civility as a moral project, which 
humanity is craving for, and which, in turn, will formulate a moral cosmopolitan 
framework. The next chapter precisely builds on this argument by recommending the 
efficacy of a rooted ambassadorial approach to resolving the climate conundrum by 




















6. Mahatma Gandhi: A Cosmopolitan 
Ambassador 
 
Not until we have reduced ourselves to 
nothingness can we conquer the evil in us.... 
And when a man thus loses himself, he 
immediately finds himself in the service of all 
that lives. 
      --M K Gandhi, in Young India, 
20.12.1928 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter and the next aim to show how the rooted approach to cosmopolitan moral 
motivation which I developed in the last chapter could be applied to the politics of 
climate change. In this chapter I will turn to the Indian context for an exploration of  the 
potentially transformative influence of a specific moral ambassador, Mahatma Gandhi, 
on the values of national culture. I will give details on Gandhi’s life and the core tenets 
of his still highly influential social thought, ultimately with emphasis on the 
cosmopolitan strains in it. This will serve to establish Gandhi as a Cosmopolitan 
Ambassador – a thought leader whose ideas resonate with cosmopolitanism and could 
be employed in social and political discourse to help generate support for policy 
outcomes consistent with cosmopolitanism.  
The chapter is structured as follows: in the first section, I introduce Gandhi’s 
iconic stature in India and follow it up with some biographical details, with emphasis on 
how he sought to put his moral principles into practise during his life. The second 
section presents a systematic account of Gandhi’s major ideas, particularly Nonviolence, 
Satyagraha and Swaraj, which will be shown to form the foundation of his cosmopolitan 




outlook.  The final section will highlight the ways in which Gandhi can be seen as an 
exemplar of cosmopolitan principles in practice. In Chapter 7, then, I discuss how my 
construct of ambassadorial cosmopolitanism could be applied in the context of India’s 
actions in relation to climate change mitigation. 
6.2. Gandhi’s Moral and Political Influence  
In India, Mohandas K. Gandhi is held in veneration, ‘appropriated as national founder,  
hero, and martyr’ (Brown 2011: 7), and appreciated as ‘an image and a metaphor’ as 
well as a ‘builder of the modern World’ (Rajmohan Gandhi 2007: xi). He is ubiquitous 
in India’s social, political and economic space. Myriad buildings and roads are named 
after him, and his picture adorns the walls of almost all educational institutions and 
governmental buildings. His name has also been prefixed to numerous governmental 
policies and plans of social welfare and empowerment. For example, India’s Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme, now acknowledged by the World Bank as the world’s 
largest social security programme (Honorati et al., 2015:10; Arora et al., 2013), has been 
named the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA).  
Similarly, the Swacch Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission), a massive awareness 
campaign aiming to make Indian cities, towns and other public spaces cleaner and more 
hygienic, uses Gandhi’s iconic spectacles as its logo and invokes his ideas to appeal to 
the younger generation. It was, not coincidentally, launched on his birthday, October 2, 
in 2014.  
Widely referred to as the Mahatma (great soul) and Bapu, the father of the Indian 
nation, Gandhi has a revered place in India. Not only does his image appear on every 
denomination of Indian paper currency except the one-rupee note, he is also the only 




national leader whose birthday is marked as national holiday. Statues and peace 
monuments honouring him are commonplace throughout the country, and Gandhi has 
been credited with developing and promoting the principles of tolerance and pluralism 
that helped India’s experiment with a vastly diverse democracy succeed (Kohli 2001). In 
fact, the respect and esteem Gandhi enjoys amongst the millions of Indians, past and 
present, have been said to constitute the ‘core of Indian nationhood’ (Nandy 1983). For 
innumerable Indians and many non-Indians, Gandhi comes off as a saint, a messiah, a 
saviour, a legend, an apostle of peace. He remains the only ‘hope for humanity in a 
disastrous world’ (Docker 2007: 217).  
Likewise, outside of India, Gandhi has been hailed as an ‘innovative ideologist’ 
who has had a lasting influence on social economic and political practices across the 
world. His contemporary admirer Albert Einstein said, 
 
Mahatma Gandhi's life achievement stands unique in political 
history. He has invented a completely new and humane means for 
the liberation war of an oppressed country, and practised it with 
greatest energy and devotion. The moral influence he had on the 
consciously thinking human being of the entire civilised world will 
probably be much more lasting…Because lasting will only be the 
work of such statesmen who wake up and strengthen the moral 
power of their people through their example and educational 
works…Generations to come will scarce believe that such a one as 
this walked the earth in flesh and blood’.47 
 
 Richard Attenborough’s biopic ‘Gandhi’ (1982), which chronicled Gandhi’s path from 
civil rights activism in South Africa to becoming the leading humanist nationalist in 
India, won eight Academy Awards and attracted global attention to his teachings and 
practices. A statue of Gandhi now adorns the Parliament Square in London, just next to 
                                                                 
47 http://www.gandhiserve.org/streams/einstein.html   [Aaccessed June, 9, 2016].  
 




the statue of Winston Churchill, who had once described him as an ‘a seditious Middle 
Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half -
naked up the steps of the Vice-regal palace’ (cf. Scalmer 2011:24; Hardiman 2003: 238, 
n1). Indeed, he has been described as one of the foremost charismatic personalities of the 
20th century.48  
According to Judith Brown ‘Gandhi also lives on: and one might say there are 
many ‘contemporary Gandhis’ as people consider his thought and his example, and are 
motivated to follow, use, and adapt much of what he suggested, as they seek to resist 
injustice in the contemporary world’ (Brown 2011: 2). In fact, two commercial Hindi-
language movies, released in 2006 and 2008 respectively, have resulted in a massive 
resurgence of interest in his humanitarian principles and the political practice of 
nonviolent protest in India. Gandhi has been held as that ‘rare great man held in 
universal esteem, a figure lifted from history to moral icon’ (McGeary 1999 cf. 
Hardiman 2003:1).  
Gandhi continues to generate both wide scholastic interest and appeal as an 
emancipatory figure.49 As noted, in India, his birthday is celebrated as a national 
                                                                 
48Time magazine declared Gandhi as the joint runner up with (Franklin Roosevelt) to Albert Einstein as 
‘person of the twentieth century and the most outstanding crusader for civil rights and individual liberties. 
See (Hardiman 2003:1); see also Time December 31, 1999 | Vol. 154 No. 27; and see 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988159,00.html . [Accessed 15 June 2016]. 
 
49 Gandhi’s life and works continue to generate massive biographical and analytical research interests from 
scholars across cultural geographical and ideological hues. Some notable accounts of Gandhi’s life and 
work are, M.K Gandhi. (1994). The collected works of Mahatma Gandhi. New Delhi: Publications Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India; Bhikhu, P. (1997). Gandhi: a very short 
introduction, Oxford University Press.; Judith M. Brown. (2004) Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Judith Brown & Anthony Parel. 
(2011) The Cambridge companion to Gandhi. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press; Anthony 
Parel. (2006). Gandhi's philosophy and the quest for harmony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Judith 
Brown. (1989). Gandhi: prisoner of hope. New Haven: Yale University Press; Y. Chadha. (1997); Gandhi: a 
life. New York: John Wiley. ; David Hardiman (2003). Gandhi in his time and ours: the global legacy of his 
ideas. London: C. Hurst & Co.; Rajmohan Gandhi. (2008). Gandhi: the man, his people, and the empire. 
Berkeley: University of California Press; Anthony Parel. (2009).  Hind swaraj and other writings. Cambridge 




holiday, and in 2007, the United Nations General Assembly decreed that his birthday 
should be celebrated as the International Day of Nonviolence. Gandhi was neither a 
systematic philosopher, nor an acclaimed theoretician in the academic sense, yet his life 
practices convey the utility of nonviolence, love, faith, courage, and patience in seeking 
truth.  
Gandhi’s life literature and method represent a dynamic narrative 
of entangled strings of religious practices, secular aspirations, 
philosophical ideas, and goals and strategies’ and even though [he] 
erected the framework of his philosophy and methods on India’s 
philosophical presuppositions, he also embraced western ideas of 
social justice, economic and labour equality and the politically 
independent democratic state’ (Howard 2013: 10). 
 
 His life and ideas are thus a powerful exposition of a humanitarian world view. They 
are not intended to systematise wisdom but to transform society, based on an undying 
faith in the goodness of human nature (Sankhdher 1972: 68). His advocacy of non-
violent means in realizing moral principles and social justice has left an enduring legacy 
not just in India but in many other societies across the globe.  
Gandhi provided independent India with a ‘political canon’ which still informs its 
political practices. As Parel notes, it is ‘virtually impossible today to discuss Indian 
politics without the help of concepts such as satyagraha, sarvodaya, constructive 
programme, trusteeship, Harijans, anasakti yoga – all concepts invented by him’ (Parel 
2011:228).  We can add to this list concepts such as swaraj, ahimsa (nonviolence), satya 
(Truth), aparigraha (freedom from excess), and swadeshi -- all found elsewhere in Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
New York: Cambridge University Press; H. Jack. (1994).  The Gandhi reader: a source book of his life and 
writings. New York: Grove Press; C. Hatt. (2002). Mahatma Gandhi. London: Evans; Stanley Wolpert. 
(2002). Gandhi's passion: the life and legacy of Mahatma Gandhi. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Louis 
Fischer. (2002). The essential Gandhi: an anthology of his writings on his life, work and ideas. New York: Vintage 
Books. online portal : https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org 
 




thought but radically transformed by Gandhi, such that they have become genuine 
Gandhian concepts. We can also note that even ‘though Satyagraha (the Hindi word for 
‘nonviolent civil resistance) would not gain popularity on a global scale, the idea of 
‘nonviolence’, which Gandhi took from the Sanskrit ahimsa – has, rather, become the 
standard term to describe such a practice’ (Hardiman 2011: 239-40), generating and 
inspiring numerous movements in different societies and cultures across the globe 
(Hardiman 2011).50 
In what follows, I will offer details on Gandhi’s life and especially his actions, to 
reinforce the importance of his lived philosophy. I will then offer further details on the 
specific concepts he developed and ways in which his thought connects to 
cosmopolitanism.  
6.3. Early Life 
Gandhi was born October 2, 1869 at Porbandar, a town on India’s western coast, in the 
state of Gujarat. His mother (Putli Bai) who had a very profound impact was a follower 
of the Parnami sect51 and led a semi-ascetic life, carrying out her household chores, 
abstaining from the conspicuously consumptive lifestyles that define a middle class 
                                                                 
50 Leaders inspired by Gandhi would include Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Martin Luther King Jr. in 
the United States, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, to name a few. Addressing a joint session of the Indian 
Parliament on November 8, 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama, acknowledged the influence and impact 
of Mahatma Gandhi on his own life through King: ‘I am mindful that I might not be standing before you 
today, as President of the United States, had it not been for Gandhi and the message he shared with 
America and the world’. The full text of President Obama’s speech is available on 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-
parliament-new-delhi-india. Accessed August 11, 2016. For a detailed discussion see David Hardiman 
(2011) ‘Gandhi’s Global Legacy’, in Brown and Parel (eds.) Cambridge Companion to Gandhi. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 239-57. Also see David Hardiman (2003) chapter 9, in Gandhi: in his Time 
and Ours. New Delhi Permanent Black.  
 
51 The Parnami sect combines Hindu and Muslim religious beliefs, and gives equal honour to the sacred 
books of the Vaishnavites and the Koran, and preached religious harmony. 




living. Her ‘religious fasts and vows…had an abiding impression on her son’ (Parekh 
2005: 1). Gandhi’s father, who held an influential political position as the chief 
administrator and member of the court of Porbandar, had friends who followed and 
practised Jainism. The ideas of nonviolence and strict self-discipline that constitute the 
core of Jainism are widely believed to have influenced Gandhi from an early age. 
Gandhi thus had an upbringing steeped in religious and mythical precepts, infusing in 
him respect for the human values of love and respect. It is from such learnings that 
Gandhi developed his particular understanding of ‘Truth’ (Rudolph & Rudolph 1983: 
48) 
In 1888, Gandhi travelled to England to study law and jurisprudence. Initially his 
mother was averse to his idea of ‘crossing the seas’, 52 however, after he vowed strict 
adherence to vegetarianism and to stay away from wine and women, she reluctantly 
agreed to let him go. In London, Gandhi enrolled at the Inner Temple for training as a 
Barrister. He joined the Vegetarian Society, and through it established connections with 
members of the Theosophical Society, who followed the teachings of Henry David 
Thoreau and advocated the ideas of universal love and human bonds (Pyarelal 1965, 
229; quoted in Hunt 2005: 202).  The philosophic insights of Thoreau, along with the 
thought of British Fabians such as George Bernard Shaw and Edward Carpenter, w ould 
later inform Gandhi’s constructive programmes and strategies, as well as his 
commitment to helping the poor and excluded. In London, Gandhi also read Sir Edwin 
Arnold’s English translation of the Bhagvad Gita -- a Hindu religious text written in 
                                                                 
52 Crossing the dark waters (seas) was considered a depraving act, and a sin in the Indian society in those 
days amounting to losing caste purity (Mishra 2007:33-34).  




Sanskrit. It contains the instructions of Lord Krishna to his disciple Arjuna to believe and 
follow that path of karma (duty). Gandhi developed immense veneration for it.  
6.3.1. South African Struggles 
Gandhi qualified as a barrister in the year 1891 and returned to India the same year, but 
in the first two years of his career, first at Bombay and later in Kathiawad, struggled to 
establish a solid practice. In 1893, he accepted an offer to act as legal counsel for 
Abdullah Haji Adam Jhaveri - head of the trading firm Dada Abdullah & Co., at Natal, 
a British colony in South Africa (Vahed 2005).53  The employment opportunity brought 
Gandhi to South Africa and presented him with his first significant moment of fame. 
This fame had a cost, however, as it was preceded by numerous instances of 
racial abuse and ill treatment. The most well-known is the incident in which Gandhi was 
bodily thrown from a train. After about a week’s stay in Durban, after his arrival from 
India, Gandhi had to travel to Pretoria in connection with the lawsuit for which the 
company had hired him. As part of his agreement with his client, a first-class railway 
ticket had been given to Gandhi. When the train reached Maritzburg, a white passenger 
boarded the same first class compartment and objected to his presence there, arguing that 
the compartment was meant only for white travellers. Gandhi refused to leave and 
consequently was pushed out at the Pietermaritzburg railway station. During a freezing 
night at the station, Gandhi had a moment of self-enlightenment.  
I began to think of my duty. Should I fight for my rights or go back to 
India, or should I go on to Pretoria without minding the insults, and 
return to India after finishing the case? It would be cowardice to run 
                                                                 
53 Gandhi was employed because he could speak and understand Gujarati language and could help the 
English speaking legal counsel of the firm.  
 




back to India without fulfilling my obligation. The hardship to which I 
was subjected was superficial –only a symptom of the deep disease of 
colour prejudice. I should try, if possible, to root out the disease and 
suffer hardships in the process. Redress for wrongs I should seek only to 
the extent that would be necessary for the removal of the colour 
prejudice (Gandhi 2010: 76).  
 
Gandhi decided to continue with his journey, but his problems were not over yet 
and he had to face similar behaviour at least on two more occasions, at Pardekoph, 
where he was beaten by the stage coach driver for not complying with the prejudicial 
commands of the later and again on the train to Pretoria from Johannesburg. However, it 
is worth mentioning that whilst Gandhi faced many such racially prejudicial onslaughts 
during his 21 years long stay in South Africa, it is also true that on most of the occasions 
he was rescued by people from the same white race (Guha 2013)54.    
In South Africa, Gandhi dedicated himself to opposing racial discrimination and 
other forms of oppression, injustice and exploitation. These struggles had a powerful 
impact on him. They transformed him from a barrister into an ingenious popular 
political leader who would agitate, protest and lead from the front, with an 
uncompromising adherence to the faith and conviction of non-violence (Parekh 2005: 8).  
The seeds of his nonviolent social protest (Satyagraha) thus were laid in South Africa 
between 1894 and 1914. On numerous occasions, they culminated in restoring the 
                                                                 
54 Apart from the Maritzburg (Pietermarizburg) incidence, Gandhi had to face racial prejudice many times 
during his stay in South Africa. There are at least two other incidents – The first one preceded the train 
journey incident and happened almost immediately after his arrival in South Africa, when he was asked by 
a local magistrate at a Durban Court to remove his head gear – a demand he stoutly refused to oblige. The 
other incident was one wherein he was kicked by a policeman without warning for daring to walk on a 
footpath, where the non-whites were not supposed to go (M K Gandhi 2010: 73-79). In a later incidence, 
in 1897 at Durban, Gandhi was attacked by a mob of whites. He was rescued by the wife of Richard 
Alexander, the chief constable of police. Later Gandhi refused to bring upon charges against members of 
the mob.  
 




dignity, rights and the human worth of hundreds of thousands of the victims of racial 
prejudice (Guha 2013).  
Gandhi’s activities in South Africa in the period, 1894 - 1906 were primarily 
focused on organising the Indian community. During these years, he combined the roles 
of organiser and social reformer -- something that would stand him in good stead much 
later, during his campaign in India against British colonial rule. Gandhi’s ideas and 
practices in South Africa were greatly influenced by three books: Henry David Thoreau’s 
On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (1847), Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of God is Within You, and 
John Ruskin’s Unto This Last (1862) (Parekh 2005:7).55  From Thoreau’s work, Gandhi 
got the idea of civil disobedience, while from Tolstoy he took some important lessons on 
using religious ideas to promote non-violence and feelings of love and common 
humanity. Most significantly, Tolstoy taught him the need of conforming to what one 
preaches.  ‘During his 21 years in South Africa, Gandhi’s ways of thought and life’ 
according to Bhikhu Parekh, ‘underwent important changes. Indeed, the two became 
inseparable for him. Thought came to have no meaning unless it was lived out, and life 
was shallow unless it reflected a carefully though-out vision of life’ (Parekh, 2005:6).   
6.4. Returning to India and Spearheading the Anti-Colonial Campaign 
Gandhi returned to India as a well-known political activist on January 9, 1915 (Parekh 
2005:9). It was on the advice of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, his political mentor, that 
Gandhi had taken the decision to return to India. His South African experiences had 
made him adept at public speaking, but more importantly, it had made him adept in the 
                                                                 
55 Interestingly, both Ruskin and Thoreau are believed to be themselves inspired by Indian philosophic 
ideas (Joshi 1969: 67). 




art of building and nurturing organizations to promote specific political outcomes (Guha 
2013).  On the advice of Gokhale, Gandhi spent the first two years after his arrival 
touring the length and breadth of India, gaining first-hand experience and understanding 
of the nerves and heart of the country, with emphasis on the countryside.  
In 1915, Gandhi established his Ashram – a place for discipline and morality 
oriented to communal living, in the city of Ahmedabad in his home state of Gujarat. 
Later in 1917 it was shifted not far away, to the banks of Shabaramati River. In 1916, 
Gandhi joined the Indian National Congress, which remains one of the country’s leading 
national political parties. It had been founded in 1885 to represent the interests of 
Indians, but by the time Gandhi arrived in India it had become stale both in its 
operations and methods. Its effectiveness also had been hampered by infighting between 
strong nationalists and liberal constitutionalists.56  Gandhi sought to launch an inclusive 
nationalist movement that would address the concerns of the marginalised and the 
disempowered sections of society. His priorities were to be the eradication of social evils 
(untouchability), voicing the concerns of the poor peasantry/working class, women’s 
empowerment, and fostering harmony between India’s religious and ethnic 
communities.      
 
                                                                 
56 The Congress had been divided into two groups. While leaders like B.G. Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, and 
Lala Lajpat Rai favoured an aggressive nationalistic approach and were referred to as the extremists, the 
other group, comprised of leaders such as Gokhale, believed in liberal constitutional reforms and were 
called moderates. Gandhi was also helped by the fact that his arrival in India coincided with the aging of a 
generation of nationalist leadership. Dadabhai Naroji, one of the most prominent liberal constitutionalist, 
was around 90 years old, Tilak was approaching 60 (died later in 1920), and S.N. Banerjee was 67. 
Gokhale was three years older than Gandhi, but he died just a month after Gandhi’s arrival. In a way, the 
Congress was facing a leadership vacuum, and Gandhi’s reputation helped him in establishing his 
leadership credentials within the Congress relatively easily (Brown 1972: Ch.2; Wolpert 2002: 6).   
 




6.4.1. Champaran (1917), Kheda and Ahmedabad (1918).  
Gandhi attempted to put some of his principles into action at Champaran - a small town 
in India’s eastern state of Bihar. For years, the European planters had forced the local 
peasantry into cultivating indigo on 3/20 to 5/20 part of their land. In the closing years 
of the 19th Century however, with the invention of dyes made in Germany, the demand 
for indigo was reduced significantly, and its cultivation was no longer profitable.  The 
peasants wanted to shift to other crops, but the European planters would allow them to 
do so only if they agreed to pay higher compensatory rent (Johnson 2006:21).  
On the invitation of a local peasant leader, Gandhi arrived at Champaran. After 
familiarizing himself with the social realities and establishing personal rapport with the 
peasantry, Gandhi, on behalf of the peasants, tried to enter into a dialogue with the 
planters. But that failed and he was ordered to leave. Noncompliance of that order by 
Gandhi resulted in a summons from the local courts. By this time the peasantry had 
become mobilised, and on hearing the news of Gandhi’s impending arrest a massive 
number gathered outside the court. Inside the courtroom, Gandhi himself explained why 
he defied the law and asked for a penalty for protesting. The magistrate trying the case 
was completely taken aback both by the size of the support Gandhi had generated and by 
Gandhi’s own charisma. He did not want to imprison him and hence imposed a penalty 
of one-hundred Indian rupees. Gandhi argued that he did not have that money, and that 
he should be sent to prison. Instead, the magistrate ordered his release on a personal 
legal guarantee. In the next three to four months Gandhi organised many more meetings 
and consultations, and the numbers of peasantry and other classes supporting the 
agitation continued to swell. Finally, the government relented and a committee was 




formed to inquire into the matter. Gandhi was nominated as a member of that 
committee, wherein he used his deliberative prowess and the reports prepared earlier to 
convince the government that the forced cultivation was not supportable. The report of 
the committee was subsequently accepted by the government. According to Richard 
Johnson (2006: 22) Champaran was the single brick that would lead ultimately to the 
cracking of the Raj (colonial rule) 
Enthused by the success of his first political experiment in India Gandhi moved 
on repeating it at Kheda, and Ahmedabad, both districts in Gujarat. Whilst at Kheda, 
Gandhi launched his movement demanding tax waivers for the drought hit peasants, at 
Ahmedabad, he stood with the textile mill workers in their demand of an increased 
dearness allowance in the wake of rising inflation (Johnson 2006:22; Chandra et al., 
1989 Ch. 15).  Gandhi’s interventions at Champaran, Kheda and Ahmedabad not only 
demonstrated the efficacy of the strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience in the Indian 
context, they also established his ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters. Gandhi 
had been very clearly able to demonstrate the need to forge solidarity between various 
groups for a just cause. His work also indicated that, in order to construct a pan India 
opposition to colonial rule, the beginnings had to be made at local levels – mobilizing 
support around local issues, generating momentum in ways that eventually, the entire 
country could stand united as one. These movements had succeeded in making Gandhi a 
national leader as well as establishing the moral tone of his politics. Gandhi’s 
‘[M]oralistic language, complex personality, clarity of vision, use of culturally suffused 
symbols, manners, enormous self-confidence, and courage to stand up to the established 
leadership both impressed and intrigued his countrymen, and added to his charisma’ 
(Parekh 2005: 15).  




Over time, Gandhi launched three major pan-India movements championing the 
cause of independence as a moral imperative for the Indian people (Chakrabarty 2006). 
These were the Non-cooperation Movement (1920-22), The Civil Disobedience 
Movement (1930-34 in two phases) and the Quit India Movement (1942). All three 
movements were mounted on a series of constructive protests and nonviolent campaigns 
undertaken mainly to widen the participation base of the masses in opposition to the 
exploitative and unjust colonial practices and laws. The ideas developed or promoted in 
each initiative influenced the particular strain of cosmopolitan thought identifiable in 
Gandhi’s work as a whole.  
6.4.2. The Non-cooperation Movement (1920-22) 
In 1919, the colonial rulers introduced a draconian law (Rowlett Act) curbing the 
freedom of the press and allowing arrest without trials. Gandhi by now had a great deal 
of influence in the country, so the support base of the movement quickly grew on his 
call. In the midst of the movement, on April 13, 1919, in city of Amritsar, in the 
province of Punjab, hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured after the army 
troops under the command of General Reginald Dyer, indiscriminately fired onto a 
peacefully protesting crowd. The massive causalities of the incident caused Gandhi to 
rethink his strategy, and he withdrew his movement, though later in the year he 
undertook another movement (Khilafat Movement), to protests against the 
dethronement of the ruler in Turkey. These protests were in solidarity with the religious 
sentiments of the Muslim community, and Gandhi saw them as an opportunity to help 
forge bonds between India’s Hindus and Muslims (Chandra et al., 1989: 168; Brown 
1989).  




The agitations against the Rowlett act as well as the Khilafat Movement were 
then merged with a wider movement against the British rule in 1920 in the Non-
Cooperation movement. The movement was launched with the understanding that the 
colonial rule had survived for so long only because of the continued support and 
cooperation of the Indian people, and it would fall flat if they were to withdraw their 
support. Once that happened, new and institutional mechanisms could be created to 
replace it (Parekh 2005: 16). The non-cooperation movement recommended boycotts of 
government functions and programmes, renunciation of titles, resignation from local and 
other legislative bodies, along with attempts to produce and popularize indigenous 
products.   
The movement commanded great support from all sections of the masses. It was 
stalled, however, by a violent incident in 1922,57 in Gorakhpur in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, in which a mob burnt down a police station, resulting in death of several 
policemen inside. Gandhi immediately gave a call for withdrawal of the movement, even 
though many of his supporters supported its continuation (Amin 1984). Gandhi himself 
was arrested and tried on charges of sedition at this time. The judge hearing the trial, 
however, was so moved by Gandhi’s account of the exploitative and unjust nature of 
British Colonial rule in India, that while pronouncing the judgement, he bowed to 
Gandhi and remarked,  
That you are in a different category from any person I have ever tried or am likely 
to try. It would be impossible to ignore the fact that, in the eyes of millions of your 
countrymen, you are a great patriot and a leader. Even those who differ from you in 
politics look upon you as a man of high ideals and even of saintly life (Jack 1994: 206) 
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Gandhi was imprisoned but released on health grounds in 1924. That same year, 
he was elected president of the Indian National Congress – the only time he held any 
official position within the organisation (Parekh 2005: 18; Jain 1987:17). For the next 
several years he focused on developing Congress’ organizational capacity and making it 
truly representative of people’s hopes and aspirations. He also used this time to focus on  
ideas of social reform – stressing the need for abolishing untouchability, underlining the 
importance of women’s empowerment and involvement in politics (Forbes 1999: 124), 
promoting self-reliance through commonly owned and decentralised means of 
production, and popularizing vernacular languages (Parekh 2005:19).  
6.4.3. Civil Disobedience Movement (1930) 
Gandhi launched his civil disobedience movement in March 1930, by undertaking a 240-
mile march from Ahmedabad to Dandi, a village situated on the coast of Gujarat. The 
main objective of the movement was to register protest against salt laws aimed at 
maintaining a British monopoly on salt manufacture and sale. The colonial government 
had imposed high taxes on salt, and declared illegal the indigenous methods of 
producing salt from sea water. The salt laws had long been a source of unrest among 
Indians. The march started with a group of 78 volunteers, however, as it went along the 
numbers swelled. Gandhi would stop at different places on the way and address huge 
gatherings comprised of people from many religions and castes. Many of the people who 
came to listen to him or to view the march would ultimately join him.  
The march attracted wide press coverage both at national and international levels.  
It reached Dandi on April 5 and, in the morning hours of the next day, Gandhi went to 




the shores and picked up a handful of mud and salt to symbolize defiance of the salt 
laws. All across India people followed Gandhi in defying the salt laws though similarly 
nonviolent means. The government responded coercively, with authorities arresting 
thousands of participants and volunteers, while beating many. The reporting of the 
events and the subsequent clampdown by the International media, however, forced the 
British administration to ultimately unconditionally release Gandhi and all other 
protestors in 1931. Gandhi then agreed to participate in the second-Round Table 
conference, to be held in London to finalize a blueprint for governance reforms in India.  
He travelled to London, but the negotiations failed and he had to return emptyhanded.    
6.4.4. Quit India Movement 
Gandhi’s third major effort came during World War II. The British Parliament wanted 
to secure the support of the Indian National Congress in its war efforts, and to that end,  
it sent a delegation under Sir Stafford Cripps in the year 1942 to negotiate with Congress. 
The British offered Indian self-government under dominion status after the war, in 
exchange for support during it. Congress rejected dominion, and Gandhi decided to up 
the ante by getting Congress to pass the Quit India resolution in July 1942. The aim of 
the resolution was to reiterate the point that nothing other than complete independence 
would satisfy the Congress. 
 Gandhi now took a very tough stance, saying in a public call to action: ‘There is 
a mantra, a short one that I give you. You imprint it on your heart and let every breath of 




yours give an expression to it. The mantra is ‘do or die’  (CWMG 5876:392). Gandhi’s call 
had strong effect on the masses, and even though the colonial administration reacted by 
arresting the top leadership of the Congress, the number of participants kept increasing. 
The pronouncement of the Congress as an illegal organization by the British 
administration added impetus to the movement, widening its appeal. Strikes, boycotts 
and processions were to be the mainstay of the movement. All the important leaders 
including Gandhi were arrested and locked up, and in the absence of leadership the 
movement turned violent, resulting in a severe clamping down by the authorities.  
By 1943, the movement had lost momentum, and by 1944, Gandhi’s health had 
started deteriorating. The death of his wife earlier in the year had left a very deep void in 
him. By the time, he was released from jail that year, the political landscape had also 
undergone a drastic change, with ascendency for the demand for a separate homeland 
for Muslims. In a demonstration of the ecumenical intention of his politics, Gandhi 
strove to dissuade such demands by offering alternative mechanisms (Bonney 2004) to 
Muslim leader Muhamad Ali Jinnah.59  
The ever-growing pressure exerted by the Indian nationalists as well as the 
developments following the ghastly end of the Second World War, meant that colonial 
control over India would not last long. Within the subcontinent however, communal 
passions were at their pinnacle, taking the entire subcontinent into communal riots, in 
particular between Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi tried to quell the violence by again 
                                                                 
58 All of Gandhi’s writings have now been collected, organized and published by the Publication Division, 
Government of India into hundred volumes by the name of ‘Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi’ 
(CWMG). The reference in the parentheses of this thesis is to volume and page number. 
 
59 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a Congress leader, who defected to form his own party in championing the 
cause of a separate homeland for the Muslims by the name of Pakistan, which was eventually created in 
1947 by partitioning India.  




undertaking fasts and offering moral appeals, succeeding in some occasions and failing 
in others, but he was not ready to ‘surrender to sorrow’ (Wolpert 2002: 7). He continued 
with his reconciliatory attempts, ‘ignoring even threats to his own life, rejecting appeals 
to remain in New Delhi to celebrate the dawn of India's freedom at midnight on August 
15, 1947’.  For Gandhi, the partition of India that same year was akin to ‘vivisection of 
the Mother’ - fit only for prayer and ‘deep heart-searching’ not for fireworks, proud 
speeches, and songs’ (Wolpert 2002: 8).  
On January 30, 1948, while coming out for his prayer meeting, Gandhi was shot 
dead by a far-right Hindu nationalist angered by his outreach to Muslims (Nandy 1980: 
70-98; Hardiman 2003: 174-77). Incidentally, before firing the shots, Gandhi’s assassin 
first bowed to Gandhi in reverence. Gandhi died instantly, but even his death ‘had a 
cathartic effect…It discredited Hindu extremists, chastened moderate Hindus, reassured 
the minorities, and pulled the mourning nation back from the brink of disaster’ (Parekh 
2005:32). 
6.5. The Moral and Political Themes of Gandhian Philosophy 
As noted, Gandhi aimed to be neither a systematic theoretician nor a philosopher. In the 
year 1936, speaking to a voluntary group60, he said,  
There is no such thing as Gandhism and I do not want to leave any 
sect after me. I do not claim to have originated any new principle or 
doctrine. I have simply tried in my own way to apply the eternal truths 
to our daily life and problems’… The opinions I have found and 
conclusion I have tried at, are not final. I may change them 
tomorrow... I have nothing to teach the world. Truth and non-violence 
are as old as the hills. All I have done is to try experiments in both on 
                                                                 
60 Meeting of the Gandhi Seva Sangh – A voluntary organisation founded in the year 1923 by the efforts of 
the famous industrialist Jamnalal Bajaj to carry forward Gandhi’s constructive programmes (Weber 2004: 
109).  




as vast a scale as I could do... Quoted in, Kripalani and 
Radhakrishnana 1960:43).   
 
Whilst Gandhi’s admission very clearly establishes his modesty, in reality, through an 
exploration of some of his writings it is possible to identify certain essential values from 
which a genuine Gandhian ethics can be drawn out.61 Reduced to their essence, 
Gandhian ideas are based on the values and priorities of reconciling the apparent 
contradictions between self and others through compassion, faith, love, service, 
truthfulness, harmony and cooperative interdependence. Whilst Nonviolence and 
Satyagraha were to be the means, the attainment of an ideal social order akin to the 
Kingdom of God (Ramarajya), or what Gandhi termed as Swaraj, was the end. I shall 
now briefly set out the three most basic tenets of Gandhian thought – Nonviolence, 
Swaraj, and Satyagraha.  
6.5.1. Non-Violence (Ahimsa) 
Gandhi’s foremost contribution to social and political life is his creed of non-violence. In 
constructing his understanding of nonviolence, Gandhi was considerably influenced by 
the religious teachings of Hinduism, Jainism, Christianity and Buddhism, but his 
understanding of the concept goes beyond what is contained therein. Gandhi 
endeavoured to provide a dynamic interpretation to the concept by elaborating the 
connotations of nonviolence in a lived context. Writing in his newspaper Young India  on 
September 13, 1928, he declared, ‘Non-violence is not a mere philosophical principle, it 
is the rule and breath of my life.... It is a matter not of the intellect but of the heart’. 
                                                                 
61 That, in itself, is an arduous task as there has been an exponential proliferation of literature on Gandhi 
for the purpose of this thesis, I primarily refer to ‘Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi’ (CWMG), some 
biographical works on Gandhi and other credible writings.  




Gandhi coined the word nonviolence as a literal English translation of the Sanskrit word 
Ahimsa, which in the Indian philosophic tradition implies non-injury or non-harm (see 
Mayton and Burrows 2012: 713-723). He broadened its meaning by giving a positive 
interpretation. For Gandhi, nonviolence was inextricably linked to love, persuasion and 
the general good, and the absence of unhappiness, ill-will, hatred, sorrow and grief. It 
meant ‘both passive and active love, refraining from causing harm and destruction to 
living beings as well as positively promoting their well-being’ (Parekh 1999:130).  
By linking nonviolence with ‘love’, Gandhi very subtly attempted to highlight the 
fine line that separates two key aspects of human lives: ‘self-interest’ and ‘selfishness’.  
He looked to self-interest as an intrinsic aspect of human life. It was necessary for the 
realization of one’s needs, albeit in a harmonious relationship with nature. Gandhi was 
however, opposed to selfishness, which he associated with greed and prioritizing one’s 
own interest over the other. It was this aspect of human life that gave way to aggression 
and domination. For Gandhi, the selfish desires were simply immoral. He writes that 
our desires and motives may be divided into two classes—selfish 
and unselfish. All selfish desires are immoral, while the desire to 
improve ourselves for the sake of doing good to others is truly 
moral… the highest moral law is that we should unremittingly 
work for the good of mankind’ (quoted in Kripalani, & 
Radhakrishnan 1960:72).  
 
For Gandhi violence was the ‘law of the brute’ whereas ‘nonviolence was the law 
of nature…it is a perfect state. It is a goal towards which mankind moves naturally - 
though, unconsciously’ (quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967:102). He did not view 
nonviolence from a negative standpoint. It was not absence of action; it did not mean 
passivity, or pacifism. Adherence to Nonviolence is not for fear or helplessness or 
cowardice. Instead, Nonviolence was to be the soul force or truth force or truth-seeking 




force. It was both a supreme duty as well as the prerequisite for the quest of truth. It was 
the use of moral force or firmness in the vindication of truth. It was ‘not a cloistered 
virtue to be practiced by an individual for his peace and final salvation, but a rule of 
conduct for society if it is to live consistently with dignity’ (Iyer 1987: 237).  
Nonviolence was also a means to promote social change. It was to be the means 
of mobilizing the masses to be aware and conscious of their right and claim to freedom. 
It was the most democratic means of resisting injustice, as it was available to everyone. 
In terms of the moral transformation, it implied pitting one’s soul against the wi ll of the 
tyrant, resistance to evil and wrong with the moral and spiritual force that every person 
can command. It was a fight in which violence was to be defeated by the moral integrity 
and force of the person having abiding faith and conviction in truth. Nonviolence 
implied a positive benevolence for all forms of life, so as to be ‘at peace with oneself, 
other human beings, and with one’s natural and social environment’ (Parekh2005:112).  
For Gandhi, nonviolence was a code of conduct, promoting good intent. As such, 
strong moral integrity and impeccable character were the prerequisite of nonviolent 
action. It required unflinching faith and adherence to truth, the sovereign principle 
encompassing many other principles. Gandhi recommended inner purity, fasting, 
fearlessness, non-possession (as detachment from materialistic orientations) and 
perseverance, as other essential requirements of practicing and upholding nonviolence 
both at the individual and collective levels.  
6.5.2. Soul-force (Satyagraha)  
In providing a dynamic interpretation to the concept of nonviolence, Gandhi came up 
with his inventive strategy of action, by the name of Satyagraha, described as ‘the center 




of [his] contribution to the world’ (Jones 1948: 82). It is often presented as a theory of 
civil disobedience, but its full meaning is more subtle and expansive. Translated into the 
English language, Satyagraha could be taken to imply the efficacy of ‘insisting/firmly 
holding to truth’ (CWMG 17: 151-158). Satyagraha emanated from Gandhi’s conviction 
‘about human perfectibility, and is a mature fruit of his repeated experiments with 
political action and social reform…the doctrine of Satyagraha is a comprehensive social 
and political application of satya (truth) and ahimsa (nonviolence).  
For Gandhi, it was the soul-force of the practitioner that produce the ‘civil 
insistence on the tenacity in the pursuit of truth, aimed to penetrate the barriers of 
prejudice, ill-will, dogmatism, self-righteousness and selfishness and to reach out to and 
activate the soul of the opponent…it was ‘surgery of the soul’ (Parekh 2005:68). In its 
essence, Satyagraha is a strategy of resistance to evil and unjust forces by an 
unconditional adherence to truth in morally upright ways. Focusing on purity of means 
and love for others (including the oppressor), Satyagraha naturally involves self -
suffering, to change the heart of the perpetrators/inflictors making her/him desist from 
wrong doing. Satyagraha, in this sense, is a technique of resisting all that is evil, unjust,  
impure or untrue by love, self-suffering, self-purification and by appealing to the divine 
spark in the soul of the opponent. 
Satyagraha was not the equivalent of passive resistance, which is ‘associated with 
internal violence resulting in unleashing of forces of prejudice and separatism rather than 
compassion and inclusiveness’ (Dalton 1993: 74). It ‘was a simple technique of direct 
action open to literate and illiterate, appropriate to a wide variety of occasions, a means 
of demanding redress for almost any grievances’ (Brown 1972:51). According to 
Gandhi’s action programme, Satyagraha was mutually advantageous both to the 




perpetrator of injustice as to its practitioner. This was based on his conviction that, whilst 
suffering would result in a change of heart of the wrongdoer, the adoption of morally 
upright means would purify the sufferer as well. Additionally, it would help in the 
generation of public opinion, which is powerful enough to make the strongest of 
oppressors think twice before inflicting harm or injury to the other.  The practitioner of 
Satyagraha, according to Gandhi, is spiritually motivated and possesses a steely resolve 
to even disregard death while suffering.  
For Gandhi, Satyagraha is twice blessed, ‘it blesses him who practices it, and him 
against whom it is practiced.  Satyagraha….is essentially a…. process of purification and 
penance’ (CWMG 39:122). According to Thomas Pantham, self-suffering for truth was 
not an ordinary thing, as it required immense faith and courage, more than that what 
could be required to resort to violence. It would only then result in the moral persuasion 
of the oppressor (Pantham 1987:303). Thus, Satyagraha was a legitimate positive action 
on the part of people against injustice and exploitation. In this sense, Satyagraha is 
action oriented towards achieving social reform attuned towards welfare of all. Being an 
ardent believer in the essential goodness of man, Gandhi did not support hatred against 
the inflictors. The idea behind Satyagraha is to oppose unjust rule and laws. To that 
extent, Gandhi did not favour launching Satyagraha as a matter of first resort. Dialogue 
and deliberation were rather to be used first. It was only after their failure that 
Satyagraha could be launched through mechanisms such as non-cooperation, civil 
disobedience, fasting, peaceful picketing, strike etc.   
 
 





The need for self-restraint/control and keeping the concerns and the good of all - 
including the most ardent of enemies, are the two most important and recurrent themes 
in Gandhi’s thought. Swaraj is often translated into English as self-rule/governance, but 
again it has more complex meanings in the context of Gandhi’s social thought. 62 His 
understanding of Swaraj emphasises interlinkages between self-control and the concern 
for the good of all, on the way to the creation of a truly emancipatory social order free 
from coercion and exploitation, full of harmony not just between humans but between 
humans and nature.  
Before detailing Gandhi’s conception of Swaraj, I will note that he did not coin 
the word. In fact, the idea of Swaraj had been emphasized in the Indian philosophical 
tradition as well as in the context of the India’s anti -colonial movement, long before 
Gandhi used it in his seminal work, Hind Swaraj, in the year 1909. Further, at least three 
interrelated and overlapping interpretation of Swaraj can be discerned within the context 
of India national movement against British colonial rule. It had been used, for example, 
by the liberal nationalist Dadabhai Naroji to imply home-rule, wherein Indians should 
be part of the governance structure under British rule. For extremist nationalists such as 
Tilak, Swaraj meant complete political independence from the alien rule, whilst for 
spiritualist nationalists such as Aurobindo Ghosh, Swaraj meant complete renunciation 
of worldly/materialistic pursuits in favour of the spiritual life. Gandhi synthesized all 
                                                                 
62 It has been argued that while translating his book ‘Hind Swaraj’ originally written in Gujarati, Gandhi 
used Indian Home Rule as the English translation for Hind Swaraj. He was not satisfied with it, however, 
because for him Swaraj was more than just Home Rule. It was more than freedom and liberty which, i n 
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these understandings, and in so doing gave Swaraj, a very morally innovative meaning 
(Suhrud 2009:115).  
Gandhi understood humans as freedom loving beings. Swaraj was a natural 
progression of human consciousness, a final moral and political ideal. For Gandhi, 
Swaraj was first of all a moral ideal which, if achieved, would pave the way to an ideal 
social and economic order, one in which each individual, as a morally conscious being, 
would pursue responsible and responsive behaviour without any external restraint.  It 
would be based on the fulfilment of needs, and not of greed. With that in mind Gandhi 
tried to establish a dualistic interpretation of Swaraj, by underlining its individual and 
social aspects. At the level of an individual, Swaraj meant the development and elevation 
of the ‘self’ to those echelons of spiritual development, where self-interested constructs 
are subsumed into the concerns of the good of all.  Swaraj in this sense refers to the 
process of removing the narrowly conceived interests which impede the incorporation of 
the concerns of the others within one’s own fold. It thus involves individuals’ avowed 
commitment to the feelings of love and generosity for the other.  This could only occur 
when the ‘self’ could control itself.  
Gandhi was equally aware of the need and importance of political freedom 
(national sovereignty) as well, but he believed in prioritizing moral freedom over 
political ends. On February 13, 1930, in his weekly journal Young India Gandhi 
observed, ‘mere withdrawal of the English is not independence. It means the 
consciousness in the average villager that he is the maker of his own destiny, he is his 
own legislator through his own representatives’ (CWMG 42:469). Gandhi thus 
attempted to forge the spiritual and the political in his understanding and interpretation 




of Swaraj. The spiritual in this sense was to supply morality to politics, ensuring that it 
remains free from corrupting influences and tendencies of power. Swaraj thus denotes ‘a 
disciplined rule from within’ (CWMG 45:263-4). Gandhi was equally aware of the 
economic needs of a social order, and to that end advocated the need of indigenous 
(Swadeshi) and need based production under a system of trusteeship. Swaraj thus was ‘a 
state of affair in which individuals were morally in control of themselves… it 
presupposed self-discipline self-restraint a sense of mutual responsibility, the disposition 
neither to dominate nor be dominated by others and a sense of duty Dharma i.e. duty 
(Parekh 2005: 93).    
6.6. The Cultural Moorings of Gandhi’s ideas 
Gandhi is notable for using theoretical insights drawn from India’s socio -religious, 
cultural practices to carry out political strategies and actions (Sharp 1979; Parekh 2005; 
Panter-Brick 2014; Veeravali 2016). Doing so enabled him to have a genuine 
understanding of the social context in which he worked, and it allowed him to effectively 
communicate with the masses. Simultaneously, by adopting their daily life practices 
Gandhi also succeeded in casting himself in their mould, identifying with them, 
ultimately creating a massive following for himself (Sharp 1979: 64). This transformed 
the nature of the nationalist movement, making it a mass movement in every sense 
(Dalton 1993: 31; Bakshi 1988).  
The Rudolphs (1967:159), have argued that ‘Gandhi’s charisma had a cultural 
referent’, in the sense that the prodigious following that he commanded was because of 
his ‘reputation that preceded him and the ideal he embodied…‘the authenticity with 
which he sought virtue and the highest religious goals through self-control, truth and 




nonviolence re-enacted a familiar but rarely realized cultural model, that of the saintly 
man’ (1967: 159). Gandhi was deliberate in picking his key precepts, like Satya Swaraj, 
Ram Raj, Swadeshi, etc., from the moral and spiritual texts of the Hindu tradition. It was 
a conscious attempt to have direct resonance with the masses. By resting his ideas and 
practices in the larger moral and spiritual contexts and bases that constitute the Indian 
tradition, he was able to establish immediate connections.  
Gandhi was open in accepting ideas and practices from other traditions but only 
up to the point that it did not infringe upon his own cultural core. In fact his own 
personal convictions, as well as day-to-day activities, were as influenced by the 
philosophical insights of Tolstoy, Ruskin, Thoreau, and the religious preaching of Islam, 
Christianity and Jainism as they were by the Hindu religious texts. He himself 
acknowledged this: ‘I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my 
windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as 
freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any’ (Gandhi et al., 2005:151). 63 
According to Robert Young (2001: 346), ‘Gandhi theorised diasporic receptivity to other 
ideas and cultural forms as a combination of rootedness and openness rooted in the 
ancient heritage of his native Hinduism but open to the spiritual inheritance of all the 
great religion of the world’. Similarly, Ashish Nandy observes that ‘Gandhi mixed 
incompatible genres cultures castes and classes. This performative hybrid mode was the 
secret of his popularity, of how he achieved the active and enthusiastic support not only 
of the Indian Hindu bourgeois elite, but also the vast majority of Hindu peasantry with 
whom he publicly identified’ (Nandy 1983:104).  
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Religion was a perennial source of morality, and an effective guide for the 
realization of moksha (salvation) not through renunciation but by indulging in one’s own 
karma (duty). Performance of duty and morality were convertible and resulted in 
mastering mind and passions and knowing ourselves (Parel 1997: 67). Gandhi 
interpreted religion in the dharmic way, emphasizing its cohesive and reciprocal aspects,  
i.e., its capacities to hold together all forms of life. For Gandhi, ‘all the principal religions 
[were] equal in the sense that they are all true…supplying a felt want in the spiritual 
progress of humanity’ (Chatterjee 1983: vi).   
Gandhi’s ideas are very firmly rooted in the Hindu metaphysical tradition of 
Advaita Vedanta – the philosophy, illustrated in the sacred Hindu texts of Upanishad, and 
the cosmology of Bhagvad Gita – a scared Hindu text that emphasizes the importance of 
nishkam karma or selfless duty. Whilst the advaita philosophy emphasizes a non-dualistic 
outlook, meaning it looks to the human being not in isolation but as an intrinsic part of 
the cosmos, the Bhagvad Gita is an archetype of teaching valorising the value of 
detachment or withdrawal from worldly affairs.  The life cycle of an individual under the 
advaita philosophy is analogous to the relationship between seed and a tree. Just as the 
seed grows, expands and blossoms as a full grown tree and is assimilated into it,  the life 
of an individual follows the same path, i.e., the complete unison of the atma (soul) into 
moksha (salvation). Gandhi looked to human being not as an autonomous, sovereign 
being, as in the liberal tradition, but as a conscientious being, continuously involved in 
the process of self- redemption or the process of self-transformation – a process that 
revealed higher forms of knowledge, leading ultimately to the unity with the Brahmana 
(absolute).  




Since Gandhi drew his insights of the cosmic reality from the Hindu religious 
texts and traditions it would be good to have a very brief description of what is referred 
to as Para Brahman (the supreme reality or consciousness) in the Hindu religious 
tradition. Under the advaita (non-dual) metaphysics of Hinduism, Brahman is seen as the 
ultimate reality of the universe (Lochtefeld 2002:122). It is seen as constituting the root 
as well and the essence of everything. It is formless, non-changing infinite and eternal. It 
generates the diversity of the legible world, but being the root of all creations it 
incorporates all the diverse forms within its folds. The Brahman can be understood by 
reference to both the higher knowledge (para vidya) and the lower knowledge (apara 
vidya) or in the form of Nirguna Brahman (Brahman with attributes) and the Sagun 
Brahman (Brahman without attributes) respectively.  
Gandhi derived the framework of cosmos from the Nirguna Brahman, the source 
behind the existence of every other thing. By virtue of being the source, behind all 
creation, the Brahman is present in all its manifestations and, since the entire universe i s 
the manifestation of the Brahman, it can be experienced indirectly in all experiences of 
the microcosmos. Brahman is the essence of consciousness, the foundation of 
knowledge, it is the knower of knowing, it is self-sufficient, and hence spiritual. The 
Brahman as such, was the infinite spirit and constituted the inner self of each individual. 
Since the self and the cosmos were intrinsically linked with each other, understanding 
the cosmos was to be a precursor to the understanding of the self. As part of the cosmos, 
individuals for Gandhi thus were ‘necessarily interdependent…four dimensional beings 
made up of the deha (body), manas (mind) atman (soul or spirit) and the swabhava 
(distinct psychological and moral constitution of each individual) whose interplay 
explained their behaviour and formed the basis of morality’ (Parekh 2005: 49).  




Echoing the views expressed in the Bhagavad Gita, Gandhi argued that the 
cosmos was like an ever-expanding circle comprising of not just the sentient beings but 
also the material world and the cosmos. Each part of the cosmos had its own laws of 
functioning and yet was linked with the other in inextricable ways. The cosmic spirit was 
present in each soul, which enabled it to embrace feelings of love appreciation and 
harmony. The world as such could not be comprehended by ‘segmenting it into narrowly 
drawn compartments’ (Trechek 1998:10). Gandhi resolutely looked to individuals as 
moral and virtuous creatures, intrinsically linked with each other as part of the cosmos. 
‘Since the cosmic spirit pervaded or infused the universe and was not outside it, the so 
called natural world was not natural or material but spiritual or divine in nature…[and] 
needed to be approached in the spirit of cosmic piety and maitri (friendliness) (Parekh 
2005: 50).  
Gandhi was immensely proud of his cultural roots, but he was not an exclusivist.  
Writing in his publication, Young India he declared ‘nothing can be further from my 
thought than that we should become exclusive or erect barriers. But I do respectfully 
contend that an appreciation of other cultures can fitly follow never precede an 
appreciation and assimilation of our own’ (Gandhi & Prabhu 2008:173). 64 Gandhi 
believed that culture provided the necessary distinctiveness in human lives. Naturally, all 
cultures had their own distinctiveness and none were superior or inferior to the other. 
Whilst preserving the rationally distinct cultural practices was beneficial, dialogues and 
deliberations between cultures were equally desirable. It has been argued that ‘Gandhi’s 
encounters with his native and foreign cultures produced in him an enlightened and 
enriched cultural persona (Kumaravadivelu 2008:168), allowing him to be open to 
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incorporating the good practises of others. In this sense ‘Gandhi represented cultural 
hybridity and radical cultural eclecticism’ (Parekh 2001: 59; Young 2001:346).  
6.7. Gandhian Cosmopolitanism 
Having laid out three of the most central humanistic principles of Gandhian philosophy, 
I will now seek to establish Gandhi’s cosmopolitan connections. Gandhi’s ideas were a 
mixture of ‘the great Indian tradition of devout and philosophic religion and the Western 
tradition of civil and political liberty in the life of the community…Gandhi has been a 
great bridge [between East and West]’ (Barker 2012 :44).  By grounding his ideas in 
humanism, Gandhi, ‘appealed to humanism and attempted to construct an Indian social 
imaginary that would attempt to reconcile a national model of development and the 
cosmopolitan orientation towards the idea of a global village’ (Padmanabhan 2012: 464).   
Gandhi’s cosmopolitan orientations are best understood by drawing the linkages 
between his conception of Swaraj and Satyagraha.  As argued earlier, Swaraj, for 
Gandhi, was not a substitute for political independence or home-rule. It was much more 
than that. It was an understanding and realization of one’s true self by a sustained 
adherence to the morally right path involving a serious introspection and evaluation of 
conduct. Thus ‘Swaraj [is] when we learn to rule ourselves. It is therefore, in the palm 
of our hands’ (Gandhi 1997: 73). Exercising self-control and restraints on one hand 
enables a person to perform his/her duties in morally righteous, fair and unprejudiced 
way, and on the other establishes the attainment of moral autonomy of the self ( 
Terchek 2002). Similarly, the adherence to nonviolence helps one to get rid of the false 
and socially constituted ego, and to replace it with feelings of love and concern allowing 
generous engagement with the other.  




In support of the claim that Gandhi indeed had a cosmopolitan vision, it is worth 
quoting an incidence from a lecture delivered by his grandson Gopal Krishna Gandhi at 
Cambridge in 2010. According to G K Gandhi (2010:15), ‘in 1931, during his last visit to 
London, Gandhi was asked a question by journalist – How far would you cut India off 
from the British Empire? He was quick and emphatic in his reply- from the Empire 
entirely: from the British nation, not at all. India should love to be an equal partner with 
Britain sharing her joys and sorrows. To what extent, he was asked, would India be 
prepared to share the sorrows of England?  His answer was swift, to the fullest extent’65. 
Surprising as it may have appeared to journalists then, but analysed in the backdrop of 
his moral and ethical ideas, this only denotes Gandhi’s concern for the other, including 
across national boundaries. As Petre observes:  
if Mahatma Gandhi had devoted his life to the cause of his own 
people, he had also stood for a wider cause, a more far-reaching 
cause, the cause of humanity itself…he had worked for the ideals 
of every country that is conscious of the of the part it has to play in 
the destiny of the world as large as well as in the conduct of its 
own affairs. For like the individual, every nation has a twofold 
vocation: the call to live its own life and direct its own affairs to the 
best for its own welfare, and the call to live as an organ of the great 
community of all nations and all mankind…the mahatma has been 
a prophet and leader of this second and greater vocation of every 
human soul and every human society (Petre 2012: 179).  
 
A number of  recent authors, in fact, have emphasized the cosmopolitan elements 
or currents in Gandhi’s thought (Ganguly 2007; Snauwert 2009; George 2010:69; 
Padmanabhan 2012).  Snauwert, for example, pays particular attention to Gandhi’s 
cosmopolitan personal ethics, and his pronouncements on the essential moral unity of  
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human kind. He cites a well-known passage from a 1924 piece Gandhi wrote for his 
English-language weekly, Young India: ‘I believe in the essential unity of man, and for 
that matter, of all lives. Therefore, I believe that, if one man gains spiritually,  the whole 
world gains with him, and if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent,’ ( 
Snauwert 2009: 18). According to Snauwert, Gandhi’s faith in the quintessential oneness 
on humanity, along with his conviction of the applicability of non-violent means in 
realizing truth in all social contexts, makes him a votary of cosmopolitan ideals 
(Snauwert 2009: 14).   
Snauwert notes further how Gandhi believed that truth was multifaceted, but 
reduced to its essence it implied an understanding and realization of one’s own self.  Self -
realization, according to Gandhi, is the primary objective of life. It is a continuous 
process and requires the shedding of one’s ego. This shedding of the ego can lead to a 
genuine awareness of one’s own situation and a consequent attachment with the ‘other’,  
which ultimately is interpreted to include all persons in the world:  
The ego per se is not the real self; it is a fabrication. This egoic self 
must be transcended. As the egoic self-loosens and one becomes 
increasingly self-aware, one deepens the realization of one’s 
authentic being, and that being is experienced as unified with 
humanity and all living things’ (Snauwert 2009: 17) 
 
Such a ‘realization’ of the ‘self’ helps in the identification and solidarity with others,  and 
can lead to a moral reciprocity in which harming others could be recognised as also 
harming oneself.  For Snauwert, Gandhi’s teachings and ideas can plausibly account for 
ways in which individuals can be engaged in the processes of internal self-
transformation, which is a prerequisite for the development of capabilities as well as 
inculcation of virtues for ‘morally responding to the human dignity of others’ (Snauwert 
2009:14).  




I note here a broadly similar 1929 article Gandhi wrote for Young India. Here, his 
moral cosmopolitanism, his emphasis on the moral unity of all persons, the moral 
essence they share and the moral goods they deserve, is clearly enumerated. Significant 
in the context of environmental protections, Gandhi is clear here that human sentiment 
should expand not only to other humans, but to the fate of all creatures:  
My mission is not merely brotherhood of Indian humanity. My mission is 
not merely freedom of India, though today it undoubtedly engrosses 
practically the whole of my life and the whole of my time. But through 
realization of freedom of India I hope to realize and carry on the mission of 
the brotherhood of man. My patriotism is not an exclusive thing. It is all-
embracing and I should reject that patriotism which sought to mount upon 
the distress or the exploitation of other nationalities. The conception of my 
patriotism is nothing if it is not always, in every case without exception, 
consistent with the broadest good of humanity at large. Not only that, but 
my religion and my patriotism derived from my religion embrace all life. I 
want to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the beings called 
human, but I want to realize identity with all life, even with such things as 
crawl on earth, I want, if I want, if I don't give you a shock, to realize 
identity with even the crawling things upon earth, because we claim descent 
from the same God, and that being so, all life in whatever form it appears 
must be essentially one66. 
 
 
A separate vein of cosmopolitanism in Gandhi’s thought has been well explored by 
Debjani Ganguly (2007). She argues that Gandhi’s focus on nonviolence understood as 
‘vernacular Hinduised life-practice’ is demonstrative of his cosmopolitanism sensibilities 
(Ganguly 2007:250). According to Ganguly, Gandhi never ‘thought of India’s freedom 
from colonial rule in isolation from world events’... The Empire ‘needed to be 
challenged, globally, not merely nationally or territorially’ (Ganguly 2007:251).  For 
Ganguly, Gandhi’s confrontations with racial prejudice in South Africa shaped his 
cosmopolitical vision of a just and fair world, and this is amply manifest in his 
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denouncement of all forms of exploitative practices and ideologies across the world. On 
the one hand, Gandhi’s mobilization of the Indian masses during the Khilafat 
movement, in solidarity with the Caliphate demonstrates his opposition to the imperial 
onslaught on all non-Western political and spiritual formations. It was also a paragmatic 
act to bridge the widening differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities 
keeping in mind the larger goal of national independence from an alien rule. On the 
other hand, his expression of grief and sorrow at the bombing of London in 1941, 
condemnation of the Nazis persecution of Jews, as well his request to the Indian 
National Army (led by the nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose) to show restraint in helping 
the Japanese army in its invasion of the east coast of India during the Second World 
War, is further evidence of his cosmopolitan vision of a peaceful, free and fair world. 
Living democratically to Gandhi, was akin to ‘putting oneself in touch with the very root 
or foundation of what made humanity possible-the condition of being poor, bereft, 
destitute, a condition of pure difference in all eras and yet a common living form’ 
(Ganguly 2007:255) 
Gandhi’s cosmopolitan outlook is also evident in his framing of nonviolence as a 
moral and political ideal. Gandhi’s emphasis on the necessity of morally upright conduct 
on the part of practitioners of Satyagraha, and his affirmation of nonviolent means, can 
be interpreted to demonstrate two things. First, whilst, it connotes an unflinching faith in 
the doctrine of non-injury or non-harm to ‘others’, the identification and location of the 
‘other’ as unbound and open allows the inclusion of the welfare and advancement of all 
(Iyer 1973). In other words, the idea of nonviolence is based on ‘universal ethic of 
equality of all people and the right of all living being to live in peace’ (Padmanabhan 
2012: 469). This relationship again includes not just humans but other beings as well. 




Second, in establishing the utility of self-suffering as a principal mechanism of 
individual’s transformation, (of both the sufferer and the perpetrator), Gandhi’s thought 
on nonviolence opens up the possibility of social transformation both at national and 
global levels. The possibility of change through love and affection for ‘others’ -- including 
the most ardent of enemies, forms the bedrock of Gandhi’s ideas, making him a devout 
believer in the essential unity of humanity, ‘and for that matter of all that lives’ (Dalton 
1993:6)   
Gandhi’s cosmopolitan outlook emanates from the ways in which he reconciles 
the apparent contradictions between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and is largely based on his 
understanding of truth, i.e. awareness of one’s own being, (essence of life in terms of 
duty, i.e., Dharma). For Gandhi, pursuance of Dharma develops the cognitive capacities 
of an individual enabling her/him to see all people as ends in themselves. It also 
facilitates the identification of one’s own good with the good of the other. Understanding 
of truth, further, allows the deconstruction of the socially constituted false ego/self 
(Borman1986:71) and its replacement by feelings of generosity and good-will towards the 
others. Thus ‘in an ontological sense, Gandhi maintains that Satya, Truth, is self-
realization, a realization of one’s self-awareness as essentially unified with and thereby 
existing in solidarity with all human beings and with all living things’  (Snauwaert 2009: 
17).  
6.8. Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter, I said that my main objective is to show Mahatma 
Gandhi as an exemplar of cosmopolitan principles, but also as a social thinker whose 
principles are deeply rooted in the Indian tradition. An incidence of Gandhi’s life as 




cited in Bhikhu Parekh’s article ‘Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship’ is worth 
quoting here. According to Parekh, when a good friend of Gandhi offered his son a 
scholarship to go to England, Gandhi advised him to give it to someone more qualified 
or in greater need (Parekh 2003: 8). The key issue that I wish to highlight here is that 
Gandhi had special relationships and special duties to certain people, and yet his 
overarching moral outlook was informed by the needs and concerns of all persons. To a 
large extent, the adulation and reverence Gandhi has not only in India, but in many 
societies across the world can be traced to this outlook.  
My arguments in the last section of this chapter have been focused on 
highlighting the cosmopolitan dimensions of Gandhian ideas. I have shown how, at 
root, he sought to reconcile the apparent contradictions between the ‘self’ and the 
‘others’ and in so doing came up with an alternative account of moral autonomy that is 
strongly cosmopolitan in practice. His development of such cosmopolitan conclusions 
from within Indian moral traditions also marks him, as a rooted cosmopolitan. 
Specifically, his teachings are embedded in the Indian spiritual traditions, but he finds 
within those traditions and his own extension of them a strong imperative to see 
individuals in terms of the essential unity of humanity.  
In the next chapter I will show how Gandhi’s status as a moral exemplar could be 
used to achieve two purposes in the Indian context: (1) appealing to the conscience and 
sensitizing individuals to undertake climate sensitive actions; (2) using that sensitivity 











7. Applying Ambassadorial 
Cosmopolitanism: Gandhi and India’s 
Action on Climate Change 
 
 
I do not believe…that an individual may gain…while those 
around him suffer. I believe in advaita, I believe in the 
essential unity of man and for that matter, of all that lives. 
Therefore, I believe if one man gains spirituality, the whole 
world gains with him and if one man falls then the whole 
world falls with him to that extent.  
--M.K. Gandhi in Young India, 4 December, 1924: 398 
7.1. Introduction 
Before demonstrating how Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan can be applied, I will briefly 
summarize the chain of argument leading to this point. This should help to bring the 
various threads together and clarify how Gandhi as a Cosmopolitan Ambassador could 
help to generate support for current policies, as well as how those policies would 
measure up within a cosmopolitan framework.  
Recall that in Chapter 4, I defended the hybrid approach to resolving the menace 
of climate change for its moral persuasiveness and feasibility. I argued that by 
dovetailing the normative concerns of equality, capacity and responsibility with the 
realistic needs of each of the relevant actors involved in climate change negotiations, the 
approach offers the most promising route to comprehensively addressing the problem. I 
highlighted three essential components that set the hybrid approach apart from other 
approaches in the literature : (a) its core commitment to providing a minimal standard of 
dignified living for all, i.e., its sensitivity to human rights (b) conferment of 




responsibilities on a range of actors, e.g.,  individuals, regional governments, NGOs as 
well as the supra-national actors; but most significantly (c) for drawing out and 
combining the merits of the two often cited principles of Climate Justice, namely the 
Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle. I have also favoured the hybrid 
approach for prescribing a very progressive schema of differentiated responsibilities, 
which in assigning leading/major responsibilities to the most advantaged, does not 
preclude the least advantaged from having responsibilities to pursue an alternate, low 
energy developmental path. In favouring the hybrid approach, however, I have also 
flagged certain issues – emphasizing in particular the need to identify motivating 
strategies for ensuring compliance.   
In Chapter 5, I explored some possible motivating strategies proposed in the 
cosmopolitan justice literature. I noted that, unlike in domestic systems, the mechanisms 
of compliance in the international system are largely voluntary. In that context, and in 
order to make these mechanisms robust enough to generate meaningful action, I 
suggested that one plausible way could be to project cosmopolitan solutions in such a 
way that they are seen to be in harmony with important aspects of more nationally based 
traditions. To that end, I supported the ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ framework as a 
practical means of generating public support for climate change policy within various 
countries. In so arguing, my aim has not been to support nationalism per se to promote 
cosmopolitanism, but rather to reinforce ways in which influential local/national 
traditions can be shown in fact to lead us to cosmopolitanism.  
Whilst accepting the possibility of narrow and obscurantist tendencies found in 
local national narratives, I have argued for the need of filtering them out by developing 
syncretic understandings of national traditions through the lenses of their national 




icons/ambassadors. This would help in the identification of those local and national 
norms which transcend political boundaries and resonate with cosmopolitan notions of 
connections to all humans and communities. I argued that by emphasizing and further 
developing these norms and values and promoting them in the domestic political culture 
and civic discourse, it is possible to promote cosmopolitan principles and compliance 
with cosmopolitan moral requirements in the context of climate change. With that as the 
backdrop, and specifically in the Indian context, in Chapter 6 of the thesis, I presented 
some of the key principles and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi -- one of India’s most 
revered national figures.  
This applications chapter is concerned with two specific and related questions. 
The first is, what would the hybrid cosmopolitan approach require of countries such as 
India? The second is, how could Gandhian ideas makes practical contributions to 
motivating Indians to shoulder the burdens that would be necessary to meet climate 
commitments under a hybrid approach?  
Before outlining the answers offered here, I will note that Government of India 
has, in fact, taken some very recent steps precisely in the direction advocated by this 
thesis, of using Gandhi’s legacy to generate support for commitments made at the 2015 
Paris Climate Summit. The Government very consciously chose Gandhi’s Oct. 2 
birthday – earlier noted as a national holiday in India -- to submit its 2016 ratification of 
the Paris Climate Treaty to the United Nations. In making the submission, India’s 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Syed Akbaruddin, said this: ‘by 
putting Gandhi[’s] seal on the climate deal, the country will now urge the global 
community to adopt 'Gandhian way of life' (shun extravagant lifestyles) to reduce their 
carbon footprints and protect the earth from adverse impact of climate change’ (Mohan 




:2016). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also featured Gandhi in his praise of India’s 
move, saying,  
 
In all he did, Gandhi honoured our obligation to all living things.  He 
reminded us that “Earth provides enough to satisfy everyone’s needs,  
but not everyone’s greed.”   Gandhi also challenged us to “be the 
change we wish to see in the world”. Today that commitment is 
reflected in a momentous way.  India is depositing its instrument of 
ratification to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. What better 
way to commemorate Mahatma Gandhi and his legacy for people 
and planet. I warmly congratulate India for its climate leadership, 
and for building on the strong momentum we see from all corners of 
the globe for the agreement to enter into force as quickly as possible 
this year.  India's ratification of the agreement moves the world an 
important step closer toward achieving that goal (Ban 2016). 
 
Such developments give reason to think that an Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach 
could indeed have strong practical relevance in countries such as India, as well as other 
contexts.  The fact that Gandhi and possibly some other national icons such as the noble 
laureate poet Rabindranath Tagore or the right wing icon Pandit Deen Dayal 
Upadhyaya could be looked up to for promoting a distinctively cosmopolitan approach 
to significant humanistic problems only reinforces the confidence that adopting an 
Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan figures could be one of the most effective means available 
to try to promote cosmopolitan principles.  
The discussion of this chapter is structured as follows: In the first section, I offer 
details from the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015 
(CoP-21), where states’ representatives committed to a range of climate change 
mitigation measures. I focus in particular on ways in which the agreement embodies 
some of the major concerns of the hybrid cosmopolitan approach. In the second section, 
I work to identify some of the specific steps that the Indian state would be required to 
take under the Paris Agreement. In the third section, I examine some of the positive 




shifts already taking place in India’s climate policies, before highlighting the challenges 
in implementing a fully consistent hybrid approach-inspired climate policy. In the last 
part of the chapter, I discuss the application of my preferred Ambassadorial 
cosmopolitan approach by looking into ways in which Gandhian thought could be 
invoked for of generating support for both individual and state action in this regard.   
7.2. The Paris Climate Agreement and the Hybrid Approach to Climate 
Change*67 
The Paris Climate Summit has been seen by many as path-breaking in the history of 
climate summits, for its focus on voluntarism, transparency, support systems and 
understanding between states and communities within them, as the way forward for any 
realistic and time-bound solution to the problem of climate change. Though the 
commitments for mitigation made at the summit are for post 2020 period, when the 
Kyoto mandate expires, (Rogelj et al., 2016) it has already been described as ‘ambitious 
and balanced…and an historic turning point’ (Fabius 2015)68 and a ‘diplomatic success’ 
(Friedman 2015) in averting the potentially hazardous impacts of climate change.  
The 190-plus negotiating parties to the conference (states) at Paris agreed on 
achievable mitigation targets and on augmenting adaptation-centric capabilities. The 
agreement aims at achieving an aspirational target of keeping the global rise in 
temperature to less than 2o Celsius, around 1.5o Celsius (UNFCCC 2015: Article 2), in 
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terms of pre-industrial levels. The Paris agreement attempted to broaden the emission 
mitigation horizon by including both the developed and developing economies under 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). The INDC is a mechanism 
under which states are expected to voluntarily declare their plans on mitigation by taking 
into account their respective domestic constraints and developmental levels (Falkner 
2016: 1107; Christoff 2016:777). According to Robert Falkner, the ‘reliance on [a] 
country’s voluntary climate policy ambition marks the most significant departure from 
the Kyoto Protocol approach’ (Falkner 2016:1115).   
The developed world is expected to voluntarily contribute $100 billion annually 
(increasing over time) to help developing countries in their adaptation strategies and 
access to cleaner technologies (UNFCCC 2015: Article 9.5). As part of review 
mechanisms, each state, starting in the year after 2023, and every five years thereafter is 
expected to voluntarily declare further stringent mitigation plans. The need for 
transparency has been addressed through a system of naming and shaming (Falkner 
2016:1121). Understanding between communities is to be promoted through education 
and global stock taking.  
I will argue here that two major features of the Paris climate agreement make it 
resonate well with the hybrid approach of climate justice. These are: first, its 
endorsement of a human rights-inspired mitigation and adaptation strategy that is to be 
worked out within the larger framework of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
(CBDR); and second, the linking of CBDR with the respective capabilities of the states 
through the mechanism of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. The Paris 
agreement works to reconcile principles of responsibility and capability, by linking 
mitigation and adaptation-specific contributions of states with their respective 




developmental imperatives and capabilities. Similarly, the acknowledgement of 
‘differentiated responsibilities’ of states is akin to the acceptance of histo rical 
responsibilities, albeit in more open and forward looking ways. Most significantly, it 
amounts to a very pragmatic acceptance of the imperatives of development and poverty 
eradication in the poorer regions of the world. In other words, the Paris agreement 
accepts the Kyoto mandate but goes beyond this by expecting states to contribute on the 
basis of their respective capabilities (Falkner 2016).  
The preamble of the agreement shares a number of key elements with the hybrid 
approach to climate justice, including equity, integrity, vulnerability, specificity 
capability and responsibility. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has described 
the Paris Agreement as a ‘win for climate Justice’.69 The remark is noteworthy, given the 
fact that within climate negotiations India has generally been seen as a deal blocker or as 
a reluctant negotiator.70  For its part, India has been consistent in citing its 
developmental imperatives as well as historical and present per capita CO2 emissions, 
which remain significantly lower than that of the United States or China even today, to 
call for larger and specific climate commitments from the developed world. The Indian 
perspective thus far has consistently been that any successful climate deal must be just 
and equitable for its wider acceptability and compliance.  
 




70 Just before the CoP 21 at Paris the US secretary of State John Kerry expressed his concerns on the 
challenge of bringing India on board. http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/12/john-kerry-
india-poses-challenge-at-un-climate-talks/ 




7.3. Assessing India’s Climate Duties under Hybrid Cosmopolitanism 
Before I turn to the specifics of the responsibilities and duties that states like India would 
be required to undertake, I will briefly reiterate some of the key prescriptions of the 
hybrid cosmopolitan approach to climate change. Recall that in Chapter 4, I presented 
the hybrid approach as the minimalist and integrationist moral framework capable of 
providing normative justification on which a fair and feasible climate policy could be 
mounted. Its minimalism lies in its insistence that the most basic rights and resources be 
secured for all individuals across the globe; its integrationist aspects refer to the balance it 
attempts to achieve between the key issues of rights, responsibility, accountability, 
capability, efficiency, duty and need. Whilst the approach recognises states as the bearer 
of responsibilities, following a poverty- sensitive polluter pays principle, it also brings 
other affluent agents, including individuals, communities, corporations, etc., within the 
ambit of responsibilities.  Significantly, displaying its feasibility concerns, the approach is 
unequivocal in its support for the claim that, in fulfilling responsibilities, no agent should 
be relegated or pushed ‘beneath a decent standard of living’ (Caney 2010a: 218).  
In terms of applicability, the hybrid approach envisions a set of progressively 
differentiated duties which take into account both the developmental levels and 
imperatives of the states. By conferring dual responsibilities (emission reduction and 
resource transfers to the impacted) on the most advantaged – both within and across 
states, it very pragmatically attempts to identify both the individuals and states as 
flagbearers of cosmopolitan responsibilities on climate change. Whilst the approach is 
flexible and realistic in allowing developing countries more emission rights in enabling 
them to achieve a certain minimum threshold level of development, it does not give 




them a complete walkover. Instead, by expecting them to choose alternate low energy 
sustainable path, it effectively adheres to the Sustainable Developmental Goals71.  
In other words, whilst on the one hand the hybrid approach would allow India to 
increase its emission levels as part of its primary obligation to ensure a basic standard set 
of living conditions for its people, it also would apply the principle that warrants even the 
less developed agents to follow climate sensitive emission pathways. Thus, it would 
require India to ensure that its emission trajectories do not surpass the standards drawn 
at the base line year (1990) under an agreement such as the Paris accords. India would 
have to perform the task of fulfilling its developmental priorities, but through cheaper 
and cleaner emission norms and technologies. Similarly, following the norm that 
requires capable and efficient states to reduce their emission so as to compensate for their 
GHG emissions (harms) or to undertake adaptation specific duties, or be involved in 
both, India would have to identify and confer both adaptation and mitigation related 
responsibilities on its ever-growing class of wealthy people.72  
                                                                 
71 Sustainable Development Goals have been put forward as sequel to the Millennium Developmental 
Goals to be pursued in the post 2015 period. These goals have been expressed and defined in the United 
Nations report ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. Adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in September 2015, the SDGs are in form of seventeen goals that 193 member 
states have pledged to achieve and include a range of objectives such as poverty alleviation, hunger 
eradication, accomplishing education, wellbeing health for all, gender equality, clean energy, reduced 
inequalities, responsible consumption and production etc. According to Jefferey Sachs, the overarching 
emphasis of these goals is on a combined realization of economic development, environmental sustain 
ability, and social inclusion. (Sachs 2012: 2206) 
72 According to a report published in India’s national daily ‘The Times of India’, the number of 
millionaires living in India is estimated around 236,000. Citing a report prepared by the New World 
Wealth for the Asia pacific region, it says that ‘India is home to the fourth largest population of high net 
worth individuals (HNWIs)-those with net assets of USD 1 million or more. See:  The Times of India, 
(2016). India home to 2.36 lakh millionaires: Report. [Online] Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-home-to-2-36-lakh-millionaires-
Report/articleshow/50638625.cms  [Accessed 18 Nov. 2016].    
  




I will note that, with an annual per capita CO2 emission of 1.8 metric tons, India 
remain far behind major emitters like the United States (16.5), Australia (16.75), and the 
European Union member states (6.7)73. Even a contemporary fast growing economy like 
China is way ahead of it, with an annual per capita CO2 emission of 7.6 metric tons
74.  
Even, in absolute terms, with an emission of 2088 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, 
India is far behind both United States and China, though it is the world’s third -largest 
overall emitter.75 At the same time, its own vulnerabilities (IPCC 2014) mark it as a 
victim of climate change. As India moves ahead, pursuing poverty alleviation and socio 
economic development to ensure the basic minimum needs and rights of all its citizens 
(Chaudhary 2012) through industrialization, and through strengthening and expanding 
infrastructural facilities, its emissions and vulnerabilities can only be expected to increase 
in the times ahead.  
So, what should then be expected from India in the context of the Paris 
agreements, which again are broadly consistent with a hybrid cosmopolitan framework? 
What responsibilities will India be required to assume, and how will it reconcile them 
with its existing developmental priorities?  These are some of the issues that I take up 
next. It is pertinent to point out here that, consistent with its cosmopolitan moral 
underpinnings, the hybrid approach confers mitigation and adaptation related 
responsibilities both on states and individuals. This is immensely significant in a 
democratic domestic context such as India’s, where sensitive policy decisions demanding 
significant sacrifices on the part of the individuals can be enacted only by motivating the 









actual affirmation of those persons. I will expand on this aspect below, after first 
detailing some of the shifts in India’s climate policy in a direction consistent with the 
requirements of a hybrid cosmopolitan approach. 
7.3.1. Positive Shifts  
A significant positive shift is already discernible in India’s approach towards addressing 
the impacts of climate change (Kapur et al., 2009; Dubash 2011; Thaker& Leiserowitz 
2014).76 This enhances the practical potential for the application of Ambassadorial 
Cosmopolitanism in the Indian context. Three interrelated plausible explanations have 
been offered for this. First, even though India, at least in the near future, is not likely to 
give up on its long-held stand that the differentiation between developed and developing 
countries should remain a key principle of any new climate agreement, there seems to be 
a growing realization amongst policy makers and think tanks around the issue of ‘co-
benefits’.  It must be said that the idea of co-benefits is instrumental in India’s context 
and has been used to specify ways in which India’s developmental imperatives and 
emission related responsibilities can be aligned and made to reinforce each other. It is a 
‘nuanced approach that allows India to pursue its development and poverty eradication 
goals, [in ways] that reduces fossil fuel consumption and therefore greenhouse gas 
emissions’ (Dubash et al., 2016:49)   
                                                                 
76 The most conspicuous evidence of India’s shift is the statement given by Prime Minister Modi at a joint 
press conference with US president Barack Obama in New Delhi in 2015. In his response to a question 
about the increased pressure on India to take on specific emission reduction target, Modi said ‘Climate 
change itself is a very big pressure. Global warming itself is a very big pressure and whoever worries about 
the future generations has a responsibility to be conscious about climate change; adopt practices and 
policies which will ensure a good life and good environment for future generations’. 
 




Second, increased media coverage, and the announcement of the Fifth Report by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as increased instances 
of climatic variations resulting in tragedies and natural disasters such as the one at 
Kedarnath in 2013, have all resulted in India’s pragmatic understanding that it cannot 
simply focus on developmental imperatives; there also is urgency around addressing the 
impacts. In its Fifth report in 2014, the IPCC described India as one of the most 
vulnerable nations to climate change impacts (IPCC 2014:1334).  
The report specifies in detail that climate change impacts would have impact in 
Indian not just on land utilization, agricultural production, food security and price 
stability, but that increased rainfall variability, snowmelt and glacier retreat could lead to 
other acute problems such as fresh-water scarcity and the spread of both water and 
mosquito borne diseases like diarrhoea, cholera and malaria. The report notes that 
climate change would severely impact most of the major sectors of India’s economy, 
including energy, transport and tourism, resulting in a significant drag on efforts to 
reduce poverty, as well as efforts to improve the delivery of goods and services, 
especially to those living in rural and less accessible regions. Rampant poverty, highly 
imbalanced infrastructural preparedness and inadequate planning only adds to India’s 
vulnerabilities to climate change impacts (IPCC 2014: 618). 
Third, India’s pragmatism is also borne out of the fact a focus solely on 
development and not on climate change impact would only result in international 
impasses that could well take it far away from both the developed and least developing 
economies (many of the vulnerable small islands as well as other countries in Africa). 
With its aspirations of international leadership, India would most certainly ill afford such 
developments. Additionally, India’s pragmatic shift on issues related to climate change is 




also in sync with its long-standing desire of being the moral leader - exemplifying its 
ability to ‘practice the professed’ - something that would allow it to play a weightier role 
in international climate negotiations (Dubash 2016: 49).  
It is not surprising therefore that in policy terms India has been unequivocal in i ts  
support for a common but differentiated responsibilities approach. This approach is 
worked out by taking into account historical responsibilities, respective capabilities and 
developmental necessities of the states (Kapur et al. 2009). In fact, in the run up to the 
Copenhagen CoP, in 2008, India came out with a detailed policy document called 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)77, formally elaborating its key 
strategies for addressing climate concerns. This Plan continues to shape Indian climate 
response and is worth examining in some detail. 
The NAPCC entails a bottom–up approach that seeks to realize developmental 
objectives through an increasing reliance on renewable energy resources harnessed 
through the use of cutting edge green technology78. The idea is to usher in a new 
developmental framework that while being less carbon driven also supports indigenous 
mitigation and adaptation practices. It gives emphasis to:  
1. Protecting the poor and vulnerable sections of society through an inclusive and 
sustainable development strategy, sensitive to climate change;  
2. Achieving national growth objectives through a qualitative change in direction 
that enhances ecological sustainability, leading to further mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions;  
                                                                 
77  Government of India, ‘National Action Plan on Climate Change’ Prime Minister’s Council on Climate 
Change, 2008, available at http://pmindia.nic.in/Pg01-52.pdf Accessed on June 27, 2016. 
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3. Devising efficient and cost-effective strategies for end-use Demand Side 
Management;  
4. Deploying appropriate technologies for both adaptation and mitigation of 
greenhouse gases emissions extensively as well as at an accelerated pace;  
5. Engineering new and innovative forms of market, regulatory and voluntary 
mechanisms to promote sustainable development;  
6. Effecting implementation of programmes through unique linkages, including with 
civil society and local government institutions and through public private-
partnerships;  
7. Welcoming international cooperation for research, development, sharing and 
transfer of technologies enabled by additional funding and a global IPR regime 
that facilitates technology transfer to developing countries under the UNFCCC. 
For an effective realization of the NAPCC, eight sectoral missions have been also 
been outlined.79 These include the National Solar Mission; the National Mission for 
Enhanced Energy Efficiency; the National Mission on Sustainable Habitat; the national 
water Mission; the National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem; the 
National Mission for a Green India; the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture; 
and the National Mission on Strategic Knowledge on Climate Change (PM’s Council on 
Climate Change 2008). The first three missions aim at reducing emissions, whereas the 
later three are adaptation centric and the last two are designed to disseminate knowledge 
and responses on climate change. The objective of all these missions is to ensure that 
developmental priorities and plans are pursued in climate sensitive ways.   
                                                                 
79 ibid 




In the run-up to the Paris meetings, India submitted its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC) to the UNFCCC, for the period 2021-203080.  India’s 
INDC states its commitment securing developmental goals such as food security, 
poverty eradication, and healthcare availabilities etc., following low carbon pathways. It 
commits India to reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 percent by 
2030, from its 2005 level. It also commits the country to generating about 40 percent of 
its electricity from non-fossil fuel based energy resources by 2030, and to generating 175 
gigawatts of renewable energy by 2022 with the help of transfer of technology and low 
cost international finance including from Green Climate Fund (GCF)81. It also proposes 
to create additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent through 
additional forest and tree cover by 203082.  
Analysts working in the field have rated India’s mitigation related pledges and 
targets as ‘medium’ well below the ‘sufficient’ rating – a must for its own aspirations of 
being a global player83. Whilst describing India’s continuing efforts towards a low carbon 
transformation as ‘the most important development underway globally today’  a report 
published by Climate Action Tracker – an independent body responsible for tracking the 
progress made in achieving mitigation objectives aimed at keeping Global warming 
below 20C (1.50C post Paris Climate Treaty) describes India’s nationally determined 
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83 India - Climate Action Tracker. [online] Climateactiontracker.org. Available at: 
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contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement as  ‘weaker than the actions resulting 
from current policies [and] ripe for improvement’ (Climate Tracker 2017). According to 
the report ‘neither the NDC nor current policies are ambitious enough to limit wa rming 
to below 20C, let alone the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.50C limit, unless other countries 
make much deeper reductions and comparably greater efforts’ 84. Whilst no country can 
be expected to satisfy all of its critics, however it is true that India would have to take 
some very radical steps in order to meet the ideals of Paris Climate Treaty, which it 
describes as Just and fair Treaty. The least it would require is some kind of 
transformational thinking and pursual of policies on those lines. In the section below I 
have attempted to highlight some major steps/challenges but pertinent in this context is 
to say that Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism comes off as a way to think about how to 
further those commitments, and make them more robust. With these commitments in 
mind, I will now detail things that the Indian state could be required to do to be fully 
consistent with the hybrid cosmopolitan approach to climate justice.   
7.3.2. Policy Imperatives   
Since the hybrid approach allows developing countries to pursue their developmental 
imperatives through low energy and sustainable pathways, the first and foremost 
requirement for the Indian state as a collective would be of reconciling the possible 
contradictions between pursuing carbon-intensive affordable developmental plans and 
fulfilling mitigation related responsibilities. The task in hand is both mutually reinforcing 
and complex. It is mutually reinforcing in the sense that socio- economic development is 
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a must for ensuring that the vast majority of India’s poor people have access to the basic 
minimum conditions of a rightful and dignified life.  
In policy terms, India would require shifting to alternate low emission path of 
development. It is well known that for India coal is the most important energy resource 
because of its accessibility as well as affordability. India is not only World’s third largest 
coal producer,85 but the relative high cost of other non-conventional energy resources 
also makes coal- fired energy plants an option that many policy makers see as desirable 
for its developmental needs. India is the world’s third-largest coal consumer also, with 
annual consumption of almost 800 billion metric tons, and that figure is projected to rise 
to almost 1.5 billion metric tons by the year 2020 (IEA 2015) as it moves ahead with 
policies aimed at poverty alleviation and empowerment. 86  According to the World 
Energy Outlook Report produced by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2015) 
worldwide energy consumptions are likely to grow by one- third by the year 2040, and 
India alone is likely to account for the single largest share of this energy growth - 
contributing one-fourth of the rise in demands.  The report notes that  
India today is home to one-sixth of the world’s population and its 
third-largest economy, but accounts for only 6% of global energy use 
and one in five of the population – 240 million people still lacks 
access to electricity. With policies in place to accelerate the country’s 
modernisation and develop its manufacturing base…India is entering 
a sustained period of rapid growth in energy consumption. Demand 
for coal in power generation and industry surges, increasing the share 
of coal to almost half of the energy mix and making India by a 
distance the largest source of growth in global coal use. Oil demand 
increases by more than in any other country … (IEA 2015:2) 
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Dependence on coal is a convenient policy option for India, however, complying with its 
own climate goals requires it to reduce its reliance on hydro-carbons through an 
increasing focus on development through alternative renewable energy resources such as 
wind, solar, hydropower and nuclear energy. Delivering on its pledge of having a 40% 
share of non-fossil fuel capacity in the power sector by 2030 means that India would have 
to make an estimated $2.8 trillion of investment that is needed in energy supply to 2040 
(IEA 2015). Additionally, for significantly improved energy efficiency, India would also 
need to establish an efficient transmission and distribution system through cutting edge 
technology. That could then be used to offset the growth in energy consumption (on 
account of continued developmental march). The challenges involved in meeting 
commitments can be understood just by a reference to India’s current capacity to 
generate solar energy which is estimated at 7.5 gigawatts per day87 just over 3 percent of 
the world total of 227 gigawatts88. Similarly, its current capacity to generate wind power 
is just 23 gigawatts (IEA 2015: 32) and would be required to go up almost by four times 
to match up the commitments.    
Another key requirement for India is to undertake significant adaptation efforts. 
One way to do this is by greatly increasing its greenhouse gas (GHG) sequestering 
capacities by expanding its forest cover. It has been argued that, in order to be able to 
absorb a target of 2.5 to 3 gigatons of carbon from the atmosphere, India will be required 
to enhance its dwindling forest cover by almost 19-20 million hectares by 2030, while 
improving the quality of another five million hectares of forest. According to estimates 
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from the World Bank, India will have to increase its forest cover by almost 10 percent to 
take it to 33 percent. It would also have to undertake other developmental measures, 
including water conservation, flood control, coastal zone protection and disaster 
management (World Bank 2006: ix).  
Socio economic development has always been India’s top priority. Under the 
Paris Agreement, however, India will have to find a better way of aligning its 
developmental imperatives with climate sensibilities. It is obvious that India’s massive 
infrastructural deficiencies along with the imperative of securing minimum basic needs 
of a vast majority of its own population imply that it cannot completely give-up on its 
carbon-driven developmental model, yet the ever-intensifying impacts of climate change 
are also impelling it towards the establishment of a more open and robust technological 
and financial collaborative arrangements with the developed world. Access to 
technology is important for India’s plans for meeting its ever -increasing energy 
requirements through more sustainable and climate friendly sources. With the impacts of 
climate change already becoming evident, such techno-financial collaborations will not 
only enhance India’s access to greener technologies but also significantly aid its 
adaptation specific needs. In other words, India will have to conjoin both mitigation and 
adaptation centric responsibilities, in ways that results in lower emission trajectory, 
without compromising on the goal of increased energy access.  
In the last decade or so, India has very well demonstrated to the world its 
intentions by announcing some very magnanimous decisions on climate front but in the 
times to come it will have to match its commitment by action at domestic levels. 
According to Navorz Dubash and Radhika Khosla, ‘[T]the starting point for a more 




assertive international position [should be based on] complete domestic understanding’ 
(Dubash and Khosla 2015: 14). That is, generating domestic support for shouldering the 
burdens of climate change mitigation will be crucial.  
7.4. Bridging the Theory –Action Gap 
In this section, I argue that the realization of India’s commitment is dependent on two 
things. The first is the extent to which the ‘differentiated responsibilities’ pledge is 
fulfilled and developed countries contribute the 100 billion USD they have promised for 
generating low carbon developmental pathways in the developing countries. The second 
is the extent to which India is able to sensitize and motivate its own people to act in 
climate sensible ways.  
Whilst both the tasks are extremely significant and mutually reinforcing from the 
climate change perspective, I argue that the promotion of voluntary and proactive efforts 
at the domestic levels is going to be even more challenging -- though crucially rewarding 
in the longer run. Per available estimates, India would require 2.5 trillion USD (2014-15 
prices) to meet its climate targets by the year 2030 (Parikh and Parikh 2016).  Thus, to 
actualise aspirations, India will have to secure its financial and technology requirements,  
which will require it to continuously show to the international community its 
commitment and resolve in shouldering responsibilities related to climate change. 
Moreover, it will need to persuade its citizens that undertaking climate sensitive actions 
is desirable, despite the constraints or sacrifices that they might have to face in doing so. 
In India’s case, the persuasive task will involve addressing widely held beliefs that the 
country does not bear primary responsibility for mitigating harmful climate change, since 
its cumulative CO2 emission is estimated at less than 3 percent historically (Baumert et 




al., 2005: 32).  That is almost three to four times lower relative to the share of developed 
states and so, the beliefs run, that developed states should lead in mitigation action while 
funding the developing countries in their adaption related works.  
It is here that an Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach can be of vital 
importance. It can help to promote the understanding that climate change mitigation 
efforts are not only in India’s own socio-economic and political interests, but also that 
assuming such responsibilities is in accordance with India’s deeply rooted social and 
cultural ethos. In other words, a rooted Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach 
plausibly can be applied to persuade Indians that it actually is their duty to support 
national policies that would be consistent with cosmopolitan principles. This is also in 
sync with the state led voluntary action strategy formally accepted under the Paris 
agreement. In the next section I argue that one way of doing that could be by drawing on 
the ideas, teaching and moral principles of Mahatma Gandhi, whom I describe as one of 
India’s most venerated cosmopolitan ambassadors.  
7.5. Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, I see cosmopolitan ambassadors 
as popular figures whose ideas, while rooted in local and/or domestic traditions, connect 
to state-transcendent moral principles. They are flag bearers of vernacular traditions,  but 
by providing syncretic interpretation of the local they also facilitate its transcendence to 
modernity. The principles that these ambassadors posit have the transformational 
potentials in the sense that they can be employed in inculcating moral sensibilities 
necessary for the development of shared understandings and feelings.    




Given the complexities of contemporary living and the desire of the individual 
and communities to escape from its inherent vulnerabilities, the role of transformational 
leadership has indeed become the ‘focus of much research since the early 1980s’ 
(Northouse 2016: 161). It has been argued for instance, (Bass and Riggio 2006) that the 
inherent charisma and the spirituality of the leader provides the intrinsic push, 
motivation and inspiration required to change the attitudes and orientations of the 
followers especially in the times of uncertainty. This aspect of leadership involves an 
exceptional form of influence that moves followers to accomplish more than what is 
usually accepted of them.  
As an encompassing approach, Ambassadorial cosmopolitanism89 can be used to 
describe the ways in which revered societal figures can be seen and employed as 
‘ambassadors’ of a cosmopolitan view point. They would be ambassadors in a way 
roughly analogous to the ‘goodwill ambassadors’ employed by the United Nations – 
well-known persons who embody and promote an ethics-based internationalism in 
various countries.  These are figures who in many cases have achieved great status in 
societies through their actions on behalf of ordinary citizens in social movements, 
movements for national self-determination, etc., but who also have embraced state-
transcendent moral principles consistent with or deeply complementary to the ones 
                                                                 
89 As an alternative to the phrase Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism one could use ‘Missionary 
Cosmopolitanism’ ‘Activated Cosmoplitanism’ or even Iconic Cosmopolitanism but I have preferred to 
use the Ambassadorial Cosmoplitnism for two fundamental reasons. First, not only the identified icons as 
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flexibility in identifying different icons in different socio-cultural contexts. Second, the amabassadors are 
not brand ambassadors in the narrow sense of the term, selling or endorsing products to a targeted set of 
people. Instead they are moral practioners, who have been often looked upto by people especially in time 
of distress, worries and strains. 




identified in the thesis as characterizing cosmopolitanism.  They are thus ‘ambassadors’  
of a cosmopolitan approach in some significant and substantive ways, and this aspect of 
their thought and legacy can be employed to promote an approach to state-transcendent 
social problems that would be consistent with cosmopolitanism. The wide reverence that 
these transformational icons have amongst the members of specific communities, can be 
used to influence followers on a one to one level as well as entire cultures. As 
Ambassadors of humanism these icons are expected to play pivotal roles in precipitating 
change, amongst the followers inextricably inducing in them concerns of welfare not for 
their own self but for humanity as a whole. As mentioned earlier many such 
ambassadors could be identified in different social and political contexts but for the 
purpose of this thesis Mahatma Gandhi stands out as a moral exemplar in the Indian 
context.   
7.6. Applying the Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan Approach on Climate 
Change in India 
 
By re-creating himself, through the power of his passion, in the humble,  
vulnerable image of India's poorest starving naked millions, Gandhi 
could, when moved to do so by his ‘inner voice,’ call upon that 
unarmed ragged army, whose pain he mirrored and magnified in his 
own naked body, to follow him barefoot up India's Via Dolorosa to 
freedom. And countless millions unhesitatingly did follow him, not as a 
modern political leader, nor as a medieval native prince or martial 
maharaja, but as their own Mahatma, India's Great Soul  
                                        --Wolpert 2002: 4-5   
India’s decision to ratify the Paris Climate Treaty, on Mahatma Gandhi’s birth 
anniversary is immensely significant. Whilst, it very clearly highlights the extent to 
which India’s intentions and plans are inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophic vision 
and insights, it can also be read as its initial inclination and receptivity to alternative 




modes of development.  Since the policy implications of adopting alternative modes of  
development (for reducing the carbon, footprints would have its bearing on individuals 
both present and future) affecting the way they live, an invocation of Gandhi’s thought 
can additionally be understood as a political strategy for preparing Indians for  accepting 
sustainability and conspicuously less consumptive consideration in their daily life 
practices.  
Whilst I take these developments as early positive signs, I argue that a more 
meaningful and effective way of ensuring that India is able to keeps up with 
commitments made in Paris could be developed by delving into Gandhi’s key moral 
formulations – ‘Satyagraha’ ‘Swaraj’ and ‘Sarvodaya’ to construct an approach to 
specifying ecological obligations. It should be noted that a substantial part of such 
formulations are drawn from India’s dharmic tradition that emphasizes duties and 
forbearance as a necessary precursor for the validation and upholding of equal rights for 
all. A charter of ecological obligations thus can be constructed out of Gandhi’s key 
precepts. Popularizing such a duty-centric charter by making them part of civic 
discourse, government-sponsored public awareness campaigns, and campaigns by salient 
non-governmental organisations, would help in fostering a greater sense of responsibili ty 
amongst Indians for shouldering the burdens necessary to contribute to address climate 
change. It also holds potential for ensuring that political elites and agencies adhere to 
their own commitments.  
7.7. Gandhi on the Oneness of Life  
Gandhi was not an environmentalist or ecologist in a strict sense of the terms. However,  
what makes him relevant to ecological prescriptions and thinking are his insistence on 




unity, integration and the interdependence of all forms of life. Gandhi did not make 
many explicit remarks on human- nature relationships in his voluminous writings 
(Weber 2004), but an analysis of some of Gandhi’s most important political precepts 
certainly lead to the understanding that he was much ahead of his times in apprehending 
what Ulrich Beck calls ‘the side effects’ of modernity (Beck 2006:329). As noted in the 
previous chapter, central to Gandhi’s holistic philosophy is his belief in the Hindu 
concept of advaita (non-duality) and a consequent rejection of human superiority and the 
right of domination over other forms of life (Webber 1999).   
Gandhi negated all ontological claims that viewed human as superior and 
consequently dominant over other beings. His faith in advaita had convinced him of the 
essential unity of human with other beings. For Gandhi, humans were part of the 
cosmos, interlinked and interdependent on with each part in intrinsic ways. He was also 
convinced that as part of the cosmos, humans possessed a soul enabling them to 
transcend (material) lower desires. ‘Gandhi’s cosmocentric anthropology establishes a 
more balanced and respectful relationship between [humans] and the natural world, 
assigns the animals their due place and provides the basis of a more satisfactory and 
ecologically conscious philosophical anthropology’ (Parekh 1989: 196-7).  
Human beings, in Gandhi’s view were different but not superior to other forms of 
life. Humans, however, possess self-realizing attributes, which in allowing them to 
develop moral character and virtues of goodness also engrosses them with the idea of 
achieving perfection (Roy 1984: 41). As discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.6, human 
beings according to Gandhi were linked to each other and all other forms of life by virtue 
of being part of the Paramatman (cosmic soul/power/energy), later referred to as ‘Truth’ 
(see Parekh 2005:35). Each individual was a manifestation of a part of the larger soul,  as 




the spirit of god resides in each of them. Such an understanding meant that there could 
not be any alternative to nonviolence as a means of conduct. As part of the cosmos thus 
each is linked with the other. To reiterate Gandhi’s famous quote once again:  
I believe in the essential unity of man and for that matter, of all 
that lives. Therefore, I believe, that if one man gains spiritually, the 
world gains with him and if one man fails, the whole world fails to 
that extent (Gandhi 1924)  
 
Forming an organic whole, individuals, according to Gandhi, were dependent on 
each other. Society for Gandhi was a collective enterprise, blossoming on the wisdom, 
knowledge, experiences and services of its people both in past and present. It was a site 
where individuals, in association with one other, found opportunity for the development 
of their moral and rational outlooks and, being interdependent, were indebted to each 
other. In stressing the interdependent aspects of human life, Gandhi very clearly 
underlines its social, cooperative and progressive nature. Similarly, by highlighting the 
intricacies, complexities and enormities involved in repayment of societal debts, (as 
neither the creditors nor the quantum of debts are identifiable) Gandhi is able to establish 
moral responsibilities that individuals owe to each other. In other words, in the absence 
of direct, specified obligations or duties, the best option available is to ‘recognise the 
condition of their existence and continue the ongoing universal system of 
interdependence by discharging their duties and contributing to the collective wellbeing’ 
(Parekh 2005: 52).  
In the context of the larger environmental concerns, Gandhi’s emphatic assertions 
on the interlinkages and interdependence between human beings and the larger natural 
world can be used as moral resources for grounding an innovative and inspiring theory 
of mutual obligations. I will now look into Gandhi’s three specific formulations – 




Satyagraha, Swaraj and Swadeshi to delineate the spirit of oneness and ecological 
obligations that underline them. I argue that a cosmopolitan charter of duties can be 
carved out of such formulations and promoted as part of civic discourse to sensitize 
Indians to abide by them.  
7.7.1. Satyagraha, Swaraj and Swadeshi as Repository of Moral 
Duties 
Gandhi had incredible faith in the conventional Hindu philosophy that everything that 
exists in nature, belongs to God (Chatterjee 1983: 62). The nearest way to approach 
Truth or God as such was by loving mankind.  Since each individual was a part 
reflection of the ultimate reality identification with one another could be the only way 
towards the realization of the whole or realization of God. Truth and love were thus the 
instruments that bound individuals to one another and to God.   
To see the all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be 
able to love the meanest of creation as oneself.... Identification 
with all that lives is impossible without self-purification; without 
self-purification, the observance of the law of Ahimsa must 
remain an empty dream. (Gandhi and Prabhu 2008:312) 
 
Gandhi made it very clear that identification with the meanest of creation 
presupposes self-purification which on the one hand implies practising restraint, 
voluntary simplicity and austerity, on the other it connotes an endeavour for achieving 
perfection through with noblest and purest of measures. If realization of God was the 
ultimate end of life, then Satyagraha, practised through nonviolence was the means. The 
practise of Satyagraha was neither regulated nor subject to any legal authority. It was 
rather a manifestation of the moral desire of seeking perfection. The path of Satyagraha 
for Gandhi was difficult but worth travelling for it made individuals self-disciplined and 




restrained. Self-control and restraints for Gandhi were the key virtues that allow 
individuals to control ego (the source for material needs enabling them to be the true 
seekers of truth. Satyagraha thus allowed the development of a moral-self and 
capacitated the adherence to truth following nonviolent means.  
Satyagraha thus is a deliberate and conscious action undertaken for the wellbeing 
and prosperity of all. In the context of climate change Satyagraha then comes as a highly 
motivated and methodological practise for social good that can inspire individuals to 
lead altruistic and contended lives as part of the endeavour to attain moral perfection. 
Sustainability is a natural outcome of such practise. According to Gandhi, in making 
‘the modern materialistic craze our goal, so far are we going downhi ll in the path of 
progress’ (CWMG 13:314).   
Gandhi’s emphasis is on the development of an alternate path where 
development is seen in terms of growth in moral values of individuals and the overall 
general social good of humanity. However, it in no ways implies that individuals should 
starve or not have access even to the minimum. For Gandhi, the evil is not in leading a 
good life but in a life full of wants. A willingness to limit wants is the essence of a true 
practitioner of Satyagraha. In the context of climate change, such a prescription would 
require individuals within and across states to undergo self-transformation through 
introspection of their respective life styles and a willingness to be the agent of change. A 
charter of duties specifying voluntary reductions of need and simplification of life 
practices certainly has the potential of transforming the society. As Gandhi asserts:   
It is the fundamental Law of Nature … that Nature produces 
enough for our wants from day to day, and only if everybody took 
enough for himself and nothing more, there would be no 
pauperism in this world, there would be no man dying of 
starvation in this world (CWMG 45:225).  




   
If Satyagraha can be taken as providing the moral foundation for building an economic 
and social order that trumps realization of needs over materialistic desires, then Swaraj 
should be understood as an exemplification of Gandhi’s views on freedom and 
autonomy of the individual (Dalton 1993: 16). Recall that for Gandhi, Swaraj implied 
not just political independence for India. Rather it was a manifestation of a lifelong guide 
for emancipatory objectives of human life. His understanding of Swaraj was based on 
human goodwill that is capable of encompassing the concern and good of the other as 
well. It is a moral virtue, which in motivating individuals to act in just and humane ways 
contains the potential of bridging the gaps between individual and social ethics (Ganguli  
1973:99).  
Gandhi added yet another dimension to his understandings of self-rule and self-
restraint (as exemplified through Swaraj) by linking it with Swadeshi (self-reliance). It has 
been argued that if Swaraj is descriptive of Gandhi’s vision of ‘alternative modernity’ 
Swadeshi denoted the actual measures for its realization (see Hardiman 2003: Ch. 4).  
Explaining his perception of Swadeshi Gandhi wrote  
the spirit in us, which requires us to serve our immediate 
neighbours before others and to use things produced in our 
neighbourhood in preference to those more remote…in the domain 
of politics it [implies making use] of indigenous institutions…in 
that of economics [it implies using] only things that are produced 
by my immediate neighbours and serve those industries by making 
them efficient and complete where they might be found wanting. If 
we follow the swadeshi doctrine, it would be so doing we serve 
humanity to the best of our capacity (CWMG 13:219) 
 
The focus of Swadeshi thus is on local production for local consumption. The idea 
behind such thinking is to minimise the dependence on external factors and promote self-




sufficiency. Since production is primarily oriented towards catering local needs, the 
volume is small.  The idea behind Swadeshi is to ensure that each village becomes self -
sufficient, possessing its own systems of production and distribution. These locally 
empowered and self-sufficient communities form the essence of swadeshi.   
Gandhi’s emphasis on self-restraints and local production thus is an endorsement 
of the idea of self-sufficiency and economic stability.   It is also an acceptance of 
decentralised need based economy. In combination, Swaraj and Swadeshi pave way for 
local sustainability.  In this context, we can note that the Indian government’s recent 
stand on climate change to a large extent reflects Gandhi’s key formulations on Ahimsa 
(Non-violence), Swaraj (Self-rule), Satyagraha (Soul-Force) and Sarvodaya (upliftment of 
all). Whilst India’s declared intention as part of its INDC (2015) to produce 40 percent of 
its energy requirements through non-fossil fuel sources reflects its cosmopolitan vision 
and concerns of planetary good (Swaraj), the fact that the decision to do so is voluntary 
and does not stem from past harms highlights its adherence to the principles of ahimsa - 
seen in terms of the ability of not being dictated by others. Similarly, it could well be 
taken as reflecting the spirit of Satyagraha - in its willingness to suffer, for the moral 
correctness of its stand. Most significantly, India’s stand is in sync with the philosophy of 
Sarvodaya - as it is aimed at ensuring the most basic levels of dignified living for all.  This 
trilogy of the soul, soul-force and human emancipation as reflected in Gandhi’s 
understanding can provide a philosophically profound grounding for the debates on and 
around sustainability and human responsibilities.   
 
 




7.8. A Gandhian Charter of Duties Related to Climate Change  
It is very clear that resolving the impacts of climate change necessitates the development 
of moral and social sensibilities and solidarities that are capable of addressing the plight 
of the impacted in most realistic terms. It requires the acceptance of the moral worth of 
our shared humanity and a consequent acceptance of the moral duties that individuals 
qua humans have towards each other. These duties can then be relied upon for bringing a 
moral synthesis between the individual and the group, between the social and economic 
and political life. Given the reverence with which hundreds of millions of Indians view 
Gandhi, his highly influential thought should again be of great use in helping to ensure 
that individuals support the changes needed to comply with climate responsibilities.  The 
duties can be seen emanating from Gandhi’s key formulations and can be described as 
follows:  
1. Duties emanating from the cosmic acceptance of oneness and interrelatedness of 
beings. These include 
(a)  Promoting sustainability through activities that are less dependent on fossil 
fuel emissions.  
(b)  Protecting the flora, fauna, and biodiversity.  
 
 
2. Duties aimed at empowering the weaker and vulnerable sections by  
(a)  Ensuring the most basic human conditions of survival for all  
(b)  Providing basic access to adequate resources for all, with the objective of 
enabling the weakest of the weak to avail equal and adequate opportunities of 
developments.   
(c) Respecting the equal rights of all 
 
3. Duties for ensuring equal participation by 
(a) Respecting the opinions and views of each member of society 
(b)  Fostering virtues of tolerance and truthfulness 




(c) Undertaking voluntary actions 
 
4. Duties for Promoting Nonviolence by 
(a)  Undertaking responsibilities for promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
(b) Undertaking adaptation centric responsibilities in the context of climate 
change specifically. 
 
5. Duties for Promoting sustainable development by 
(a) Prioritizing the responsible use of renewable resources 
(b) Avoiding conspicuously consumptive patterns of life styles 
(c) Promoting indigenous systems of need based production 
(d) Promoting conventional sustainable practices.  
7.8.1. Applying the Gandhian Legacy to Climate Change in India   
Despite the overwhelming evidence on the potentially dreadful impacts of climate 
change, significant moral and political differences on resolving them still remain between 
individuals, states and communities. Resolving such differences is a must, for survival 
not just of humanity but of the entire biotic community. Climate change, in this sense, 
appears as an urgent moral and political issue of our public discourse. Resolving it 
however, requires sensitivity, willingness and adherence both on part of the individuals 
and the state to adhere to and comply with duties and obligations promoting 
sustainability. In this context, Gandhi’s influential ideas become important not only 
because of their potential for creating awareness and positively moulding attitudes, 
perceptions and values for ethical living, but also because of their sensitivity to the needs 
and sufferings of others. They can thus be thus used for launching community outreach 
exercises, and motivating individual Indian citizens to adopt practices that are in 
conformity with their climate change related obligations.  




It is worth recalling here that in its commitment to providing a human rights 
sensitive minimalist standard of dignified living for all, the hybrid approach confers 
responsibilities on a range of actors: individuals, regional governments, NGOs as well as 
supra-national actors. In so doing it pronounces a scheme of differentiated 
responsibilities, which in assigning leading/major responsibilities to the most 
advantaged, does not preclude the least advantaged from pursuing an alternate low 
energy developmental path. Seen in this context, Gandhi’s insistence that individuals are 
the bearers of change appears to be the ideal starting point for working out the theoretical 
and philosophic nuances of an economic system that is less dependent on fossil fuels. In 
the paragraphs below, I will highlight some specific ways in which Gandhi’s status as 
one of India’s foremost spiritual and moral leaders and his ideas could be employed to 
help motivate Indians to support stated objectives on climate change.  
First, we can note that the role of spiritual and moral leadership in bringing in 
attitudinal changes in followers has been well recognized (Seaward 1995; Hooks 2000; 
Dorn 2002; Lawson and Price 2003). Spirituality is seen in terms of actions grounded in 
ethical and moral values that create feelings of ‘care, concern, and appreciation for both 
self and others’ (Fry 2003: 695). A spiritual life in this sense, is ‘about commitment to a 
way of thinking and behaving that honours principles of inter-being and 
interconnectedness’ (Hooks 2000: 77). A spiritual leader by this account is one who in 
stressing moral righteousness of actions and the values of magnanimity, also ‘strengthens 
individual sense of responsibility towards the world’ (Dorn 2002: 6). The morally 
exemplary life practices of Mahatma Gandhi and his ethical prescriptions of peace, 
purity of means, suffering and most importantly inner change as precursor of outer 




change etc. puts him on very high pedestal amongst some of India’s outstanding spiritual 
leaders in this sense.  
Against such a backdrop then, my submission is that the moral teachings of 
Gandhi, as well as lessons drawn from his own exemplary life practices, can be 
effectively used for promoting civic virtues and fostering ecological responsibilities 
amongst individuals. Though there can be many ways of undertaking such a project, one 
of the most effective could be a very straightforward public information campaign 
linking Gandhi’s legacy to climate change mitigation efforts. This could feature Gandhi’s 
images along with relevant quotes from his writings, specifically those that endorse the 
idea of simple and sustainable living, and possibly also those explicitly presenting a 
cosmopolitan world view. The success of public information campaigns to a large extent 
is dependent upon some complex communication strategies, but given the ubiquity of 
Gandhi in public sphere in India, pictorial and textual depiction of consistent Gandhian 
ideas could be an effective starting point. 
Such a campaign could be launched by the state. However, for ensuring 
consistency of the campaign and cascading ideas inherent therein, civil society 
institutions can be roped in as well. The campaign can be broadened through 
conventional and modern means of communication. It could involve a series of efforts 
ranging from billboards, advertisements in print and electronic media, and viral 
propagations through the social media. Additionally, awareness campaigns can be 
thought as being initiated in educational institutions, at all levels across the states. The 
key here is to use Gandhi’s iconic imagery to reaffirm his connect with the people and 
use his teachings in ways that effectively resonate with people’s perceptions of the 
possible ill effects of climate change.  




Identifying some of Gandhi’s life practices, especially those consistent with 
sustainability and putting them in the public discourses as civic virtues can be another 
novel and innovative way of applying ambassadorial cosmopolitanism in the climate 
change context. According to Farah Godrej, Gandhi’s understanding of nonviolence 
interpreted as a civic virtue can be used  
as a public standard for moral and political arbitration…as a 
method of justification that allows people to use their 
judgements to make moral and political choices in consonance 
with the truth as they see it, as well as to present those choices 
in public discourse and provide public justification for action 
(Godrej 2011:83) 
As noted earlier, since a substantial part of Gandhi’s own life practices are drawn 
from India’s cultural heritage. Pinpointing and highlighting such discursive practices and 
making it part of the civic discourses can plausibly result in their adoption especially by a 
new breed of activists and leaders. The point becomes significantly valid in light of the 
fact that Gandhian ideas and practices have already inspired a host of famous 
environmental activists, including Chandi Prasad Bhatt, and Sunder Lal Bahuguna 
(Chipko Movement), Medha Patkar (save Narmada River Movement) Vandana Shiva 
(Feminist Ecology) in India (Shephard 1987; Barua 2015:140-41)90.  
Another important way of generating domestic support for policy measures 
promoting sensitivity on climate change could be by encouraging serious public 
deliberations on the ‘Gandhian legacy of austerity premised upon a radical critique of 
industrialism and consumerism’ (Bidwai 2012: 153). According to Bidwai:   
                                                                 
90 For the save Narmada River Movement see: http://www.lokashakti.org/encyclopedia/groups/143-
narmada-bachao-andolan. For Chipko Movement and Sunderlal Bahuguna see: 








Gandhi’s legacy survives among a majority of Indians in the simplicity and 
frugality that is part of their life. Elements of the legacy are built into what 
has been called “the moral economy of the poor” (Thompson, 1993). It is 
necessary to integrate it into a need based development model, at the core of 
which lie social and economic justice, climate equity and environmental 
sustainability (Bidwai 2012: 153). 
 
Rooting climate sensitive policy measures in Gandhian thought and practices through 
protest and awareness marches have an educative impact and certainly can reinvigorate 
ecological consciousness amongst individuals.  Similarly re-experimenting with some of 
Gandhi’s most innovative practices like fasting, silent march, prabhat pheri (morning 
walk or strolls), etc., could be effective. Such practices, on the one hand are laden with 
potential for bringing positive changes in attitudinal and behavioural patterns of the 
practitioners, on the other, they are significantly helpful in highlighting the gravity of the 
matter in the public sphere.   
Aligning India’s climate policy with Gandhian practices can have an additional 
strategic benefit as well. Given that much of India’s commitment in terms of fulfilling i ts 
mitigation and adaptation related responsibilities depends on the extent of financial and 
technological help it is able to obtain from the developed states, a reference to Gandhian 
understanding of ‘suffering’ may be of help in broadening the moral contours of the 
developed states and activating their cosmopolitan obligations as well. I have mentioned 
earlier, much of India’s climate sensitive action will depend on the extent to which the 
global community is able to help India both technologically and financially in carrying 
out its fair share. In that context, a reference to Gandhi’s ideas can be of help not just in 
persuading them to have a sympathetic understanding of India’s developmental 
imperatives, but also in getting them adopt a considerate view of its claims and demands. 




It would surely help in reminding the global community of the moral duty it has towards 
the members of the developing societies who have been innocent sufferers of the others.  
Gandhi’s moral teachings thus can be effectively used to not just build up a 
sustainable and harmonious social order but most significantly to transform the selfish 
‘self’ into morally conscious self-restrained, empathetic, loving and virtuous beings. In 
this context, his famous aphorism that ‘the earth has enough to meet the needs of all, but 
not greed’ certainly appears as providing the most valuable insight for human action 
(quoted from Pyarelal 1959: 12). This on the one hand would help in having an ethical 
understanding of man-nature relationship, it would also allow the consolidation of 
feelings that a genuine cosmopolitan attempt at addressing some of the most pressing 
collective action issues may require. Gandhi provides us the resources that can be 
employed in moving away from the consumption based materialistic utilitarian 
rationality into an ethical approach that could result in the goodness and happiness of 
all. If selfishness is at the base of the unprecedented environmental crisis, then self -
restraint can provide a straight way out of it. Overall, Gandhi’s teachings can be used to 
create awareness of such duties and promoting support for them.  
7.9. Conclusion 
In this chapter I started by providing a detailed account of the agreements reached 
between states on mitigation and adaptation measures at the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Paris in December 2015 (COP-21). In providing the salient 
features of the Paris Climate Treaty, my , focus however, was on highlighting the ways 
in which some of the major principles that underline the hybrid cosmopolitan approach 
on climate change –equity, integrity, vulnerability, specificity, capability and 




responsibility have been embodied in the Paris Climate Treaty. Moving on from there 
then, I argued that even though India has described the Paris Treaty as just and fair, in 
walking the talk, or fulfilling its commitments, especially against the backdrop of its own 
developmental imperatives will not be easy. Fulfilling commitments will require India to 
face some serious policy challenges and dilemmas in making some tough and hard 
choices. In highlighting the challenges in implementing a fully consistent hybrid 
approach-inspired climate policy, then in the last part of the chapter, I attempted to offer 
ambassadorial cosmopolitan approach, rooted on Gandhi’s highly influential and 
motivating philosophy, as a plausible way for motivating individuals’ compliance with 
policy measures promulgated with the objectives of reducing emissions and combatting 
the catastrophic impacts of climate change. I argued that whilst it is possible to construct 
an ecological duty charter promoting sustainability from an ethical and moral 
interpretations of Gandhi’s key formulations of Satyaraha, Swaraj and Swadeshi, the 
actual application of these duties in day to day life practices would be dependent on the 
extent to which they are established as civic virtues and incorporated in public 
discourses. A very specific suggestion in this context offered was about the use of 
conventional and modern means of public awareness campaigns.  
If there is anything that addressing the fatal consequences of anthropogenic 
warming requires today, it is the shared moral understanding amongst human beings 
about the limitations of idea of limitless growth and development. It also requires a 
fundamental resolve and commitments both on parts of individuals and communities to 
share responsibilities for remedying the disastrous consequences of their own actions. 
Most significant however is the need of having a moral framework that is simultaneously 
capable of encapsulating such concerns and providing strategies for consistent action. It 




is my conviction that the ideas and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi appear very apt and 
germane in providing the moral groundings to such attempts as they not only have 
universalist strains, consistent with the cosmopolitan ethos, but can also be used to 
synthesize not just individual and the group but also social and economic and political 
life. For Gandhi, such a synthesis could be only brought or achieved on the basis of 
morality as the moral standards that guide civilized human beings in their individual and 













May the soul of my master, my leader, my father rest not in peace, not in peace, 
but let his ashes be so dynamically alive that the charred ashes of sandalwood let 
the powder of his bones be so charged with life and inspiration that the whole of 
India after his death be revitalized into the reality of Freedom. My father, do not 
rest. Do not allow us to rest.   
 
(Sarojini Naidu, The first Indian women president of Indian 
National Congress, paying her homage to Mahatma Gandhi on his 
death, Lucknow, February 1948)  
8.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has argued that an ambassadorial approach to addressing cosmopolitan moral 
motivation holds strong potential for generating meaningful support for policy outcomes 
consistent with moral cosmopolitanism on issues such as global climate change. Within 
such an approach, Cosmopolitan Ambassadors are identified. These are typically high ly 
respected national figures whose own moral and social thought can be shown to connect 
in significant ways with cosmopolitan precepts. By highlighting such connections and 
promoting cosmopolitan policy outcomes as consistent with the Cosmopolitan 
Ambassador's own thought, I have argued, it becomes more possible to generated 
support for sometimes demanding cosmopolitan policy prescriptions.  
The exemplar ambassador I discussed was that of Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian 
context, and the cosmopolitan policy prescription concerned action on mitigating 
harmful climate change. A summary of the argument follows. 
 




8.2. Summary of the Argument  
In Chapter 1, I introduced ‘ambassadorial cosmopolitanism’ as a novel and pragmatic 
approach that aims to use the legacy and exemplary life practices of some of the most 
revered national figures in actualizing normative cosmopolitan prescriptions. The 
approach can be seen as a response to the highly contentious debates regarding the 
feasibility of realizing cosmopolitan prescriptions. Towards that objective, I argued that 
highlighting the consistencies between moral cosmopolitan ideas and the universalistic 
strains in the insights of the revered national figures, and invoking the ideas of the latter,  
could result in bridging the issue of moral distance which confronts cosmopolitan 
theories.  
 I must clarify here that whilst the phrase ambassadorial in general parlance is 
used to refer to diplomatic representation, I see them specifically as champions and 
exemplars of moral ideas and practices. The compatibility between what they practise 
and preach makes them revered in their contexts. Ambassadorial cosmopolitanism then 
is a plausible way of helping to realize the humanistic and universalistic aspirations of 
cosmopolitanism by motivating individual citizens to adhere to demanding duties 
implied therein.  To a certain extent my project can be seen to have some resemblance 
with what Richard Shapcott has described as a ‘communitarian path to 
cosmopolitanism’ (Shapcott 2001:31).  However, it should be noted that the whilst the 
basic focus of such attempts is on emphasizing the social embeddedness of the principles 
of justice and consequently an extension of rights from local to global scales, my project 
takes a different approach in focusing on adherence to duties as a possible first step 
towards bridging moral distance. Specifically, in the context of resolving the potentially 




catastrophic impacts of climate change, the introductory chapter argues for the need of 
ensuring compliance to duties in the moral appeal of the revered icons (across 
traditions).  
In the Indian context and specifically on the issue of climate change, I have 
argued for the need of referring to Gandhian moral and political thought as being most 
effective in motivating individuals and leaders alike. My claim is not to describe Gandhi 
as a leader who could motivate all other communities almost equally, but to simply 
highlight the applicability of the idea that invoking the universalist strains in the thought 
of national figures could be a plausible way of realizing cosmopolitan prescriptions. It 
then becomes natural that there could be many such figures all across societies who 
could be looked up to for similar objectives.  
In Chapter 2, I worked to demonstrate the urgency of addressing harmful climate 
change, and some reasons why it has been so challenging to realize effective action on 
it. On the way to describing the science behind the problem of climate change, I very 
briefly presented an assessment of the likely impacts of climate change on India. I then 
provided a general survey of attempts made by the international community thus far, 
towards solving the climate conundrum.  
Chapter 2 works to demonstrate the failures of such attempts by underlining two 
important dimensions. The first is the spatio-temporal nature of the problem. This refers 
to divergence in the nature and extent of impacts, as well as the uncertainties in the time 
frame in which they are likely to happen. Climate change will affect different regions 
differently, and it has strong implications for the well-being of future generations. The 
second dimension relates to the different capabilities of states to address the impacts, 
owing to massive differences in their developmental standards. This means that climate 




change is not even a collective action problem in the classical sense of the term, where a 
threat stands to affect like actors to a roughly equal extent. It is, nevertheless, an issue 
that needs to be resolved collectively. Extensive detail was offered on past collective 
efforts, leading to the 2015 Paris agreement. I highlighted that, while that agreement has 
been widely praised, significant challenges still remain in getting the relevant actors to 
comply with their own commitments.  
In Chapter 3 I argued that, since resolving the ill effects of climate change 
requires considerable distributions of burdens and benefits (in terms of sharing the costs 
involved in restricting emissions and responding to adaptation specific needs), the issue 
of fairness becomes important – a precondition for the acceptance of any proposal.  In 
the absence of a common understanding on what constitutes a genuinely fair distribution 
of the burdens and benefits, it is extremely difficult to make any proposal meaningful 
and effective. I reviewed some of the recent literature seeking to identify a fair 
distribution in the climate change context. I focused on principles of equality, equity and 
responsibility, and specific proposals built around grandfathering, which would 
effectively grant continuing emission rights to those countries which have been large 
emitters in the past; contraction and convergence, for furthering the climate impasse and 
belittling the urgency of the issue by allowing significant time frame (mid years of this 
century) to developed states for emission reductions; and polluter pays, which seeks to 
put most of the cost burden for climate change mitigation and adaptation on large-scale 
emitters. I also discussed some additional proposals such as equal shares, Greenhouse 
Development Rights and beneficiary pays, highlighting their respective merits and 
limitations.  




In Chapter 4 of the thesis, I then made a detailed presentation of the Hybrid 
cosmopolitan approach to climate justice as outlined by one of its key proponents, 
Simon Caney, and I defended it against some critiques. The Hybrid approach, I argued, 
presents the fairest, most coherent and defensible set of principles in distributing the 
burdens and benefits in the context of resolving the climate conundrum.  In specific 
terms, I highlighted the three essential components of the approach which sets it apart 
from rival approaches. The first is its core commitment to providing a minimal standard 
of dignified living for all, i.e., its sensitivity to basic human rights, reflecting its 
commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. The second is its conferment of responsibili ties 
on an appropriately broad range of actors, including individuals, regional governments 
and NGOs. Third and most significant is its inherent focus on joining critically 
important principles of capability and accountability by accepting the stronger points of 
the Polluter Pays Principle and Ability to Pay Principle, whilst simultaneously 
discarding their defects.   
After detailing the Hybrid approach, in Chapter 5, I examined some of the ways 
in which the issue of compliance and motivation has been addressed in the literature on 
cosmopolitanism. I considered three main strategies. The first was the empathy 
approach, focused in particular on arguments presented by Martha Nussbaum and Luis 
Cabrera for widening circles of understanding and empathic identification through 
promoting cosmopolitan education and related strategies. I then considered an approach 
focused on harm avoidance, adopted by Thomas Pogge, Andrew Linklater and Richard 
Shapcott. It sees individuals’ desire to avoid harming others, along with evidence of 
ways in which those within affluent states routinely contribute to such harms due to 
unjust features of the current global system, as potentially powerful motivation to 




support some cosmopolitan prescriptions.  Finally, I considered rooted and statist 
strategies for generating such support, as developed by Kwame Appiah, Tony Erskine 
and Lea Ypi. Such strategies focus on ways in which cosmopolitan sentiment might be 
promoted within the domestic sphere.  
I offered reasons to adopt a rooted cosmopolitan strategy, focusing on its practical 
potential for generating support. In fact, some might even say that in its concerns of 
actualizing the cosmopolitan prescriptions, rooted cosmopolitanism actually results in 
establishing some kind of a moderate version of cosmopolitanism by putting the state 
back in the driver’s seat. I endorsed Lea Ypi’s statist cosmopolitanism, which looks to 
the state as an agency providing the necessary context and resources for realizing 
cosmopolitan principles and obligations.   
Whilst I accepted the rooted cosmopolitan strategy of identifying and conforming 
to particularistic values that are consistent with universal duties, for an effective 
realization of cosmopolitanism, I also argued that in so doing one needs to be extremely 
careful, as particularistic values may give rise to conflicting interpretations, especially in 
ethnically diverse societies. The real need then in this context is of identifying ways for a 
syncretic understanding of local cultures and traditions. My endorsement of using the 
highly influential teachings and moral prescriptions of the revered and iconic figures in 
the nationalistic traditions was primarily motivated by such a concern.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, my aim was to demonstrate how an ambassadorial 
cosmopolitan approach could be developed as a specific variant of rooted 
cosmopolitanism and applied specifically in motivating consistent action on climate 
change in India. Chapter 6 focused on establishing the transformative influence and 
motivating potential of Mahatma Gandhi’s thought.  I argued that whilst the universalist 




strains are evident in Gandhi’s thought, its distinguishing aspects emanate from the fact 
that they are mostly grounded in India’s ethico-religious traditions and principles. I 
provided a brief biography of Gandhi, presenting the core precepts of his still highly 
influential social thought. I also worked to highlight the cosmopolitan strains in his 
thought.  
By establishing connections between the traditional roots and the cosmopolitan 
dimensions of Gandhian thought, I worked to show how Gandhi himself addresses the 
issue of moral distance – encouraging individuals to support actions in behalf of others 
who they perceive as distant from them, communally, geographically, etc. I argued that 
by widening the ambit of ‘self’ to include the ‘others’ Gandhi provided an alternative 
account of moral autonomy that is strongly cosmopolitan in practice. He also offered 
more explicitly cosmopolitan sentiments relating to a sense of oneness with all persons in 
the world. The development of such cosmopolitan conclusions from within Indian moral 
traditions marks Gandhi as potentially an exemplar Cosmopolitan Ambassador – a 
thought leader whose ideas resonate with cosmopolitanism and could be employed in 
social and political discourse to help generate support for policy outcomes consistent 
with cosmopolitanism.  
After establishing Gandhi as an exemplar cosmopolitan ambassador in Chapter 6, 
the final chapter was concerned with demonstrating two things. The first was the kind of 
actions India would have to take under the Paris Climate treaty, and ways in which 
those actions can be seen as consistent with the demands of the Hybrid cosmopolitan 
approach to distributing climate change burdens which was detailed in Chapter 4. The 
second is how Gandhi’s thought be applied in very practical ways to help motivate 
Indian popular support for complying with the demands of the Hybrid approach / Paris 




Agreement. I argued that Gandhi’s status as a moral exemplar could be used to achieve 
two purposes in the Indian context: (1) appealing to the conscience and sensitizing 
individuals to undertake climate sensitive actions; (2) using that sensitivity and 
awareness to create support for state-led mitigation and adaptation action. In practical 
terms, I showed, this could be done through various kinds of public information 
campaigns featuring Gandhian thought and life practices.  
Overall, in Chapters 6 and 7, I showed that Gandhian ideas are particularly well 
suited for motivating support for climate action consistent with cosmopolitanism. Firstly, 
they provide a local foundation for the universalistic discourse of climate change. 
Secondly, Gandhi also comes as a practicing philosopher whose innovative strategies 
and ideas can be used for educating the modern-day consumers not just to expand their 
thinking horizons to include the concerns of the others, but also to live a life that is closer 
in harmony with nature. His ideas can also be used to possibly provide a counter -
hegemonic discourse on emancipatory ethics in opposition to the dominant and 
pervasive understandings of human dominations. Gandhian ideas can be effectively used 
to ignite strong sentiments, mobilization of the hitherto fragmented and inert masses 
(Sharp 1979) and generating peaceful mass action (Hardiman 2003).  
8.3. Indications and Directions for Future Research 
 
India, however, is not the only context in which an Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism 
could be applicable as a means of helping to generate support for national policy 
outcomes consistent with moral cosmopolitanism. Most countries in fact feature thinkers 




connecting in significant ways to moral cosmopolitanism, including on border-spanning 
issues other than climate change. There are many possibilities for future research.  
 For example, on issues of war and peace, and related ones of humanitarian 
intervention, for example, it would be natural to turn to the late efforts of the Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., in the United States. In the period before his 1968 assassination, 
King had become critical of U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. King was very 
categorical in declaring:  
I oppose the war in Vietnam because I love America. I speak out 
against it not in anger but with anxiety and sorrow in my heart and 
above all with a passionate desire to see our beloved country as a 
moral example of the world. (King Jr. 1967) 
 
In adopting such a stand King was only demonstrating his cosmopolitan values. In fact, 
in later years King adorned very explicit cosmopolitan orientations and wondered  
 [W]hy those born into some countries lived so relatively well, 
while those born into less favoured states lived in absolute 
poverty, confronted daily by the spectres of disease, starvation 
and death. That situation, he decided, demanded action, and 
not just a small increase in foreign aid, but sweeping structural 
change in the global system (Cabrera 2004: 1) 
     
  King’s cosmopolitan turn, and the emphasis throughout his speeches and written work 
on recognizing the full humanity of the other, could make him an effective 
Cosmopolitan Ambassador in terms of pressing for U.S. foreign policy outcomes more 
consistent with cosmopolitan prescriptions (see Fabre 2012).     
 A similar thing can be said about the current (14th) Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, 
for his remarkable ethical commitments to promoting human rights, dignity and 
emancipatory politics beyond his ethnic and political community (Neuman  2014: 175).  
An ardent champion of universal human rights and an humanist to the core, the Dalai 




Lama has himself been advocating for the need of ‘an [cosmopolitan] ethics which 
makes no recourse to religion and can be equally accepted by those with faith and 
without’ (Dalai Lama 2011: xiii-xiv).  His recent support to the campaign for the 
creation of the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, as an additional body of the 
UN with popularly elected representatives, voicing the concerns of people across the 
world only adds to his ambassadorial credentials.     
Various other influential thought leaders, political and religious leaders could also 
fit the Cosmopolitan Ambassador role to varying degrees. We can note also that most 
religious and cultural traditions have some universalist strains and practices. In fact ,  one 
major extension of the argument presented in this thesis could be to examine how the 
Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach could encompass not just individual 
ambassadors but longstanding traditions as well. 
 In China, for example, there is an emerging cosmopolitan literature around 
Daoist thought and practices, and sociologists have looked at emerging cosmopolitan 
consciousness there. For example, in his research on distributive and social justice, 
Joseph Chan has argued that the most fundamental political concern of the Confucian 
thinkers has been on humaneness, a concern that certainly cannot be seen as being 
limited by political boundaries (Chan 2009: 265-269). Looking at the more recent 
developments, David Tyfield and John Urry have worked to uncover the growing 
cosmopolitan orientations amongst Chinese citizens, under the broad label of 
‘cosmopolitanism as a social force’ (Tyfield 2009 and Urry 2009: 749). They argue that 
‘cosmopolitanism is never abstract and universal, but comprehensible in specific socio-
historical configurations and this social self-understanding is crucial for the broader 
cosmopolitan project’ (Tyfield and Urry 2009: 794).  




A very positive implication of such constructive engagement has now resulted in 
growing interest in comparative political theory and its attempt to widen the ambit of 
political theorizing by inclusion of non-Western perspectives (see Godrej 2011; Dallmayr 
2009).  Along with the growing interest in comparative political theory, is the focus on 
‘polyvocality and creative reinterpretation’ under which texts and ideas are understood 
as traversing geographical and political boundaries in providing solutions (Godrej 
2011:76).  To a certain extent even this thesis then can be taken as contributing to those 
objectives in its efforts towards realizing the Hybrid cosmopolitan approach on climate 
change through an invocation of Gandhian thought though in the Indian context.   Such 
an approach could be extended, for instance, to say that different local traditions can be 
invoked in their respective spheres to provide similar results. In fact, such possibilities 
contain the potential of transforming cosmopolitanism itself over time as it engages 
further with local traditions. In this sense then Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism could 
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